

Washington National Tax Services (WNTS)



2023 Tax Policy Outlook:

Challenges and opportunities



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Executive summary

The stakes rarely have been higher as business leaders seek to manage operations and plan investments in an environment of uncertainty arising out of policy divisions among elected officials over the direction of US and global tax policy. At the same time, businesses have to respond to worldwide technological disruption, the lasting impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on how people work, and an increased focus on environmental, social, and governance (ESG) concerns.

Observation: Business leaders are facing the challenge of managing employees, operations, and supply chains at a time when the United States and other countries are facing significant macroeconomic risks—possible recession, elevated inflation, rising interest rates, and geopolitical challenges. Business leaders need to be proactive in communicating to policymakers the potential impact of legislative and regulatory proposals on economic growth, employment, and investment. They also will want to seize opportunities to leverage recently enacted tax incentives that may help to advance a company’s business strategy.

Prospects for tax legislation

In the United States, as a practical matter, divided government control—with one political party controlling the White House and Senate, and the other party controlling the House—and sharp partisanship will limit the scope of new tax and spending legislation. President Biden and Congressional Democrats no longer will be able to use privileged ‘budget reconciliation’ procedures to pass legislation with only Democratic votes. Budget reconciliation was used to enact the 2022 Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and the 2021 American Rescue Plan Act (ARPA), which included tax and spending provisions universally opposed by Congressional Republicans.

Republican control of the House means that any tax legislation will require bipartisan support to clear both chambers of Congress. A recent example of significant bipartisan legislation is the 2021 Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, which was negotiated primarily by a group of Senate Democrats and Republicans. Instead of the corporate tax increases that had been proposed by President Biden, the 2021 infrastructure legislation relied on funding primarily from an extension of existing fuel excise tax rates and a few new revenue-raising provisions, such as new reporting requirements for digital asset transactions.

Observation: As demonstrated by the challenges that House Republicans experienced in electing a speaker and organizing at the start of the 118th Congress, it will be difficult for the new House Republican majority to reach agreements on bipartisan legislation with President Biden and the Democratic-led Senate. With a narrow 222-seat majority, House Republicans hold the same number of seats that House Democrats held at the start of the last Congress, but so far have been less unified in setting a direction for how they will govern.

Elected leaders of both parties are expected to advance legislative proposals and hold oversight hearings intended to highlight policy differences in advance of the 2024 elections for president and Congress. Issues expected to be debated over the next two years include the question of how to address individual and pass-through business tax provisions enacted in the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) that are set to expire at the end of 2025. House Republicans are expected to pass legislation that would seek to make most, if not all, of the TCJA provisions permanent, but no action is expected on such legislation by the Democratic-led Senate.

Observation: Currently, it appears likely that the fate of TCJA individual and pass-through business tax provisions could be the subject of ‘fiscal cliff 2.0’ negotiations in 2025, with the outcome of such negotiations to be influenced by which party then controls the White House and Congress. An earlier fiscal cliff moment occurred in late 2012, when then-President Barack Obama and a Republican-controlled Congress reached an agreement to address tax cuts set to sunset in legislation enacted under former President George W. Bush. The 2012 legislation averted across-the-board tax increases that were set to go into effect for most individuals, with tax rate increases largely limited to high-income taxpayers.

While a number of significant tax provisions were enacted over the last two years, the previous Congress adjourned without taking action on proposals to reinstate current deductibility of Section 174 research expenditures, which became subject to amortization beginning in 2022 under a TCJA provision. Additional TCJA business issues that were not addressed last year include proposals to reverse tighter Section 163(j) interest deduction limitations that went into effect at the beginning of 2022 and to delay a four-year phase-out of Section 168(k) ‘bonus’ depreciation deductions that runs from 2023 to 2026.

Efforts to address these business-favorable tax provisions last year as part of the FY 2023 funding bill were unsuccessful, in large part because Democrats and Republicans in Congress could not reach an agreement on the overall scope of a potential year-end tax package.

Observation: Key House and Senate Democratic leaders had insisted that any such tax package include an expansion of the child tax credit. In response, some Republicans called for delaying action on any tax issues until this year, while others suggested that Congress address only provisions like Section 174 expensing that had demonstrated bipartisan support.

The FY 2023 funding bill ultimately addressed only a few tax issues. These included a bipartisan package of retirement savings tax incentives and provisions dealing with certain charitable deductions for donations related to conservation easements and with certain medical services provided by high-deductible health care plans.

With an FY 2023 government funding bill that runs through the end of September having been enacted by the previous Congress, there are expected to be few ‘must pass’ bills in 2023 that could provide a vehicle for tax legislation. A new funding bill will need to be enacted for FY 2024, which begins on October 1.

Observation: Reaching a bipartisan agreement on FY 2024 funding for federal departments and agencies is expected to be difficult for the Republican-controlled House and the Democratic-led Senate. A failure to negotiate compromise funding legislation acceptable to both parties could result in a temporary partial shutdown of the federal government after September 30, when the current funding bill expires. At the same time, disagreements among House Republicans over the appropriate level of government funding also may affect action on FY 2024 funding bills. A number of House Republicans who played a role in securing a \$75 billion increase in FY 2023 funding for US defense programs have expressed opposition to reducing FY 2024 spending by \$130 billion back to FY 2022 levels, which was a demand of certain House Republicans who had opposed Speaker McCarthy’s election.

Congress also will need to reauthorize federal farm programs and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) programs that are scheduled to expire on September 30. Those reauthorization bills often include tax titles to offset costs; for example, the Airport and Airway Trust Fund is financed by aviation-related excise taxes under the jurisdiction of the House and Senate tax committees.

Observation: Anticipated legislation in 2023 to increase the federal statutory debt limit is considered ‘must pass,’ but action on such legislation is expected to pose a significant challenge for the new Congress. Key House Republicans have stated publicly that they will seek to use government funding legislation and action on a federal statutory debt limit increase as leverage to win concessions from President Biden on fiscal policy. President Biden has said that he expects the next Congress to fund the government and to address the federal statutory debt limit in a “responsible manner.”

Efforts to add business-favorable tax provisions that lose revenue to a debt limit bill could face objections from some in both parties unless offsets are provided.

In a January 13 letter, Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen informed House and Senate leaders that the United States would reach the current \$31.4 trillion debt limit on January 19. “Once the limit is reached, Treasury will need to start taking certain extraordinary measures to prevent the United States from defaulting on its obligations,” the Secretary wrote. Secretary Yellen’s letter states that the period of time that extraordinary measures may last is subject to considerable uncertainty due to a variety of factors (e.g., the difficulty of forecasting federal payments and receipts), but “it is unlikely that extraordinary measures will be exhausted before early June.”

Tax regulations and other guidance

With limited prospects for new tax legislation, Treasury may turn to administrative guidance in the year ahead as an alternative path to advancing President Biden’s tax agenda. Among other tasks, Treasury is responsible for issuing guidance implementing IRA provisions, including regulations relating to the corporate alternative minimum tax (CAMT), the excise tax on corporate stock repurchases, and numerous new energy tax credits and incentives.

The CAMT guidance could address taxpayer questions about the legislative text, including issues relating to the determination of distributive share with respect to a partnership interest, the treatment of credits for foreign income taxes, and international tax issues, such as the potential double taxation of earnings distributed from foreign corporations. Pending publication of proposed regulations, the IRS and Treasury issued Notice 2023-7, providing interim guidance on how the CAMT applies to corporations, certain partnerships, troubled corporations, and affiliated groups of corporations that file consolidated tax returns.

Treasury and the IRS also have begun to issue a series of ESG-related regulations and other guidance that address electric vehicles, clean energy manufacturing, clean power production, and clean transportation. In addition, Treasury and the IRS are expected to focus on guidance related to the monetization and transfer of certain clean energy credits.

Additional guidance will be needed for other legislation enacted during the previous Congress, such as the new cryptocurrency information reporting requirements enacted as part of the 2021 Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act.

Action item:

Treasury’s efforts to advance the president’s tax policy agenda through regulatory guidance are expected to be examined closely by key members of Congress, the House and Senate tax committees, nongovernmental organizations, and business stakeholders. Business leaders should be prepared to engage with policymakers throughout the regulatory process.

Global tax and trade policy in flux

OECD proposals bring tax risks

An unsettled global tax policy landscape will continue to increase risks of higher tax costs and administrative challenges for multinational corporations (MNCs). In October 2021, G20 leaders endorsed the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)/G20 Inclusive Framework on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (Inclusive Framework), a political agreement on a two-pillar plan intended to address tax challenges arising from the digitalization of the economy. The plan, agreed to by 138 of the 141 members of the Inclusive Framework (IF), provides for the reallocation of some of the “residual” profits of multinational enterprises to “market” countries (Pillar One) and a 15% global minimum tax (Pillar Two).

In contrast to the limited outlook for US tax legislation, there is a greater likelihood of new Pillar Two tax policy changes being adopted by a number of key jurisdictions following the adoption of a minimum tax directive by the EU Council in December 2022. EU member states have until the end of 2023 to transpose the Directive into national law. The December EU action increases the prospect that other countries similarly will move forward to enact minimum tax proposals.

The outlook for action on Pillar One proposals is in greater doubt, leaving both the issue of digital services taxes (DSTs) unresolved and the future sustainability of traditional transfer pricing principles at risk.

Observation: While US Treasury Department officials played a key role in negotiating the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework, the Biden Administration was unable to win sufficient congressional support to enact proposed legislation that was intended to make US international tax rules compliant with Pillar Two minimum tax rules. As a result, US MNCs could face a risk of other countries seeking to collect a ‘top-up’ tax for the difference between a company’s effective tax rate (ETR) and the Pillar Two 15% minimum rate.

Geopolitical risks dominate trade policy debate

Recent US trade policy reflects a move away from support for free trade and globalism by both Democrats and Republicans. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and US-China tensions are fueling an increased focus on national security and support for protectionist trade policies in the United States. While US and Chinese leaders recently have begun to re-engage in talks on potential areas of cooperation, such as climate policy, concerns in the United States and other countries about geopolitical risks and economic competition have dominated the debate over the benefits of globalization.

In response to these factors, the United States and other countries have acted to provide a range of new incentives for ‘onshoring’ as a way to address both national security and supply chain concerns. The “Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors (CHIPS) and Science Act” enacted in August 2022 provides roughly \$55 billion in grants, loan guarantees, and other support to promote increased US domestic manufacturing of semiconductors in order to address supply chain issues and national security concerns.

Action item

Business leaders will need to be proactive in continuing to monitor geopolitical risks that may disrupt supply chains and operations, while also seizing opportunities to leverage new investment incentives being offered by the United States and other countries.

Other recently enacted legislation has included domestic content requirements. The IRA enacted in August 2022 provides new electric vehicle credit rules requiring that certain components contained in the battery used in the clean vehicle must be manufactured or assembled in North America. These new requirements have been the subject of criticism by leaders in Europe, Japan, and Korea.


Economic challenges

Persistent inflation and monetary policy responses to fight it weigh on the forecasts for economic growth in the near term. While the labor market remains relatively strong, wage increases have not kept pace with inflation, raising concerns about how much support consumers can provide to economic growth going forward. Prospects for slowing global growth may limit the contribution that exports, a relative bright spot in 2022, make to US growth in 2023.

GDP growth

After experiencing back-to-back quarters of declining real gross domestic product (GDP) in the first and second quarters of 2022, the private consensus forecast is for the US economy to repeat that experience in the first and second quarters of 2023, followed by near zero growth in the third quarter. The *Blue Chip* consensus forecast is for real GDP at the end of 2023 to be slightly below where the US economy ended 2022.

Figure 1: Percentage change in GDP from prior quarter at an annualized rate



Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis; Blue Chip Economic Indicators (January 2023)

The war in Ukraine and associated effects on energy and food prices continue to stress European economies, with a consensus forecast for a 0.1% decline in real GDP for 2023 for the euro area and a 1.1% decline for the United Kingdom. Asian economies, led by India (5.2%) and China (4.7%) but also including Japan (1.2%) and South Korea (1.2%), are projected to be relatively less affected by the global pressures facing the United States and Europe and to post higher growth rates in 2023.

Inflation

To fight the highest inflation rates in more than 40 years, the Federal Reserve increased interest rates aggressively in 2022. The Federal Funds target rate range, which had been between 0% and 0.25% since March 2020, increased seven times in 2022, including an unprecedented four consecutive 75-basis-point increases, to end the year at 4.25% to 4.50%. Market participants expect monetary policy to continue to tighten in the first half of this year, with a more than 90% chance the Federal Reserve will raise interest rates by at least another 50 basis points by June.

Figure 2: Probability of federal funds rate equal to or exceeding

Meeting date	3.50-3.75	3.75-4.00	4.00-4.25	4.25-4.50	4.50-4.75	4.75-5.00	5.00-5.25	5.25-5.50
2/01/23	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	9%	0%	0%
3/22/23	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	84%	7%	0%
5/03/23	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	90%	37%	3%
6/14/23	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	91%	42%	6%
7/26/23	100%	100%	100%	100%	98%	81%	35%	5%
9/20/23	100%	100%	100%	99%	92%	65%	24%	3%
11/01/23	100%	100%	100%	97%	82%	49%	16%	2%
12/13/23	100%	100%	97%	83%	53%	19%	3%	0%

Current Range 4.25%-4.50%

Source: CME FedWatch Tool, January 16, 2023

With the increase in interest rates, inflation has moderated since its peak in June 2022. The consumer price index increased 6.5% for the 12 months ending December 2022, down from 9.1% in June. The consensus forecast is for prices in December 2023 to be just 2.8% higher than in December 2022.

Observation: The challenge for the Federal Reserve is to engineer a so-called “soft landing” in which inflation continues to moderate without tipping the economy into recession. Economists’ forecasts for slightly negative GDP growth through the first half of 2023 reflect the view that the Federal Reserve’s interest rate increases may push the economy into a mild recession.


The euro area and the UK are expected to continue to face high inflation rates in 2023, with year-over-year forecasts of 6.1% and 7.2%, respectively. Central banks will need to do more in order to fight inflation with less flexibility to do so, while still seeking to secure a soft landing given forecasts for weaker growth there as well. Any short-term fiscal policy to mitigate the effect of higher energy and food prices would have to be calibrated to avoid stimulating demand at a time of high inflation to ensure that fiscal policy and monetary policy do not conflict.

Employment

The labor market remained strong in 2022 as the economy added 4.5 million jobs in 2022, surpassing the prepandemic level of nonfarm payroll employment in August. While overall employment ended the year 1.2 million higher than the prepandemic peak, the recovery has been uneven with leisure and hospitality sector employment more than 5% below and transportation and warehousing employment nearly 12% above its February 2020 level. The overall unemployment rate was 3.5% in December, matching the 50-year lows reached in late 2019 and early 2020, although forecasters expect the unemployment rate to increase to 4.8% by the fourth quarter of 2023 as economic growth slows.

Labor demand remains strong as there are more than 1.8 job openings per unemployed individual. Despite strong demand for workers, the labor force participation rate remains a full percentage point below pre-pandemic levels at 62.3%. Nevertheless, the tight labor market has put upward pressure on wages. Over the past 24 months average hourly earnings of all private sector employees have increased by 9.7% in nominal terms while consumer prices have risen by 14.0%, resulting in a decline in real average hourly earnings.

Figure 3: Prices are rising faster than earnings



Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics

Fiscal outlook


The fiscal year 2022 deficit was \$1.4 trillion (5.5% of GDP), about half the level recorded in fiscal year 2021. Total outlays declined by \$550 billion (8.1%), while revenues increased by \$850 billion (21.0%). The reported deficit included a \$426 billion charge in September 2022 to reflect the cost of the Administration’s student loan debt forgiveness program, which is on hold following a federal appeals court injunction. The Supreme Court has said it will hear arguments on President Biden’s executive action to provide student loan debt forgiveness in February.

The Congressional Budget Office’s (CBO’s) latest forecast projects deficits of \$15.8 trillion over the next 10 years, with deficits rising to 6.1% of GDP by 2032. Under the CBO’s extended budget forecast, the deficit in 2052 would equal 11.1% of GDP. If discretionary spending is maintained at the level in 2022 of 7% of GDP rather than decline to 6% of GDP as forecasted, the 2052 deficit would be 13.9% of GDP. If, in addition, revenues are maintained at the 50-year average of 17.3% of GDP instead of rising to 19.1% of GDP as in the baseline forecast, the 2052 deficit would be 18.2% of GDP. To fund operations that year, the government would borrow more money than it would raise in revenue.

These projections reflect the scheduled expiration of TCJA individual tax cuts as well as the implementation of key revenue-raising business provisions enacted to offset part of the cost of the 2017 tax reform legislation, including amortization of research and experimentation expenditures, stricter interest deduction limitations, and higher tax rates on certain international income. Extension and delay of both the individual and business TCJA provisions could add more than \$4 trillion to the debt over the ensuing decade. Higher interest rates or slower economic growth than forecasted in the baseline also would exacerbate the debt.

Figure 4: Debt is forecast to double as a share of GDP under the baseline scenario

Higher interest rates or lower rate of GDP growth would exacerbate each debt path



Source: CBO (2022)




Balance of power

House of Representatives

With the first session of the 118th Congress having convened on January 3, Republicans hold a slim majority in the House of Representatives following the 2022 midterm elections. The House presently is composed of 222 Republicans, 212 Democrats, and one vacant seat due to the death of Rep. Donald McEachin (D-VA). A special election in Virginia will be held February 21 to fill the vacancy.

After four days of debate, Rep. Kevin McCarthy (R-CA) was elected on the 15th ballot to serve as Speaker of the House. House Democrats selected Rep. Hakeem Jeffries (D-NY) to serve as Minority Leader.

Observation: A slim majority means the House Speaker will have to unite Republicans behind key priorities, since nearly unanimous support among Republicans will be required to pass legislation that lacks bipartisan support.



Source: US Co


Senate

Democrats begin 2023 with an increased Senate majority, having gained one seat in the midterm elections. The Senate convened on January 3 with 51 Democrats (including the three Independents who caucus with Democrats) and 49 Republicans. Democrats now control the Senate and generally will not need to rely on the tie-breaking vote of Vice President Kamala Harris (D), which previously had been necessary in the evenly divided Senate.

Democrat John Fetterman was elected in Pennsylvania to replace retiring Republican Senator Pat Toomey, flipping a seat to the Democrats. Following the election, Arizona Senator Kyrsten Sinema announced she was registering as an Independent, but would continue to caucus with Democrats.

Note: Senator Ben Sasse (R-NE) resigned effective January 8 to become president of the University of Florida. Nebraska governor Jim Pillen (R) has appointed former Nebraska governor Pete Ricketts (R) as a replacement until a special election is held in 2024 for the last two years of the term.

Figure 6: 2022 Senate midterm election results




Source: US Senate

The Senate is expected to adopt a new organizational resolution the week of January 23, which will set committee membership ratios for the 118th Congress. Gaining a functional majority in the Senate provides additional power for Democrats at the committee level. In the previous 50-50 Senate, the chamber had been operating under a negotiated ‘power-sharing agreement,’ in which committee memberships were divided equally between the two parties and the senior Democrat was designated as the chair. Now Democrats are expected to have a majority of members on each committee, which will eliminate the procedural hurdles that sometimes resulted from a tied party-line committee vote. The new Democratic majority will provide committees the ability to report legislation in a more expedited manner and also increased authority to issue subpoenas.

Senate procedures generally require 60 votes to limit debate on legislation and bring about a vote on final passage. A Senate rule modification adopted in 2017 lowered the threshold for approving US Supreme Court nominations to a simple majority (usually 51 votes), which brought the requirement in line with a 2013 rule change that adopted a simple majority threshold for executive branch and non-Supreme Court judicial nominations. Some Democrats have advocated changing Senate rules to eliminate the legislative filibuster entirely or to allow particular bills to advance with a simple majority, such as certain bills relating to election rules. Efforts in the preceding Congress to alter the legislative filibuster were unsuccessful.

Figure 7: Current balance of power in the 118th Congress



Note: A special election has been scheduled for February 21 to fill the seat left open by the death of Rep. A Donald McEachin (D-VA).

As of January 3, 2023

* Independent Senators King (I-ME), Sanders (I-VT) and Sinema (I-AZ) caucus with the Democrats

House and Senate tax committees

Rep. Jason Smith (R-MO) was elected to serve as chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee and Rep. Richard Neal (D-MA) is the Ranking Democratic Member. The Ways and Means Committee currently is composed of 25 Republicans and 18 Democrats. The following new Republican Ways and Means members recently were announced: Reps. Mike Carey (R-OH); Randy Feenstra (R-IA); Michelle Fischbach (R-MN); Brian Fitzpatrick (R-PA); Nicole Malliotakis (R-NY); Blake Moore (R-UT); Michelle Steel (R-CA); Greg Steube (R-FL); Claudia Tenney (R-NY); and Beth Van Duyne (R-TX).

The Senate Finance Committee is led by Chairman Ron Wyden (D-OR), and Senator Mike Crapo (R-ID) serves as the Ranking Republican Member. In the previous Congress, the Finance Committee included 14 Democrats and 14 Republicans; Senators who did not seek re-election or who have since left the Senate include Richard Burr (R-NC), Rob Portman (R-OH), Patrick Toomey (R-PA), and Ben Sasse (R-NE). In the 118th Congress, there are 14 Democrats and 13 Republicans on Finance, and the three open Republican seats were filled by Senators Thom Tillis (R-NC), Ron Johnson (R-WI), and Marsha Blackburn (R-TN).



Administration

The President has the power to veto legislation passed by Congress, with a two-thirds majority of both the House and Senate required for a veto override. When Democrats held majorities in both the House and the Senate during his first two years in office, President Biden did not veto any bills. Under a divided Congress with Republicans now in control of the House and Democrats controlling the Senate, the presidential veto is not expected to be an important factor in 2023.

Janet Yellen continues to serve as Treasury Secretary and Lily Batchelder is Treasury Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy. Douglas O'Donnell has been serving as acting IRS Commissioner since the term of former Commissioner Charles Rettig ended in November. President Biden has nominated Daniel Werfel to become the next IRS commissioner. The IRS acting chief counsel is William Paul.

Observation: Continued Democratic control of the Senate is expected to facilitate the confirmation of President Biden's judicial and executive branch nominees. The Finance Committee confirmation process and Senate floor debate for considering the nomination of Daniel Werfel to serve a five-year term as IRS commissioner nonetheless is expected to provide an opportunity for Senators to raise questions about the agency's funding, management operations, and taxpayer services.

President Biden's economic team includes Brian Deese, Director of the National Economic Council; Shalanda Young, Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB); and Cecilia Rouse, Chair of the Council of Economic Advisers.

Gary Gensler is chair of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Rohit Chopra is director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). At the Federal Reserve, Jerome Powell was confirmed to serve a second term as Chair and Lael Brainard is Vice Chair.

A listing of key policymakers is provided in Appendix A.

2024 Congressional elections

All 435 seats in the House are up for election every two years. Democrats would need to achieve a net gain of five seats in the 2024 elections to regain control of the House. As of this writing, Rep. Alex Mooney (R-WV) has announced he will not seek reelection to the House in 2024, but instead plans to run for the West Virginia Senate seat currently held by Senator Joe Manchin.

Roughly one-third of all Senate seats are subject to election every two years. In 2024, 33 Senate seats are up for re-election, of which 10 currently are held by Republicans and 23 currently are held by Democrats. In addition, a special election will be held for the second Nebraska Senate seat for the two years remaining in that term. As of this writing, Senators Mike Braun (R-IN) and Debbie Stabenow (D-MI) have announced they will not seek reelection in 2024.

A listing of all Senators whose seats are subject to election in 2024 is included in Appendix B.

Figure 8: 2023 Congressional legislative schedule

House and Senate convene	January 3
Senate recess	January 4–20
House recess	January 13–23
Martin Luther King Jr. Day	January 16
President’s State of the Union Address	February 7
President’s Day recess (House)	February 10–24
President’s Day recess (Senate)	February 20–24
House recess	March 13–21
Spring recess (House)	March 31–April 14
Spring recess (Senate)	April 3–14
House recess	May 1–8
Memorial Day recess (House)	May 26–June 2
Memorial Day recess (Senate)	May 22–May 29
Juneteenth	June 19
Independence Day recess (House)	June 26–July 10
Independence Day recess (Senate)	June 26–July 7
August recess (House)	July 31–September 11
August recess (Senate)	July 31–September 4
Yom Kippur	September 25
House recess	October 2–16
Senate recess	October 9–13
Columbus Day	October 9
House recess	October 27–November 3
Veterans Day	November 10
Thanksgiving recess (House)	November 17–27
Thanksgiving recess (Senate)	November 20–24
Target adjournment date (House)	December 14
Target adjournment date (Senate)	December 15



US tax policy

Biden administration tax proposals

President Biden will lay out his policy goals to Congress in a State of the Union address and in his proposed FY 2024 federal budget. While President Biden is expected to propose additional targeted tax relief provisions, he also may re-propose various corporate, international, and individual tax increase provisions that were not included in the IRA due to opposition from some Democrats and all Republicans in the House and Senate. President Biden may seek to address some issues through an increased use of federal regulations and executive orders.

Observation: Presidential budgets generally mark the beginning of the annual federal budget process, and some proposals are considered “dead on arrival” even when a president’s own party is in control of Congress. A return to divided party control of the federal government is expected to increase the challenge of reaching agreement on tax and spending policies and issues like the federal debt limit.

The following are some of the tax proposals that President Biden included in his previous FY 2023 budget:

Corporate and international

- Increase the corporate income tax rate to 28%
- Replace Base Erosion Anti-Abuse Tax (BEAT) with an undertaxed profits rule (UTPR) consistent with the Pillar Two Model Rules
- Create new general business credit for 10% of eligible expenses paid or incurred in onshoring a US trade or business
- Disallow deductions for expenses paid or incurred in connection with offshoring a US trade or business
- Reduce the ability of related parties to use a partnership to shift partnership basis among themselves
- Conform definition of “control” with corporate affiliation test

Eliminate fossil fuel tax preferences

- Repeal expensing of intangible drilling costs
- Repeal use of percentage depletion with respect to oil and natural gas wells
- Increase geological and geophysical amortization period for independent producers

Individuals

- Increase top marginal income tax rate to 39.6%
- Tax capital income for high earners at ordinary rates
- Impose new 20% minimum tax on high-income individuals
- Provide income exclusion for student debt relief

Estate and gift

- Modify income, estate, and gift tax rules for certain grantor trusts
- Require consistent valuation of promissory notes
- Improve tax administration for trusts and decedents’ estates
- Limit duration of generation-skipping transfer tax exemption

Other provisions

- Tax carried interests as ordinary income
- Repeal deferral of gain from like-kind exchanges
- Require 100% recapture of depreciation deductions as ordinary income for certain depreciable real property
- Limit use of donor advised funds
- Extend period for assessment of tax for certain QOF investors

Congressional tax proposals

US House of Representative

House Republicans have proposed to make permanent various TCJA provisions that are set to sunset or were made subject to scheduled modifications as part of the 2017 Act.

Key TCJA individual tax provisions that are set to expire at the end of 2025 include:

- the current 37% top individual ordinary income tax rate,
- the 20% deduction for pass-through business income,
- an increased estate tax exemption,
- an increase in the child tax credit,
- a higher standard deduction, and
- a higher exemption amount and phase-out threshold for the individual alternative minimum tax.

Several temporary limitations on individual itemized deductions, including a lower limit on home mortgage deductions and the \$10,000 limit on the individual deduction for state and local taxes, also are set to expire at the end of 2025. In addition, personal exemptions, which were temporarily eliminated by the TCJA, would be reinstated.

As noted above, the previous Congress adjourned without taking action on proposals to reinstate current deductibility of Section 174 research expenditures, which became subject to amortization beginning in 2022 under a TCJA provision. Additional TCJA business issues that were not addressed last year include proposals to reverse tighter Section 163(j) interest deduction limitations that went into effect at the beginning of 2022 and to delay a four-year phase-out of Section 168(k) 'bonus' depreciation deductions that runs from 2023 to 2026.

Under the TCJA, certain international tax provisions also are scheduled to change after 2025. The global intangible low-taxed income (GILTI) regime and the base erosion anti-avoidance tax (BEAT) are scheduled to become more restrictive. The deduction for foreign derived intangible income (FDII) is scheduled to be reduced, and look-through treatment for certain controlled foreign corporation (CFC) income is set to expire.

Observation: House Republicans are expected to focus their support on provisions that they see as benefiting small businesses and families. House Democrats are expected to focus their opposition on provisions that they view as benefiting large corporations and high-income individuals. While the Republican-controlled House is expected to pass legislation that would seek to make most, if not all, of the TCJA provisions permanent, no action is expected on such legislation by the Democratic-led Senate.

House Republicans have proposed to reduce or impose restrictions on the IRA's \$80 billion in multiyear IRS funding. As this year's first legislative action, the House on January 9 voted 220-210 along party lines to approve a bill (H.R. 23) that seeks to rescind \$71.5 billion of the additional \$80

billion in IRS funding that was provided by the IRA. CBO has estimated that H.R. 23, if enacted, would reduce net federal revenues by \$114.4 billion over 10 years, due to budgetary savings from cuts to IRS outlays for tax compliance and administration programs being far outweighed by \$185.8 billion in reduced tax collections.

Observation: The Democratic-led Senate is not expected to consider H.R. 23, but the issue of IRS funding—and especially the additional funding for the agency provided by the IRA—is expected to be a point of contention later this year. Ultimately, the House and Senate will need to agree on the appropriate level of IRS funding and how those funds should be spent as part of the FY 2024 appropriations process.

Ways and Means Committee Republican leaders also have called for oversight hearings on the leak of certain taxpayer return information to ProPublica, among other issues.

See below for more information on IRS funding and tax administration issues.

Finally, Ways and Means Republicans have expressed opposition to actions by the Biden administration to advance the OECD's Pillar One and Pillar Two global tax rules, and are expected to hold oversight hearings featuring testimony from Treasury officials.

New Ways and Means Committee Chairman Smith noted a number of policy objectives in a statement issued after being selected to lead the House tax committee. In his statement, Chairman Smith said, "Ways and Means Republicans will build an economy that is strong by prioritizing our most valuable economic resource, the American worker. We will build on the success of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act and examine how our policies can reward working families with a tax code that delivers better jobs, higher wages, and more investment in America. We must also examine whether it is in the best interests of the American people to continue showering tax benefits on corporations that have shed their American identity in favor of a relationship with China."

See the Global Tax Policy section below for more on international tax issues.

US Senate

Senate Democrats and Republicans are expected to introduce many tax bills this year, but few may be formally considered on the Senate floor given the need to secure 60 votes to advance most legislation.

Senate Finance Committee Chairman Wyden has signaled that he plans to continue to focus on a number of legislative issues, including proposals to establish a new "billionaires income tax" for taxpayers with more than \$1 billion in assets or more than \$100 million in income for three consecutive years, to reform partnership tax rules, and to modernize the taxation and regulation of derivatives.

Chairman Wyden also is expected to hold oversight hearings on a range of issues; one recent area of focus has been the level of effective tax rates reported by specific companies with international operations. With an increased majority of Democrats on the Finance Committee, Chairman Wyden will have an enhanced ability to issue subpoenas in support of the committee's oversight activities.

Potential areas of bipartisan legislation

Retirement savings incentives

Legislation that seeks to promote private savings for retirement has been the focus of successful bipartisan efforts in recent years. House and Senate tax committee leaders in the new 118th Congress may seek to build on the new ‘Secure Act 2.0’ incentives for retirement savings that were enacted last year as part of the FY 2023 funding legislation.

Key retirement savings provisions that were enacted last December include:

- Any new single-employer 401(k) or 403(b) plans established after the date of enactment (December 29, 2022) must automatically enroll participants once initial eligibility requirements are met, at a rate of at least 3%, but not more than 10%, and increasing by one percentage point each year to at least 10%, but not more than 15%. Employees may opt out of coverage or change their deferral percentages. The requirements apply to plan years beginning after December 31, 2024. Auto-enrollment provisions would continue to be optional for plans that had been established prior to the date Secure Act 2.0 was enacted.
- Employers can provide matching contributions in a 401(k) plan with respect to “qualified student loan payments.” The amount of qualified student loan payments is limited to the annual deferral limit (\$22,500 for 2023) less the actual deferrals made by the employee for the year. In addition, under this provision, plans could test matching contributions on student loan repayments separately from matching contributions on elective deferrals for nondiscrimination compliance. This provision is effective for plan years beginning after December 31, 2023.
- Secure Act 2.0 expands the Employee Plans Compliance Resolution System (EPCRS) to allow more types of plan administration errors to be corrected internally through self-correction, rather than a formal correction procedure through the IRS. This provision is effective on the date of enactment, and guidance must be issued within two years.
- The original Secure Act increased the required minimum distribution date to age 72. Secure Act 2.0 further increases the required minimum distribution starting date first to 73 beginning on January 1, 2023 and later to age 75 starting on January 1, 2033.
- Currently, catch-up contributions can be made on a pre-tax or a Roth basis (if allowed by the plan). Under Secure Act 2.0, all catch-up contributions are subject to Roth tax treatment, beginning in 2024. There is an exception for employees with compensation of \$145,000 or less (indexed).
- The limit on catch-up contributions to 401(k), 403(b), and 457(b) plans, which currently is \$6,500 for employees age 50 or older, is increased beginning in 2025 to the greater of \$10,000 or 50% more than the regular catch-up amount in 2025 for employees ages 60-63 during a plan year. The \$10,000 limit will be indexed with inflation.

Observation: The retirement savings incentives enacted as part of the FY 2023 funding legislation made wide-ranging changes to qualified plans, with most changes applying to all plans but some rules applying only to new plans. The provisions have various effective dates. Employers need to consider which rules are mandatory, which are elective, and the specific effective dates, to determine how the legislation will impact their plans.

Form 1099-K compliance relief

The American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 significantly lowered the reporting threshold associated with Form 1099-K, Payment Card and Third Party Network Transactions, from \$20,000 in aggregate payments and 200 transactions to a threshold of \$600 in aggregate payments (with no minimum transaction requirement).

Although the new rule was set to become effective beginning with payment transactions settled after December 31, 2021, the IRS on December 23, 2022 issued Notice 2023-10, announcing that calendar year 2022 will be regarded as a transition period for purposes of IRS enforcement and administration of the modified de minimis exceptions for third-party settlement organizations (TPSOs) and third-party network transactions.

Observation: While Notice 2023-10 is intended to facilitate an orderly transition for TPSO compliance with the new requirements and participating payee compliance with income tax reporting, the delay in implementing the lower reporting threshold also provides an opening for bipartisan legislation to reconsider it.

With respect to returns for calendar years beginning before January 1, 2023, a TPSO is not required to report payments in settlement of third-party network transactions with respect to a participating payee unless the gross amount of aggregate payments to be reported exceeds \$20,000 and the number of such transactions with that participating payee exceeds 200. The IRS will not assert penalties for TPSOs failing to file or failing to furnish Forms 1099-K unless the gross amount of the aggregate payments to be reported exceeds \$20,000 and the number of transactions exceeds 200. For returns for calendar years beginning after December 31, 2022, TPSOs will be required to report payments in settlement of third-party network transactions with any participating payee that exceed a minimum threshold of \$600 in aggregate payments, regardless of the number of such transactions.

Observation: While some in Congress have called for reinstating the previous \$20,000 threshold, there have been some proposals for a compromise threshold level of \$5,000 or \$10,000. The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants on December 16, 2022 sent a letter to the House and Senate tax committee leaders suggesting that increasing the reporting threshold to \$5,000 would accomplish intended compliance goals while reducing the administrative burden of the lower threshold.

Cryptocurrency

Recent developments in the cryptocurrency sector are expected to be the subject of Congressional oversight hearings, which could be followed by potential legislative action. Several House and Senate committees are expected to conduct oversight hearings on cryptocurrency companies and their business operations. Last December, the Senate Banking Committee and the House Financial Services Committee held hearings around the collapse of FTX, a major digital asset exchange.

Senate Finance Chairman Wyden is expected to continue his focus on tax and other issues related to cryptocurrency and potential risks to investors. Chairman Wyden last year sought information from the six largest cryptocurrency exchanges on the risks individuals face when investing on their platforms, including whether the exchanges provide any protections for investors if the company fails. Wyden has joined other lawmakers who called for legislative and regulatory action to regulate the cryptocurrency industry after the recent collapse of some companies in the industry.

Observation: To date, Treasury and the IRS have issued limited guidance on the tax treatment of cryptocurrency. Generally, the sale or disposition of cryptocurrency is subject to US tax. Whether the gain is capital or ordinary depends on the nature of the asset in the hands of the taxpayer (e.g., inventory or capital asset). Periodic income generated from cryptocurrency activities (e.g., lending, mining, or staking) also is deemed subject to tax generally at ordinary income rates.

As part of its 2022-2023 Priority Guidance Plan, which was issued last November and covers 205 guidance projects, Treasury listed as areas of focus the tax treatment of transactions involving digital assets and guidance concerning validation of digital asset transactions, including staking (i.e., crypto holders receive new crypto in exchange for lending their crypto to validate new crypto on a blockchain).

Tax considerations around cryptocurrency include:

- income tax characterizations for different types of digital assets (e.g., cryptocurrency, utility coins, stablecoins, or nonfungible tokens (NFTs)),
- timing of income recognition and deductions (available elections),
- tax basis determinations (permissible methods and valuations),
- sourcing and jurisdictional allocations,
- tax treatment for lending, staking, and other common activities, and
- consequences to foreign corporations owned directly or indirectly by a US shareholder.

Broker reporting on digital asset transactions

The Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, enacted in November 2021, imposes information reporting obligations on service providers who effect transfers of digital assets on behalf of another in return for consideration. The new reporting requirements were set to be effective for transactions starting January 1, 2023, with reporting beginning in 2024, but Treasury and the IRS in late December issued Announcement 2023-2 delaying the effective date of the reporting requirement until after final guidance is issued.

The Act defines a “digital asset” for the first time in the Internal Revenue Code as “any digital representation of value which is recorded on a cryptographically secured distributed ledger or any similar technology.” It also defines “broker” in the context of digital assets to include “any person who (for consideration) is responsible for regularly providing any service effectuating transfers of digital assets on behalf of another person.”

For a discussion of state sales and use tax cryptocurrency developments, see the State Tax Policy section below.

Regulatory outlook

Corporate alternative minimum tax guidance

The IRA enacted a new 15% corporate alternative minimum tax (CAMT) based on financial statement income, effective for tax years beginning after December 31, 2022. This provision imposes a 15% minimum tax on adjusted financial statement income (AFSI) of applicable corporations.

The CAMT increases a corporation's tax only to the extent that the tentative minimum tax exceeds regular tax plus base erosion and anti-abuse tax (BEAT). In a tax year when a taxpayer pays CAMT, the taxpayer will generate a minimum tax credit, which may be carried forward indefinitely and claimed against regular tax in future years (to the extent regular tax exceeds CAMT plus BEAT in those years). The CAMT does not limit the general business credits.

AFSI is net income or loss on a taxpayer's applicable financial statement (AFS) with a number of adjustments, some of which are:

1. The AFSI of a corporation that is a partner in a partnership is limited to a distributive share of the partnership's AFSI;
2. For items received by a taxpayer from a corporation that is not included on a consolidated return with a taxpayer, the taxpayer's AFSI takes into account only the dividends received from the corporation (plus amounts relating to the corporation that are includible in gross income or deductible as a loss);
3. AFSI is adjusted to disregard book income, cost, and expense related to a covered benefit plan (e.g., mark-to-market adjustments related to a defined benefit plan) and to take into account amounts included in the corporation's gross income or deducted under other tax provisions relating to the covered benefit plan; and
4. AFSI is reduced by both depreciation deductions allowed under Section 167 for property to which Section 168 applies and amortization deductions allowed under Section 197 for qualified wireless spectrum, and increased for the respective depreciation and amortization taken into account in the taxpayer's AFS for those properties.

An applicable corporation is a corporation with average annual AFSI (excluding NOL carryovers and aggregated with that of other members of the corporation's single-employer group) over a three-tax year period in excess of \$1 billion. However, a corporation in a foreign-parented multinational group with a foreign parent applies a two-part test to determine if it is an applicable corporation: (1) the average annual AFSI of the corporation (excluding NOL carryovers and aggregated with that of other members of the corporation's single-employer group) over the three tax years ending with the relevant tax year is at least \$100 million, and (2) the average annual AFSI of all members of the foreign-parented multinational group over the three tax years ending with the relevant tax year must exceed \$1 billion. In determining the AFSI of all members of a foreign-parented multinational group for purposes of the \$1 billion test, AFSI is determined without certain adjustments, including those relating to a partner's distributive share of partnership AFSI.

When aggregating the AFSI of other members of the corporation's single-employer group under Section 52(a) (i.e., members of controlled group) or Section 52(b) (i.e., trades or businesses under common control) solely for purposes of determining if a corporation is an applicable corporation, AFSI excludes adjustments relating to a partner's distributive share of partnership AFSI and defined benefit pension plans.

The IRA also added a new corporate AMT foreign tax credit (FTC), which is available to an applicable corporation that claims an FTC for the tax year. The AMT FTC reduces 15% of a taxpayer's AFSI to arrive at the tentative minimum tax.

Some significant issues to be addressed in guidance include the following:

- How should items such as income from discontinued operations, unusual events, other comprehensive income (OCI), elimination entries, and variable interest entities (VIEs) be taken into account in computing AFSI?
- How is a partner's distributive share of partnership income determined?
 - What method should be allowed to determine the amount of distributive share?
 - How does the rule limiting a partner's AFSI to its distributive share of partnership AFSI interact with the rule aggregating AFSI of all trades or businesses under common control?
 - How does the applicable corporation test apply when a corporate partner's AFS includes the partnership but the rule that would aggregate the AFSI of the corporation and the partnership does not apply?
- How is AFSI adjusted for items of income or loss attributable to corporations not on a consolidated return with the taxpayer?
 - Is AFSI adjusted for, for example, income or loss of an entity accounted for using equity accounting or gain or loss from mark-to-market adjustments?
 - Should AFSI be adjusted for dividends received deductions permissible for tax purposes?
 - How should the dividends inclusion rule apply when a foreign corporation is a controlled foreign corporation subject to the pro-rata share rule?
 - How should "dividends" be defined (for example, as reported on an AFS)?
 - Should dividends be excluded that relate to a distribution of profits before the CAMT effective date or that were acquired in a transaction or a situation such as a reorganization?

Pending publication of proposed regulations, the IRS and Treasury issued Notice 2023-7, providing interim guidance on how the CAMT applies to corporations, certain partnerships, troubled corporations, and affiliated groups of corporations that file consolidated tax returns. Notice 2023-7 generally provides that if a transaction qualifies for nonrecognition treatment (i.e., under Sections 332, 337, 351, 354, 355, 357, 361, 368, 721, 731, or 1032, or a combination thereof) that does not result in gain or loss to the corporation for US federal income tax purposes, then any financial accounting gain or loss related to the transaction is not taken into account

for purposes of determining the AFSI of the corporation. The guidance clarifies that taxpayers must treat a tax consolidated group as a single entity for purposes of calculating AFSI (both for determining applicable corporation status and CAMT liability) and addresses the effect that cancellation of indebtedness income has on AFSI. The guidance provides rules that address the determination of applicable corporation status in the case of corporate acquisitions and dispositions. In determining whether a corporation is an applicable corporation subject to the CAMT, Notice 2023-7 includes a safe-harbor method that simplifies the computation of AFSI and reduces the thresholds of the AFSI tests.

The interim rules also clarify the CAMT adjustments associated with depreciation, which apply to Section 168 property placed in service in any tax year (including tax years beginning before January 1, 2023), as well as the treatment of federal income tax credits described in Section 48D, Section 6417, and Section 6418. According to Notice 2023-7, taxpayers should reduce AFSI for depreciation that has been (1) capitalized and recovered as cost of goods sold (COGS) in computing taxable income for the tax year and (2) allowed as a deduction in computing taxable income for the tax year. Similarly, AFSI should be adjusted to disregard (1) depreciation expense and impairment loss/reversal included in COGS in the AFS, (2) depreciation expense and impairment loss/reversal taken into account in the AFS, and (3) amounts that are recognized as an expense or loss in the AFS (other than depreciation or impairment) and reflected in depreciable basis for tax purposes (e.g., book expenses that are capitalized to the basis of self-constructed property under Section 263A.). Because CAMT depreciation adjustments are limited to property to which Section 168 applies, Notice 2023-7 also defines Section 168 property and provides examples of how the adjustments apply to property that is partially depreciated under Section 168.

For additional issues relating to the CAMT and international tax issues, see the Global Tax Policy section.



Excise tax on stock buybacks guidance

The IRA imposed a nondeductible 1% excise tax on a publicly traded US corporation on the fair market value of any of its stock that the corporation repurchases after 2022. A “repurchase” is a redemption (within the meaning of Section 317(b)) of the stock of the corporation and other economically similar transactions determined by Treasury. Repurchases in connection with certain transactions are not subject to the tax, which also is reduced by the fair market value of stock issued by the corporation during the tax year.

Pending publication of proposed regulations, the IRS and Treasury issued Notice 2023-2, providing interim guidance on which taxpayers may rely in computing their excise tax liability. Significantly, the notice describes the application of the excise tax in the case of certain repurchases of stock of publicly traded foreign corporations; describes steps that should be undertaken by taxpayers to compute their excise tax liability; provides rules on the types of repurchases that are either subject to, or excluded from, the excise tax; provides rules on how to determine the timing of repurchases and issuances and the fair market value of stock repurchased and issued; and provides rules on how taxpayers should report and pay the excise tax.

The notice provides that where (for example) a publicly traded foreign corporation repurchases its own stock, certain domestic affiliates may be treated as subject to the excise tax if the domestic affiliate funds by any means (including through distributions, debt, or capital contributions) the foreign corporation’s repurchase of the stock with a principal purpose of avoiding the excise tax. The notice provides a per se rule under which a principal purpose is deemed to exist if the acquisition occurs within two years of the funding (other than a funding through a distribution).

Some issues to be addressed in regulations and future guidance, taking into account comments from taxpayers and practitioners, include the following:

- How will the excise tax apply to structures with partnerships?
- Whether any exceptions will be put in place with respect to redemptions of other classes of stock, such as preferred stock, issued by a publicly traded corporation?
- Will any transactions be designated as “economically similar” to a repurchase that were not designated as such in the Notice?
- Will any changes be made to the rules for valuing stock issuances for purposes of application of the netting rule (including in connection with various forms of equity compensation and upon exercise of employee stock options) from those set forth in the Notice?
- Will a change be made to permit employee equity compensation shares under net settlement or net withholding arrangements to be treated as “issued”?

Extension of Section 461(l) business loss deduction limitation guidance

The 2017 TCJA added Section 461(l), which limited business loss deductions for noncorporate taxpayers to \$250,000 (\$500,000 for taxpayers filing joint returns), indexed for inflation. Section 461(l) as originally enacted applied to tax years beginning after 2017 and before 2026. The 2020 CARES Act suspended Section 461(l) for tax years beginning in 2018, 2019, or 2020 and made certain modifications, including clarifying the treatment of certain wages. The 2021 American Rescue Plan extended the termination date to tax years beginning before 2027. The IRA extended the termination date to tax years beginning before 2029.

Notice 2021-21 was issued by the IRS and Treasury to provide Section 461(l) guidance on the waiver of underpayment penalties for certain individual taxpayers. The guidance addresses situations in which underpayment was attributable to the CARES Act suspension of the limitation, which may have impacted anticipated net operating losses in the following year.

Some issues to be addressed in guidance include the following:

- Should computational principles that apply to net operating losses be applied in determining business losses subject to Section 461(l), for example to distinguish business from nonbusiness losses?
- Should net operating loss carryforwards be excluded from the Section 461(l) limitation?
- What ordering principles should apply to Section 461(l) and other deduction limitation provisions?
- How should the Section 461(l) limitation be treated for purposes of the alternative minimum tax?
- How are net earnings from self-employment calculated when a taxpayer conducts multiple trades or businesses, some with net income and some with net losses?



International tax guidance

Treasury in 2023 is expected to finalize foreign tax credit (FTC) guidance and certain other regulations that have been previously proposed. Most recently, on November 18, 2022, Treasury released proposed FTC regulations that modified the cost recovery requirement and the attribution requirement for withholding tax on royalty payments and amended reattribution asset rule for purposes of allocating and apportioning foreign taxes.

Observation: The 2022 FTC proposed regulations would amend the 2021 FTC final regulations to further relax some, but not all, of the stringent creditability requirements. The proposed changes should insert needed flexibility into the FTC regime, but may not go far enough to account for the wide variety in countries' income tax laws. The 2022 FTC proposed regulations, when finalized, potentially could be the last major change to the creditability regulations for some time.

Treasury also may issue final passive foreign investment company (PFIC) regulations regarding the treatment of domestic partnerships and S corporations that own stock of PFICs and their domestic partners and shareholders.

The long-awaited release of guidance related to previously taxed earnings and profits (PTEP) has slipped into 2023. The regulations are expected to be the first of several tranches. Additionally, guidance on the repatriation of intellectual property that was subject to Section 367(d) also slipped into 2023.

Another much-anticipated guidance package relates to the so-called 'Killer B' transactions involving triangular reorganizations and foreign corporations. These regulations are expected to be consistent with prior notices from 2014 and 2016, with the general aim of taxing US owners on the earnings of a foreign corporation in connection with a reorganization.

Observation: Although the repatriation concerns addressed by Killer B regulations may be outdated after the enactment of corporate tax reforms as part of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, the IRS currently is challenging certain transactions in litigation and would like to finalize the regulations in order to rely on them in court.

Other regulatory projects under consideration as part of the 2022-2023 IRS priority guidance plan include Section 482 regulations that clarify certain aspects of the arm's-length standard, including periodic adjustments; final regulations regarding the application of Section 163(j) to partnerships, S corporations, and their owners; and final regulations under Section 861 that address the character and source of income arising in transactions involving intellectual property and the provision of digital goods and services.

Energy credits and incentives guidance

The IRA represents the largest investment in clean energy in US history, creating an extensive regime of tax credits and incentives (including one deduction) estimated to cost \$370 billion over 10 years. These tax credits and incentives are intended to address climate change and promote US industry.

Observation: The IRA tax credits and incentives provisions generally are set to remain in effect through 2032, with certain exceptions. The extended period during which these provisions are scheduled to remain in effect was intended to promote long-term investments in the clean energy sector.

Many credits (and the Section 179D deduction) provide for a base rate, for example, a percentage of the cost of constructing an asset or a dollar amount per unit of production, and increase the base rate for compliance with certain project-related requirements (bonus credits). The most significant and prevalent bonus credit provision is an increase of five times the base rate if the taxpayer pays workers constructing, altering, or repairing an energy-related facility prevailing wages for the location and hires a certain number of workers from apprenticeship programs. Taxpayers also may qualify for this bonus if construction on a facility begins no later than 60 days after Treasury issues guidance on these requirements. For some credits, taxpayers may earn bonuses for locating projects in low-income communities or in areas that have lost coal- or oil-related industries (energy communities), or for using domestically produced materials in construction (domestic content).

The IRA provides for direct pay and transfer of some credits, allowing companies with low or no taxable income to realize benefits from these credits. Direct pay treats a credit as a direct payment of tax, the equivalent of a refundable credit, but for most credits is available only to tax-exempt, including governmental, entities. A taxpayer that receives a direct payment that exceeds the allowable credit is subject to a penalty unless the taxpayer can demonstrate reasonable cause. All taxpayers eligible for credits for carbon sequestration, clean hydrogen production, and manufacture of energy property components may elect direct pay for those credits. Taxpayers, but not tax-exempt entities, may transfer many credits (including the credits for which direct pay is available) to an unrelated party.

See Appendix C for a summary of energy-related credits the IRA added or extended.

The IRA delegates many interpretive issues and administrative functions to Treasury (such as establishing certification procedures), some of which (for example, determining prevailing wages or evaluating if a taxpayer meets energy efficiency or environmental standards) require technical expertise generally residing in agencies such as the Department of Labor (DoL), the Department of Energy, and the Environmental Protection Agency.

The IRS has issued nine notices requesting comments on various issues. Some issues to be addressed in guidance include the following:

- How is a credit allocated when multiple parties own different components of an overall energy property?
- To qualify for the Section 45X advanced manufacturing production credit, a taxpayer must sell eligible components it produces to an unrelated person. However, the taxpayer is deemed to sell product to an unrelated person if the taxpayer sells to a related person that in turn sells the product to an unrelated person. A taxpayer also may elect to treat a sale to a related person as made to an unrelated person. Does the election to treat a sale to a related party require the related party to sell to an unrelated party, or are these two provisions independent?
- Some credits apply only to production in the US. How much of a final product must be manufactured in the US to meet this requirement?
- How does a taxpayer meet the requirement to hire workers from an apprenticeship program if the taxpayer's employees perform all construction, alteration, or repair of a facility?
- Does the apprenticeship requirement apply only to the construction, alteration, or repair of qualified energy property that is part of a facility, or must it be satisfied for the entire facility?
- The domestic content bonus credit requires that essentially all steel and iron components of a facility must be manufactured in the US but only 40% of manufactured product components must be produced, mined, or manufactured in the US (increasing percentages for the Section 45Y clean electricity production credit); does the manufactured product percentage include steel and iron components?
- The direct payment election for the carbon sequestration (Section 45Q), clean hydrogen production (Section 45V), and manufacture of energy property components (Section 45X) credits applies on an annual basis and must be made for five years. May a taxpayer that elected direct payment transfer these credits at the end of the five-year election period?
- How do the direct pay and transfer options apply to a partnership with tax-exempt and taxable partners?
- What is "reasonable cause" exempting a taxpayer from the penalty for receiving a direct payment exceeding the allowable credit?
- How may information exchange be implemented and enforced when a taxpayer that transferred a credit later sells the related property and must recapture a portion of the credit claimed by the transferee?

The IRS and Treasury also have released the following interim guidance:

- Notice 2022-61, providing information on obtaining prevailing wage rates from DoL, establishing January 29, 2023, as the beginning-construction date, and providing guidance on determining when construction begins.
- Rev. Proc. 2022-42, which provides procedures for qualified manufacturers of clean vehicles to enter into agreements with Treasury to periodically report certain information and for sellers of clean vehicles to report certain information to the purchaser and Treasury.

- Notice 2023-6, providing information on the qualifications for sustainable aviation fuel under Section 40B; registration requirements for producers, importers, and blenders; and procedures for claiming the credit.
- Announcement 2023-1, providing the reference standard for the Section 179D deduction for energy efficient commercial buildings, and general information FAQs on the credits for individuals for energy efficient home improvements under Section 25C and clean energy property under Section 25D.
- Notice 2023-1 and a Treasury white paper on definitions and rules anticipated to be included in proposed regulations on the Section 30D clean vehicle credit, in particular relating to the battery critical mineral and component requirements; Notice 2023-9, providing a safe harbor under Section 45W for determining the incremental cost of a clean commercial vehicle placed in service in 2023; and FAQs on the Section 30D and 45W credits plus the Section 25E credit for previously-owned clean vehicles.

For additional trade issues relating to the energy credits, see the Trade Tax Policy section.

Semiconductor manufacturing credit guidance

The CHIPS and Science Act, enacted on August 9, 2022, amended Section 48D to provide a new advanced manufacturing tax credit. The Section 48D credit is 25% of qualified investment in a facility for the primary purpose of manufacturing semiconductors or the equipment to manufacture semiconductors.

The credit applies to qualified property placed in service after December 31, 2022, for which construction begins before January 1, 2027. Qualified property is depreciable tangible personal or real property constructed or acquired by the taxpayer that is integral to the operation of a facility that manufactures semiconductors or the equipment to manufacture semiconductors. For property for which construction begins before January 1, 2023, the credit applies only to the basis of the property attributable to construction, reconstruction, or erection of the property after August 9, 2022.

The taxpayer may not be a foreign entity of concern (generally, entities designated as terrorist organizations, engaged in espionage, or for which assets have been blocked) and may not have made an applicable transaction (a significant transaction, as determined by Treasury in coordination with Commerce and Defense, involving the material expansion of semiconductor manufacturing capacity in the People’s Republic of China or a foreign country of concern).

All taxpayers eligible for the Section 48D credit may elect direct payment, similar to direct pay under the IRA, but may not transfer the credit. Like the other investment credits, taxpayers may receive progress payments of the credit over the course of constructing the property. The CHIPS Act also appropriates funds for grants and loans for establishing facilities in the United States to manufacture semiconductors that had been authorized but not funded in earlier legislation.

Some issues to be addressed in guidance include the following:

- How is a facility’s “primary purpose” to manufacture semiconductors defined?
- How is basis attributable to construction after August 9, 2023 determined?
- What is a “significant transaction,” including material expansions of facilities, and what is a “foreign country of concern” for purposes of the applicable transaction rules?
- What information is needed to be provided to be eligible for progress payments?

Tax accounting guidance

US GAAP

The FASB recently voted to issue an exposure draft with proposed changes to certain income tax disclosures for both interim and annual financial statements. Among other proposed changes, the most significant changes are focused on disclosures of income taxes paid and incremental changes to the effective rate reconciliation. The FASB expects to issue an exposure draft for public commentary in the first quarter of 2023.

Proposed changes would require all entities to disclose income taxes paid by jurisdiction (federal, state, and foreign) on an interim and annual basis. For annual disclosures, the proposal also would require all entities to disclose income taxes paid by jurisdiction based on a threshold of 5% of total income taxes paid. Amounts disclosed will be net of tax refunds received.

For the effective tax rate reconciliation, the proposal would require further disaggregation of reconciling items presented in the income tax disclosures. Proposed changes include requiring eight specific categories of reconciling items to be presented in addition to further disaggregation of certain categories based upon a quantitative threshold of 5%. Additional qualitative disclosures also will be required.

IFRS

In preparation for the implementation of the global minimum tax regime under the OECD Pillar Two framework, the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) plans to propose an amendment to the income tax accounting standard under IFRS. The amendment will require a mandatory temporary exception from the requirement to account for deferred taxes arising from the implementation of the regime. The exposure draft also will include proposed disclosure requirements that may be significant. An exposure draft is expected to be released by the IASB in January 2023.

Note: See Appendix F for a discussion of tax accounting considerations for legislation.



Tax compliance

The IRA provides \$80 billion in additional funding for the IRS over 10 years. Approximately half of the additional funding is allocated to enforcement; the other half is allocated to services and systems modernization. The new multi-year funding provision was intended to provide resources for the IRS above the level of annual appropriations for the agency that are approved by Congress.

The current FY 2023 appropriation for the IRS is \$12.3 billion. The FY 2023 funding bill reduced IRS funding by 2.2% from the agency's \$12.6 billion FY 2022 funding level by eliminating \$275 million in IRS business system modernization funding; the spending reduction was a priority for Congressional Republicans who cited the new IRA funding that also is intended to support the agency's system modernization.

Observation: The long-term outlook for IRS funding—including future-year distributions of the \$80 billion in IRA funding—remains subject to change depending on which party controls the White House and Congress in future years. Congressional Republicans have opposed both proposed increases in the IRS annual funding level and the new IRA funding for the agency, as discussed above. Congressional Democrats have argued that higher IRS funding is warranted since the IRS budget was reduced by approximately 20% from 2010 to 2021.

How the \$80 billion in IRA funding for the IRS is allocated

- \$45.6 billion for enforcement activities, including:
 - determining and collecting owed taxes,
 - providing legal and litigation support,
 - conducting criminal investigations (including investigative technology),
 - providing digital asset monitoring and compliance activities, and
 - enforcing criminal statutes related to violations of internal revenue laws and other financial crimes;
- \$25.3 billion for operations support for taxpayer services and enforcement programs, including information technology development, enhancement, operations, maintenance, and security;
- \$4.8 billion for business systems modernization, including development of callback technology and other technology to provide a more personalized customer service; and
- \$3.2 billion for taxpayer services, including pre-filing assistance and education, filing and account services, and taxpayer advocacy services.

The IRS formed an office to develop a detailed IRA funding implementation plan, including key milestones and hiring targets, which must be submitted to Treasury Secretary Yellen in early 2023.

Secretary Yellen directed the IRS to focus on (1) clearing backlogs of unprocessed tax returns and other correspondence, (2) significantly improving taxpayer service, (3) overhauling the agency's technology systems, and (4) hiring employees to replace the 50,000 employees expected to retire over the next five years.

Enforcement goals

The IRS is expected to use its additional enforcement funding to increase audits of corporations, large partnerships, asset management structures, and high-wealth individuals. The agency is using real-time intelligence and analytics to identify current and emerging compliance issues. It is deploying advanced technologies to analyze and identify patterns of non-compliance to facilitate case selection and to identify appropriate methods to increase compliance.

The IRS also is continuing its focus on Compliance Campaigns. There currently are more than 50 unique areas of focus, including various Tax Cuts and Jobs Act provisions, cryptocurrency, international issues, and research and development tax deductions and credits.

Staffing challenges

The IRS on November 9, 2022 issued IR-2022-197, announcing that in addition to the more than 4,000 people recently hired to fill critical customer service representative positions, it seeks to hire over 700 new employees to assist taxpayers at Taxpayer Assistance Centers across the country. IR-2022-197 stated that additional updates on IRA implementation would be provided soon.

The IRS faces a number of challenges in retaining existing and hiring new employees. According to its Strategic Plan FY 2022–2026, the IRS estimates that 52,000 of its 83,000 employees (approximately 63%) will be eligible to retire or resign within the next six years. According to the Partnership for Public Service, the attrition rate for the IRS is 7.3%, significantly higher than the average 5.8% for all federal agencies.

The IRS must boost recruiting, process job applications, complete background checks, and onboard and train thousands of employees in a short period of time. At the same time, the IRS is facing a tight labor market and has not been able to meet hiring goals in recent years. This situation is exacerbated by existing inflexibilities around federal hiring and compensation, making it difficult for the IRS to compete for employees in a competitive job market.

Operational challenges


Meeting operational goals also presents the IRS with challenges. The agency is experiencing unprecedented backlogs in return processing, responding to notices, entity elections, residency, and certifications. The IRS examines 0.5% of all returns filed, with over 74% of audits conducted via correspondence exam. This is the lowest level of exam coverage in decades.

The agency recognizes the need to overhaul its antiquated technology while keeping processing systems stable. Mid-level and frontline managers must continue to deliver program priorities while training a significant number of new staff. Balancing the mix of ongoing retirements with new hires places a strain on the agency to achieve its stated compliance goals.


In FY 2021, the IRS had 78,661 full-time equivalent positions, a decrease of 12.9% since FY 2012. Overall, the number of agents, office auditors, and examiners was at its lowest level since the 1950s, with Appeals staffing down approximately 45% since 2010.

Figure 9: IRS funding levels for various activities

Costs Incurred by Budget Activity, Fiscal Year 2021



Costs Incurred by Budget Activity, (Constant 2021 Dollars), Fiscal Years 2012–2021




NOTE: Inflation-adjusted amounts were calculated using the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Nondefense Gross Domestic Product Chain-type Price Index with a 2021 base year.

Source: 2021 IRS Data Book, Table 30

Source: Selected IRS Data Books, Table 30

Figure 10: Historical levels of IRS staffing

Full-time Equivalent Positions Realized, Fiscal Years 2012–2021



Source: Selected IRS Data Books Table 32

Developments in tax administration and controversy resolution

Changes to reporting uncertain tax positions

The IRS on December 22, 2022 issued final versions of Schedule UTP, *Uncertain Tax Positions*, and instructions for 2022 tax year returns to be filed and processed in 2023. Corporations must file Schedule UTP with their Form 1120, *U.S. Corporation Income Tax Return*, Form 1120-F, *U.S. Income Tax Return of a Foreign Corporation*, Form 1120-L, *U.S. Life Insurance Company Income Tax Return*, or Form 1120-PC, *U.S. Property and Casualty Insurance Company Income Tax Return*, if (1) their total assets equal or exceed the applicable asset threshold for the tax year (\$10 million for 2022), (2) they take a tax position on their US federal income tax return for the current tax year or for a prior tax year, and (3) they record a liability for unrecognized tax benefits with respect to that tax position for US federal income tax in their audited financial statements.

The IRS finalized the Schedule UTP and instructions after making certain revisions in response to public comments. Changes to the Schedule UTP intended to improve the form's usefulness include (1) new columns to identify guidance that is contrary to positions taken on the company's tax return (for tax positions reported on Schedule UTP rather than Form 8275, *Disclosure Statement*, or Form 8275-R, *Regulation Disclosure Statement*), and (2) a new field for the amount of the line item on the taxpayer's return that includes the unrecognized tax benefit.

Observation: While many commentators recommended delaying the effective date of the changes, the IRS instead finalized the revised Schedule UTP and instructions, making them applicable for returns filed for the 2022 tax year.

Proposed litigation approach

Treasury and the IRS on September 13, 2022 published proposed regulations implementing provisions of the Taxpayer First Act of 2019 regarding the resolution of federal tax controversies by the IRS Independent Office of Appeals without litigation and requests for referral to Appeals following the issuance of a notice of deficiency. The proposed regulations list 24 categories of disputes excluded from access to the Appeals resolution process. In addition, Appeals will not entertain taxpayer challenges to the validity of Treasury regulations or published IRS notices or revenue procedures.

The proposed regulations list the requirements that a taxpayer must meet before Appeals may consider the federal tax controversy. The originating IRS office must have completed its action on the controversy and issued a final administrative determination or a proposed administrative determination that is accompanied by an offer for Appeals consideration. Specified procedural and timing requirements also must be followed for Appeals consideration.

The proposed regulations provide that, if the IRS denies a taxpayer's request for a referral to Appeals, the agency must provide the taxpayer with a written notice that includes a detailed description of the facts involved, the basis for the decision to deny the request, a detailed explanation of how the basis for the decision applies to the facts, and the procedures for protesting the decision. These procedures apply only if (1) the taxpayer received a notice of deficiency, (2) the taxpayer's position is not deemed to be frivolous, (3) the taxpayer has not previously requested Appeals consideration for the same matter or issue in a given tax year, and (4) Appeals previously has not considered the matter that is the subject of the request.



Global tax policy

OECD/Inclusive Framework seeks to reform international tax rules

Overview

In October 2021, G20 leaders endorsed the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (Inclusive Framework), a political agreement on a two-pillar plan intended to address the tax challenges arising from the digitalization of the economy. The plan, agreed to by 138 of the 141 members of the Inclusive Framework (IF), provides for reallocation of some of the “residual” profits of multinational enterprises to “market” countries (Pillar One) and a 15% global minimum tax (Pillar Two).

The original agreement called for enactment of the rules before 2023. The timing has shifted to implementation before the end of 2023. G20 leaders issued a declaration last November reaffirming their commitment to swift implementation of the two-pillar international tax package, calling on the IF to finalize work on Pillar One through preparation of a Multilateral Convention (MLC) for signature by mid-2023. The completion of work on Pillar Two also is expected by the end of 2023, allowing countries to implement their rules into domestic law by 2024.

Since reaching a political agreement on Pillars One and Two, significant technical work has been undertaken by the IF. Companies can expect to see further guidance released and public consultations on both pillars in 2023. At the same time, difficulties in agreeing on key technical and policy issues have become more apparent, leading to timeline changes. Countries both within and outside the IF are implementing unilateral measures; this likely will increase in 2024 if Pillar One does not enter into force by the end of 2023.

Most recently, the OECD's authority over the international tax reform process has faced challenges from individual countries taking independent unilateral action, and from other organizations such as the G-24 and United Nations (UN), who have expressed their dissatisfaction with the cadence of the negotiations as well as the disparate impact of the rules on developing countries.

In November 2022, the UN General Assembly's finance committee adopted a resolution mandating the UN to start discussions on international taxation standards, effectively challenging the OECD's long-recognized competence in this space. As an initial step, the resolution requests the UN Secretary General to prepare a report that analyzes all relevant international legal instruments and outlines potential next steps. The General Assembly will consider the report at its next annual session in September 2023.

Observation: While the OECD states there will be a Pillar One MLC ready for signing in mid-2023, there may not be a total consensus to the document that is issued. In addition, it is not certain that all the IF countries—whether or not they agreed to the October 2021 statement—ultimately will sign and then take the further steps necessary to ratify the treaty and implement the rules domestically. This could cause instability for the current taxation system, including transfer pricing rules. Likewise, if Pillar Two is not implemented with reasonable consistency among jurisdictions, there will be substantial compliance costs and double tax liabilities. Companies should prepare for the possible risk of the tax policy changes being adopted by some, but perhaps not all, jurisdictions or being broadly adopted but with meaningful differences among adopting jurisdictions, either of which could increase tax costs and administrative challenges.

Pillar One

Multilateral convention status

Under “Amount A” of Pillar One, a formulaic share of a portion of the consolidated profit of MNEs will be allocated to markets (i.e., where sales arise). Amount A applies to MNEs with revenues exceeding EUR 20 billion and a profitability greater than 10%. It reallocates 25% of the MNE's profit in excess of 10% of its revenues to market jurisdictions in which the MNE satisfies the ‘quantitative nexus’ test, subject to adjustments under the marketing and distribution profits safe harbor (MDSH).

Two sectors remain carved out from Amount A: extractive industries and regulated financial services. Amount A is expected to affect approximately 100 of the world's largest companies; it is estimated that approximately 50% of those are US MNEs.

The intention is for the rules under Amount A to be included in a multilateral convention, which the OECD has indicated should be available for signature in the first half of 2023. For Pillar One to enter into force, a “critical mass” of countries, including particularly the United States, but also Japan, Germany, the UK and France—which possess a substantial majority of parent companies for in-scope groups—must ratify the convention.

OECD guidance released

In 2022, the OECD released several documents to show progress in negotiations on technical work on Pillar One. In July 2022, the OECD issued a Progress Report on Amount A of Pillar One, which contained domestic model rules for the different building blocks relating to the taxing right under Amount A. These building blocks included a framework for MDSH and elimination of double tax. In October 2022, the OECD released a Progress Report covering administrative issues, including allocation of tax, information returns, and a dispute resolution process. The OECD also released several rolling public consultations regarding bespoke Amount A issues such as scoping, tax base determination, and revenue sourcing.

On December 20, 2022, the OECD released a consultation document on the draft Multilateral Convention provisions on digital services taxes and other measures under Amount A, which marked the last issue under Amount A released for public consultation. Earlier in December, the OECD also issued guidance on Amount B, which covers the scope and pricing of routine marketing and distribution activities.

Observation: Notwithstanding the issues addressed in the Progress Reports and rolling consultations, many unanswered questions remain, some of the most significant of which include:

- Confidentiality of taxpayer information;
- Scope of issues “related to Amount A” that are subject to tax certainty review;
- Composition of determination panels for addressing tax certainty;
- Role of withholding taxes in the elimination of double tax and MDSH mechanism;
- Other specific unidentified numbers in MDSH calculation, such as residual profit threshold and offset percentage; and
- Specific existing measures that constitute unilateral measures.

Observation: In the majority of cases, including the Progress Reports on Amount A and tax certainty, the proposed rules represented the work of the OECD Secretariat, as opposed to a consensus of IF member countries. Companies should therefore expect differences in the designs from the drafts to the final MLC language.

Pillar Two

Minimum tax regime

Under Pillar Two, the IF agreed to enact a jurisdictional-level minimum tax system with a minimum effective tax rate (ETR) of 15%. Companies with global turnover above EUR 750 million will be within the scope of Pillar Two, with headquarter jurisdictions retaining the option to apply the rules to smaller, domestic MNEs.

The global minimum tax rules under Pillar Two, referred to as the Global anti-Base Erosion (GloBE) Rules, consist of (1) the income inclusion rule (IIR), which will impose a top-up tax for the difference between the jurisdictional Pillar Two ETR and the 15% minimum rate; and (2) the UTPR (formerly known as the “Undertaxed Payments Rule”), which is intended to apply as a backstop if low-taxed income is not fully collected under the IIR. The IF also is developing the model provision for a “subject to tax rule” (STTR), together with a multilateral instrument for its implementation.

Since the 2020 Blueprint documents, several additional layers have been added to GloBE. First, in addition to the IIR and the UTPR, the respective country with the top-up tax may collect the amount via a qualified domestic minimum top-up tax (QDMTT). In addition, the scope of the UTPR was significantly broadened to allow collecting countries to reach payments both through denials of deductions as well as a collection of top-up tax, effectively changing it from an ‘undertaxed payments’ rule to an ‘undertaxed profits’ rule.

OECD guidance issued

The technical work for the GloBE rules is close to completion, with the OECD releasing Commentary and Illustrative examples in March 2022. The OECD in December released three documents under Pillar Two: a consultation document on tax certainty; a consultation document on the GloBE information return; and IF approved guidance on safe harbors, including a transitional public country-by-country reporting (CbCR) reporting safe harbor and a framework for development of permanent safe harbors, as well as penalty relief.

Observation: Along with the release of these documents, the OECD noted that it intends to release additional “Agreed Administrative Guidance” at an undetermined date. It is uncertain whether the guidance will address several of the most controversial technical issues in Pillar Two. Outstanding issues include the application of Pillar Two rules to domestic losses or equity financing partnerships, as well as the Pillar Two analysis of the US GILTI regime and guidance for QDMTTs.

Outlook for country actions

The implementation of Pillar Two is largely subject to individual jurisdictions changing their domestic law. An increasing number of countries have moved forward with Pillar Two implementation in the form of proposed legislation and/or public consultations, including Australia, Canada, Colombia, Ireland, Hong Kong, Japan, Malaysia, Mauritius, Singapore, and Switzerland. A growing list of these jurisdictions have either proposed or announced that they are considering a QDMTT. South Korea on December 23, 2022 passed Pillar Two global minimum tax rules in domestic legislation, becoming the first country to have done so.

Notwithstanding this progress, significant delays have arisen from political division in key territories, including the United States and the European Union. Even jurisdictions that have moved forward have since announced delays, including the United Kingdom and Hong Kong. Some jurisdictions are adapting a ‘wait and see’ approach when it comes to implementation, and appear unlikely to move forward if Pillar Two is not widely adopted.

US developments related to global tax policy

The IRA, enacted August 16, 2022, includes a 15% corporate alternative minimum tax (CAMT) and other revenue-raising provisions, as well as numerous climate-related tax credits, incentives, and financing options available to companies and individuals. While the Biden Administration had proposed changes to GILTI in 2021, including implementing it on a country-by-country basis, these proposals were not enacted as part of the IRA. Therefore, US-parented MNCs likely would be subject to IIR and the UTPR assuming neither GILTI nor the CAMT (separately or in combination) is treated as a compliant IIR under the Pillar Two rules.

In addition, as described further below, notwithstanding that the CAMT is imposed at a 15% rate and is calculated based on financial statement income (with adjustments), several differences exist between the computation of the CAMT and Pillar Two rules applicable to QDMTTs. As a result, there is considerable doubt as to whether the CAMT could be considered a QDMTT applicable to the United States.

Observation: The IF has agreed to address GILTI co-existence under Pillar Two. It is anticipated that forthcoming Pillar Two administrative guidance will address this issue as it applies to current-law GILTI. Technical inconsistencies with Pillar Two would need to be addressed in this regard—for example, the fact that GILTI is calculated on a global-blending basis, while the OECD Pillar Two Blueprint is calculated on a jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction basis.

Congressional reactions

Like other jurisdictions, the United States has experienced domestic political disagreements with respect to implementation of the two-pillar approach. Last December, every Republican member of the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees signed a letter to Treasury Secretary Yellen regarding the UTPR, warning that other countries implementing the UTPR will not be able to “force the hand” of the US Congress to take any action or allow companies to be taxed in a manner that is inconsistent with US law and US bilateral treaties. The letter also raised concerns about the expanded reach of the UTPR, stating that the UTPR effectively imposes tax on the income of entities that do not have a nexus to the collecting jurisdiction.

A number of members of Congress also expressed objections last year regarding transparency by Treasury about IF negotiations and the perceived disparate impact of the Pillar One rules on US tech companies. In an October 2022 letter, then-Ways and Means Ranking Member Kevin Brady (R-TX) and committee member Kevin Hern (R-OK) urged Secretary Yellen to retain all documents and communications related to Pillar One. This followed previous efforts by House Republicans to obtain information about Pillar One and calls for public hearings during the previous Congress. Senate Finance Committee Republicans also requested the same information.

Observation: While President Biden may propose changes to US international tax rules as part of his FY 2024 budget intended to make them more compliant with Pillar One and Pillar Two, such proposals are expected to face opposition by the Republican-controlled House and by Republicans in the Democratic-led Senate. The House Ways and Means Committee also is expected to hold oversight hearings at which Treasury officials will be asked to testify on the role of the Biden administration in the IF negotiations and for more information on how US companies would be impacted.



Interaction of the US corporate alternative minimum tax with Pillar Two

While some similarities exist between Pillar Two's QDMTT and the US CAMT—including a top-up tax mechanism, a 15% rate of tax, and a tax based on financial statement income as a starting point—the two regimes have a number of significant differences.

The CAMT, similar to the current US GILTI regime, is calculated on a blended basis, rather than a country-by-country basis as required by Pillar Two. Additionally, the treatments of tax credits under the CAMT and Pillar Two differ. Because taxpayers may utilize their general business credits against both their regular tax liability and the CAMT under the IRA, the value of general business credits (e.g., the research tax credit and low-income housing credit) is preserved, while the Pillar Two rules treat such credits as reducing the amount of tax paid by the taxpayer, potentially resulting in additional tax liability that erodes the benefit of the credits.

Accordingly, the CAMT may not satisfy the definition of a QDMTT under the GloBE rules. While the US GILTI regime and the CAMT (to the extent imposed on CFC income) each may be deemed to be a qualified CFC tax regime,

the determinations of each tax as a qualified CFC tax regime are foreign-law determinations and subject to foreign-law guidance.

Observation: Pillar Two will be a data-intensive exercise for companies. Starting to model outcomes can help companies analyze costs and risks, engage with stakeholders, and avoid being caught if unintended consequences arise, whether they are associated with the application of the rules or issues with the visibility of the data needed to perform the calculations.

Action item:

Companies should have data collection systems in place to perform Pillar Two and CAMT calculations, as well as identify how these data points interact with one another and what impact there would be to their ETR as well as how the calculations differ for financial accounting purposes.

Interaction of US qualified refundable tax credits with Pillar Two

The determination of whether a US company's domestic tax rate is less than 15% would be based on the Pillar Two ETR calculation that deviates from the Internal Revenue Code and generally accepted accounting principles and that differs, in a taxpayer-unfavorable manner, from the US CAMT.

The Pillar Two rules generally include refundable credits and incentives in pre-tax earnings (the denominator in the ETR calculation) and nonrefundable credits and incentives in the income tax benefit (the numerator in the ETR calculation).

Observation: Nonrefundable credits will impact the Pillar Two ETR significantly more than refundable credits, as nonrefundable credits reduce the numerator dollar-for-dollar, while refundable credits only slightly dilute the ETR via an increase to the denominator. At this time, it is not clear whether transferable credits (including credits that are now transferable under the IRA) will be accounted for under US GAAP in a manner that is similar to the treatment of refundable credits (as an increase in income) or similar to the treatment of nonrefundable credits (as a reduction in tax expense). This financial accounting determination could impact the OECD's analysis regarding the treatment of transferable credits for Pillar Two purposes, with potentially material impacts on companies claiming transferable credits on their tax returns.

Most US business tax incentives are in the form of nonrefundable credits, including the research tax credit, tax credits for renewable energy, the low-income housing tax credit, the new markets tax credit, and the work opportunity tax credit. Further, the current Pillar Two mechanics could dilute certain other US incentive regimes—e.g., the exemption for state and local bond interest and the deduction for foreign-derived intangible income—that exempt certain income from tax or impose tax on certain income at a reduced rate.

Further uncertainties arise for companies with significant investments that generate some types of credits (such as the low-income housing tax credit, new markets tax credit, and certain energy tax credits). These investments are often structured as 'tax equity,' pursuant to which the investor provides financing to a partner in exchange for an economic return that is significantly in the form of tax benefits (e.g., tax credits and tax deductions associated with accelerated depreciation). For financial accounting purposes, tax equity investments frequently are accounted for under the equity method of accounting (or a similar method).

Observation: The Pillar Two rules generally indicate that the income or loss, as well as the tax expense, associated with equity method investments are not taken into account in determining a company's Pillar Two ETR. Given the unique nature of tax equity investment structures, however, it remains unclear whether the exclusion for equity method investments provided under the Pillar Two rules would be interpreted to apply to the tax credits generated by such investments.

The UTPR will levy additional tax on the foreign affiliates of a US company if the US parent's tax on its US domestic income (as measured using Pillar Two's unfavorable accounting rules) is less than 15%.

Observation: The UTPR would undercut long-standing tax incentives adopted by Congress with broad, bipartisan support intended to strengthen the US economy and achieve important social, economic, and environmental objectives.



EU implementation of Pillars One and Two

Pillar One

Although the European Commission (EC) previously announced plans to release a draft Pillar One legislative proposal, there have been delays, most likely due to the difficulties encountered in agreeing on a path forward for Pillar Two. While no proposal has yet been released, the final text of the Pillar Two Directive obligates the EC to submit a report to the EU Council “assessing the situation regarding the implementation of Pillar One.” This obligation arose as a result of the insistence of Poland to link Pillar One and Pillar Two; it is unclear whether this linkage will end up being political or legal. The EU Council upon conclusion of the Pillar Two Directive also called on the EC to put forward a proposal by 2023 to address the potential lack of an agreement on a Pillar One MLC.

Observation: With the prospects for successful implementation of Pillar One uncertain, it remains to be seen if the EC will move ahead with legislative proposals in the absence of international agreement.

Pillar Two

Adoption of Directive

In December 2021, the EC published its proposal for a Council Directive “on ensuring a global minimum level of taxation for multinational groups in the Union” (Draft Directive). Under EU rules, unanimous agreement was required to adopt the proposed Draft Directive.

After debate on the December 2021 draft Directive, a series of compromise proposals failed to secure unanimous support at Economic and Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN) meetings throughout most of 2022 due to objections from a number of EU member countries, including Estonia, Hungary, Malta, Poland, and Sweden. By June 2022, only Poland continued to withhold support for the Pillar Two proposal, citing concerns about the EU adoption of the two-pillar solution, including Pillar One. Poland’s support subsequently was secured with the inclusion of a statement reaffirming EU support for Pillar One, as noted above, and an undertaking to make progress on Pillar One in 2023 at an EU level if there was insufficient progress at a global level.

However, at the same ECOFIN in which Poland supported the proposal, Hungary withdrew the support it previously had given, noting an uncertain economic outlook, the war in Ukraine, and concerns about the EU being a ‘first mover’ on Pillar Two. In response to Hungary’s objections, five Member States (France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the Netherlands) issued a joint statement last September to express their full commitment to implement the global minimum tax on an individual country basis if necessary.

Hungary’s objections ultimately were overcome in December 2022 when an agreement was reached to advance the draft Pillar Two Directive, unblock financial aid to Ukraine, and release certain EU economic recovery funds to Hungary. On December 15, the EU Council formally adopted the EU minimum tax Directive by unanimous agreement, with Hungary abstaining from the final vote.

EU member states will need to transpose the Directive into national law by the end of 2023. The IIR will apply to years beginning from December 31, 2023. The UTPR will apply a year later, for years beginning from December 31, 2024.

Directive issues

The Directive largely mirrors the OECD model rules but differs in some notable respects. In particular, the Directive includes an extension of the IIR to “large-scale” purely domestic groups and allows EU Member States to exercise the option to apply a domestic top-up tax to low-taxed domestic subsidiaries. This will allow the top-up tax due by the subsidiaries of the multinational group to be charged locally – within the respective Member State – and not at the level of the parent entity.

Observation: While the Directive should bring about a more coordinated approach to transposing the GloBE rules into national legislation within the EU, issues remain around inconsistent interpretation of the rules. The Directive refers to the OECD implementation framework guidance (most of which will be developed in 2023) as being a useful source of illustration and interpretation. However, the Directive does not oblige countries to incorporate this guidance into domestic law, which could result in inconsistent application of the rules. In addition, outside organizations continue to voice concern about the measures being implemented too quickly, notwithstanding the apparent momentum in some EU countries to bring Pillar Two into effect.

Observation: If Pillar Two moves forward in the individual EU countries as expected, the EU will be the first bloc of countries to adopt the Pillar Two minimum taxation rules. This could spur on other countries to adopt and implement the rules. At the same time, actions by foreign jurisdictions to implement the Pillar Two rules may lead to political tensions with some in the United States, especially with respect to the imposition of the UTPR on the domestic US income of US-headquartered businesses, as highlighted by the December letter of Republican members of the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees.

Unilateral measures

Precluding DSTs

The key impetus of the global negotiations on the OECD's digital tax project was to preclude unilateral measures (e.g., DSTs) from being imposed by different jurisdictions. The October 8, 2021 Inclusive Framework agreement formalized this resolution.

The agreement noted that the Pillar One MLC would remove existing DSTs and “relevant similar measures” for all companies, presumably including those that are not in scope of Pillar One. It also commits parties not to introduce any new DSTs or other relevant similar measures. Specifically, the agreement requires the parties not to impose any newly enacted DSTs (or other such measures) from October 8, 2021 until the earlier of December 31, 2023 or the coming into force of the MLC.

In keeping with this objective, in late 2021 a joint statement on a “unilateral measures compromise” was issued by the United States and Austria, France, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom, where the latter countries agreed to withdraw their DST rules for all companies once Pillar One takes effect. The same countries also agreed that DST liabilities accrued in their jurisdictions in the period beginning on January 1, 2022 and ending on the earlier of the date the MLC implementing Pillar One comes into force or December 31, 2023 (the Interim Period) would be credited against the tax liability arising from the introduction of Amount A under Pillar One.

In return, the United States agreed to terminate proposed Section 301 trade actions, including for periods before October 8, 2021, and not to impose any new trade actions, until the end of the Interim Period with respect to the existing DSTs imposed by the countries participating in the joint statement. The United States reached similar agreements with Turkey and India.

Uncertain outlook

Observation: The future of DSTs and the potential for renewed tax-related trade disputes remains unclear beyond 2023, particularly for those jurisdictions that decide not to join the MLC, or for companies that are not within the scope of Amount A. Further, the agreement between the United States and key countries is less than a year from expiring. If the MLC is not considered to be in force by the end of 2023, agreements to withdraw measures may be revoked, with uncertainty about the status of credits for DSTs already collected.

Observation: The potential delay for Pillar One enactment may lead to enactment of more DSTs and other unilateral measures. Companies need to be prepared to continue paying DSTs (with or without possible credits against Amount A liability) in jurisdictions that have not yet withdrawn them and those that did not sign onto the October 8 Inclusive Framework agreement (e.g., Nigeria and Kenya).

See Appendix D for a list of 30 countries with current or proposed DSTs or other unilateral measures.

Observation: While it is common to equate unilateral measures with DSTs, the scope of unilateral measures varies widely among countries. Some jurisdictions have proposed or enacted digital advertising taxes, while others have more broadly scoped their measures in the form of digital or service PEs, diverted profits taxes, withholding taxes, or significant economic presence (SEP) tests. In addition, the draft MLC language permits certain measures such as VATs or taxation of PEs to be excluded from the definition of DSTs; accordingly, some countries may seek to tailor the existing scope of transactions and types of tax in light of the OECD guidance. In addition, audit-driven actions by tax administrations in some countries may be viewed as resulting in ‘de facto’ DSTs.

Action item:

Companies should analyze their specific transaction flows to determine the possible breadth of potential additional tax liabilities, not only from a legal and regulatory sense, but also from a fact-based tax audit vantage point.

Draft multilateral convention

The Draft MLC language released on unilateral measures contains two articles: one on the removal of existing unilateral measures, plus a provision eliminating Amount A allocations for parties imposing DSTs and relevant similar measures. The document requires that parties shall not apply any measures listed as a defined unilateral measure as of the date the MLC “enters into effect with respect to that Party.”

Specific measures that would qualify as unilateral measures are to be defined at a later date in an Annex. For now, the MLC language has broad criteria that will decide whether a tax meets the definition of a DST or “relevant similar measure,” based primarily on location-specific and discriminatory characteristics of the tax.

Observation: In addition to DSTs/unilateral measures on the national and international level, companies should prepare for an increasing proliferation of digital taxes at the subnational level.

For a discussion of US state and local digital tax proposals, see the State Tax Policy section below.

OECD to consider other issues

The OECD has begun work on other projects, including developing more permanent guidance for tax issues involving worker mobility, carbon mitigation, crypto asset reporting, tax morale, and digitalization of tax administrations. In addition, the OECD Centre for Tax Policy and Administration (CTPA) has undergone leadership changes, with the retirement of Pascal Saint-Amans, the Director of the CTPA. The OECD announced on January 13 that Manal Corwin, a former US Treasury Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Tax Affairs in the Obama administration, has been appointed to serve as the new CTPA Director. Companies should be attuned to the changing leadership as well as the shifting focus toward other tax policy issues and how those interact with the two-pillar solution.

Additional EU developments expected to affect MNCs

The implementation of the global minimum tax in the EU is accompanied by other significant corporate tax changes that are expected to move forward in 2023.

- **Code of Conduct:** In November 2022, the EU Member States' Finance Ministers agreed to revise text to the European Code of Conduct for Business Taxation. The Code of Conduct plays an important role in determining which tax regimes are assessed for purposes of the EU list of noncooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes. The revision extends the scope of the Code of Conduct to cover both preferential tax measures and tax features of general application (referred to as "tax measures") which affect, or may affect, in a significant way the location of business activity in the EU. The latter element, the general features of a regime, is new and will assess whether that general feature leads to lower tax liability, including no tax liability, other than the nominal tax rate or deferred taxation as a feature of a distribution tax system. The additional measures in the Code of Conduct apply as of January 1, 2023.
- **Public CbCR:** The EU's public country-by-country reporting directive, published in December 2021, is being transposed into individual Member States' legislation. The latest date for this to apply is for accounting periods beginning on or after June 22, 2024. The Directive would apply to both EU and non-EU based MNCs operating through a branch or subsidiary with total consolidated revenue of more than EUR 750 million in each of the last two consecutive financial years. Romania is the first EU country to formally introduce the EU CbCR reporting requirements, effective January 1, 2023.
- **SAFE Directive:** Following a related stakeholder consultation that ended in October, the EC is expected to move forward with a proposal for a "SAFE (Securing the activity framework of enablers)" Directive. This aims to tackle the role of "enablers" involved in facilitating tax planning in the EU. The initiative is intended to interact and build on existing initiatives to challenge tax evasion and aggressive tax planning, notably DAC6, the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive, the AML Directive, and the Whistle-blowers Directive. The stated key objective is to prevent "enablers" from setting up complex structures in non-EU countries that could erode the tax base of member states through tax evasion and aggressive tax planning. Legislative proposals are expected in spring 2023.
- **Carbon tax:** In December 2022, the EU reached an agreement to impose a carbon tax (also known as "CBAM") on imports of carbon-related goods such as steel and cement, with the goal of supporting European industries as they decarbonize. The CBAM proposal, which was first released in July 2021, will begin to operate from October 2023 onward. Non-EU countries have expressed concerns about rules they view as discriminatory.
- **CSRD:** In November 2022, the EU formally adopted the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive, which requires companies operating in the EU to publicly disclose and report on ESG issues. Expected to impact 50,000 companies operating in the EU, the Directive will become effective upon implementation within each EU member state. The companies impacted will include more entities than are reporting under current EU non-financial reporting requirements, including certain US and other non-EU companies and their EU subsidiaries. The rules will start applying between 2024 and 2028, depending on the size of the company.

- **BEFIT:** In October 2022, the EC started a public consultation on “Business in Europe: Framework for Income Taxation (BEFIT).” This initiative, which aims to introduce a single corporate tax rulebook for the EU, would set out a structural reform of the EU business tax framework consistent with the principles underpinning the OECD two-pillar framework. It is also informed by work on previous initiatives, including the 2011 Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) and the two 2016 Common Corporate Tax Base (CCTB) and (CCCTB) proposals. The proposed BEFIT system would focus on tax base adjustments and the design of a formula for allocating taxable profits. This would apply to EU businesses or companies that are part of groups which, in most cases, are present in more than one EU country. A legislative proposal is expected in the third quarter of 2023.
- **DEBRA:** In May 2022, the EC published an EU Directive Proposal regarding a debt-equity bias reduction allowance (DEBRA) and a limitation of the tax deductibility of exceeding borrowing costs (the proposal). Negotiations on the draft directive have started. A recent ECOFIN memo to the European Council on tax issues states that in light of the many interlinkages with other corporate tax files, the examination of the DEBRA proposal will be suspended and, if appropriate, would be reassessed within a broader context only after other proposals in the area of corporate income taxation announced by the EC have been put forward.
- **EU “shell entities” directive:** On December 22, 2021, the EC proposed a shell company directive, also known as ‘ATAD 3,’ to target EU shell entities that are deemed to have minimal substance. Since the proposal was published, the EC has received feedback and is redrafting the directive. The Czech Republic, which held the presidency of the EU in the latter half of 2022, concluded that further important technical work is needed before an agreement could be feasible.
- **Digital initiatives:** Following a stakeholder consultation earlier in the year, the EC in December 2022 published a ‘VAT in the Digital Age’ package, aimed at modernizing the EU’s Value Added Tax (VAT) system to work better for businesses and be more resistant to fraud by embracing and promoting digitalization and adapting to the development of the VAT economy. The EC also published a separate draft EU Directive on Administrative Cooperation (DAC8) dealing with crypto assets transparency. With certain exceptions, these changes would apply from January 1, 2026.

Observation: Recent EU tax proposals, particularly the CSRD and Public CbCR, mark a new era of “sustainable reporting” as well as tax transparency, going beyond current non-financial reporting requirements. Companies operating in the EU should prepare for increased compliance with these requirements as well as an increasing proliferation of sustainability disclosures from the SEC and the International Sustainability Standard Board (ISSB).

Other international developments

As global tax law revisions continue, some countries are considering actions to change corporate tax rates, to incentivize investment, or to protect their tax base.

After a transition of executive power last year, the UK is expected to increase its corporate tax rate to 25%, effective April 1, 2023, and its DPT rate from 25% to 31% as of the same date.

In 2022, the United Arab Emirates announced a major change to their tax system, with the introduction of a generalized Corporate Income Tax from mid-2023. On December 9, the UAE issued a federal decree to prepare for a 9% tax on business profits scheduled to come into force in June 2023. Assuming the UAE follows through on previously announced plans to implement Pillar Two, it is expected that this rate will be raised to 15% for in-scope companies.

Australia recently passed a budget with proposed legislation significantly affecting taxpayers making payments to related parties in relation to intangibles in low-or no-tax jurisdictions, defined as having a rate below 15% or a patent box regime. The law would deny deductions for payments to related parties in relation to intangible payments for any payments from January 1, 2023.

Observation: Given the broad nature of the changes introduced, multinationals with operations in these countries should analyze and consider modeling the impact of these new provisions.

Tax treaties

There has been limited movement on US tax treaties in recent years. The challenge of securing Senate action on tax treaties has been the primary impediment to implementing new agreements. US tax treaties traditionally have been considered in the Senate under unanimous consent procedures, which permit ratification of treaties without requiring significant Senate floor time for debate and formal vote that requires a two-thirds majority.

However, since being elected in 2010, Senator Rand Paul (R-KY) consistently has objected to expediting the consideration of tax treaties due to his concerns related to tax information exchange provisions, which have been expanded in recent years as part of a global effort to prevent deemed tax evasion. As a result, few tax treaties or tax protocols have been ratified by the US Senate for more than 10 years.

US-Croatia treaty

On December 7, 2022, the United States signed the first US tax treaty with Croatia, the only EU member country with which the United States does not have an existing tax treaty. This is the first tax treaty the United States has signed in more than a decade. The treaty would eliminate withholding taxes on cross-border dividend payments to certain pension funds and on interest payments, and would provide lower tax rates for royalties and withholding taxes on dividends paid to other entities. The treaty is subject to ratification, which would require a two-thirds vote in the US Senate, and therefore may be subject to procedural delay, as noted above.

Observation: The US-Croatia treaty has significance because it is the first US tax treaty signed that is based on the 2016 model income tax treaty, including provisions for limitation on benefits (LOB) and certain other provisions (e.g., denying benefits for payments under special tax regimes, or for certain expatriated entities, and termination provision for changes in tax law). In addition, it is the first bilateral tax treaty fully negotiated since enactment of the TCJA.

US-Hungary treaty

The US Treasury Department took the rare step in July 2022 of providing notice to Hungary that it is terminating the US-Hungary income tax treaty, which has been in effect since 1979. Treasury explained its action based on its long-standing concerns with Hungary's tax system and the treaty itself, and a lack of satisfactory action by Hungary to remedy these concerns in coordination with other EU member countries that are seeking to implement the OECD Pillar Two global minimum tax proposal. The treaty termination will apply to US-source dividends, interest, and royalties for payments made on or after January 1, 2024.

A new US income tax treaty with Hungary was agreed to in 2010 (to replace the 1979 tax treaty), primarily to add a LOB article, the United States' traditional treaty anti-abuse provision. However, the 2010 treaty has not been ratified by the US Senate in light of the objections of Senator Paul noted above. In addition, according to a Treasury spokesperson, the 2010 treaty is not supported by the Biden administration given reductions in Hungary's corporate tax rate since 2010 and the 2017 changes to US tax law.

The United States has rarely terminated a US income tax treaty. The last termination was the 1980 US-Malta income tax treaty in 1997 (a new treaty was entered into in 2008). Prior to that, the United States terminated its tax treaty relationship with the Netherlands Antilles in 1987. After having provided a notice of termination of the treaty relationship (actually, an extension of the US income tax treaty with the Netherlands), the United States partially withdrew its termination notice on account of the negative impact of the termination notice on the Eurobond market; the partial withdrawal reinstated the interest article of the treaty in order to stabilize the Eurobond market.

Observation: Some in Congress have questioned whether Treasury's termination notice was intended to put pressure on Hungary with respect to its position on Pillar Two of the OECD project. Now that Hungary has lifted its OECD Pillar Two objections, the question arises whether the United States could or should withdraw its treaty termination notice in conjunction with pursuing the pending new treaty negotiated in 2010 with revisions. As noted above, the United States previously withdrew a treaty termination notice, at least partially, in the case of the US-Netherlands Antilles treaty. Notwithstanding Treasury's stated reasons for terminating the tax treaty with Hungary, Treasury's actions in this regard could contribute to a perception by other countries that the United States is not a committed tax treaty partner, given that the United States already has a much more limited network of tax treaties than other major economies and the US Senate has ratified only a few tax treaties and tax protocols over the last decade on account of the objections of Senator Paul.

US-Chile treaty

Prospects for Senate action to ratify a US-Chile tax treaty remain unclear more than a decade after the two countries signed an agreement in 2010. The treaty was first referred to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 2012. After hearings, the treaty was reported out favorably by that committee in 2014 and 2015, but was not voted on by the full Senate.

The US-Chile treaty was most recently approved by that committee in March 2022. The treaty was reported on March 29, 2022, with instruments of ratification that include certain reservations.

The reservations address Treasury's concerns that tax treaty provisions could be viewed as overriding US base erosion and anti-abuse tax (BEAT) rules by affirming that nothing in the treaty "shall be construed as preventing the United States from imposing a tax under section 59A" (i.e., the BEAT rules) on a US tax-resident company or on the profits of a Chilean tax-resident company that are attributable to a US permanent establishment (PE). The reservations also would modify the relief from the double taxation article of the treaty. The Senate did not act last year on either the US-Chile tax treaty or the proposed reservations.

The treaty was ratified by the Chilean Congress in September 2015. Assuming the treaty is resubmitted by President Biden to the Senate in 2023 and the US Senate eventually approves the treaty with the reservations, the reservations would have to be accepted by Chile before the treaty could enter into force.

Observation: Treasury officials have stated that the US-Chile tax treaty reservations should be considered as a model for other pending tax treaties and future tax treaty negotiations. How the US-Chile agreement on reservations advances may be a precursor to progress on the pending US tax treaties with Hungary and Poland, assuming they are resubmitted to the Senate for approval during the 118th Congress. Those treaties previously were submitted to the Senate for consideration, but did not progress through the Senate ratification process due in part to Treasury concerns that these tax treaties could be viewed as overriding BEAT. Progress on the pending US-Hungary treaty also will depend on how the bilateral treaty relationship overall between the United States and Hungary is resolved.

Other treaties

Treasury officials have commented in public forums that work is underway to update the existing treaty network. Also, a treaty with Vietnam is expected to be addressed to account for targeted reservations relating to 2017 tax reform. Treasury officials also have publicly indicated their desire to update and modernize existing treaties with Israel and Switzerland. Finally, Treasury concluded treaty negotiations for new tax treaties with Norway and Romania.



Trade policy

The war in Ukraine and concerns about the economic and foreign policy goals of the Chinese government have led the United States and many of its allies in Europe and Asia to apply a national security lens to economic and trade policy. Countries are paying greater attention to the national security risks of cross-border investments involving data, infrastructure, and technology. The United States and other countries also are acting to provide increased incentives for onshoring and implement other policies in response to concerns about the current geopolitical environment.

As countries review their geopolitical exposure, multinationals may consider more frequent and extensive risk assessments for their global footprint. The changing nature of globalization and supply chains is expected to put upward pressure on costs, as companies focus less on cost minimization and more on supply chain resiliency.

Observation: The recent supply chain improvement is demand driven. Cyclical improvements in supply chains are expected to be made through 2023 as demand slows, backlogs clear, and supply gradually rebounds. While slowing demand may provide temporary relief, global supply chains could experience a challenging environment once again assuming a return to historic consumer demand levels.

In a statement issued after being appointed the new chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, Chairman Smith noted that the committee will “examine using both trade policy and our tax code to re-shore and strengthen our supply chains, where products and services vital to our national security are made here at home using American labor, as well as craft policies that help America achieve food and medical security rather than dependence on nations like China.”

Trade promotion authority (TPA) has been used since the 1970s to provide for privileged, no amendments allowed, consideration of trade agreements that have been negotiated by US trade officials with Congressional oversight and consultation. The most recent TPA statute was enacted in 2015 and expired in July 2021. President Biden did not ask for the TPA statute to be reauthorized.

The previous Congress did consider legislative action to renew certain expired trade provisions such as the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) and Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA), but no final action was taken.

US onshoring incentives

Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors (CHIPS) and Science Act

President Biden on August 9, 2022, signed into law the CHIPS and Science Act, which provides roughly \$55 billion in grants, loan guarantees, and other support to promote increased US domestic manufacturing of semiconductors to address supply chain issues and national security concerns. The CHIPS and Science Act prohibits federal incentive fund recipients from expanding or building new manufacturing capacity for certain advanced semiconductors in China or in any other specific countries deemed to present a national security threat to the United States.

To ensure that these restrictions remain current with the status of semiconductor technology and with US export control regulation, the Secretary of Commerce, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence, must regularly reconsider, with industry input, which technologies are subject to this prohibition.

Inflation Reduction Act's electric vehicle credit

The IRA modified the clean vehicle tax credit to apply to new electric vehicles. The amount of the credit is equal to a maximum of \$7,500 per eligible vehicle. These vehicles must be assembled in the United States and must meet critical mineral or battery component requirements. Eligible vehicles that meet one of the component requirements, but not both, are eligible for a credit of \$3,750.

To meet the critical mineral requirement, 40% (for calendar years prior to 2024) of critical minerals contained in the battery must be extracted or processed in a country with which the United States has a free trade agreement, or have been recycled in North America. To meet the battery content requirement, 50% (for calendar years prior to 2024) of the components contained in the battery used in the clean vehicle must be manufactured or assembled in North America. For calendar years after 2023, an eligible vehicle may not contain any battery components that were manufactured by a "foreign entity of concern," and, after calendar year 2024, a clean vehicle may not contain any critical minerals that were extracted, processed, or recycled by a foreign entity of concern.

European Union policymakers have voiced opposition to these domestic content requirements, arguing that the provisions may violate Article III:4 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which prevents members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) from favoring domestically produced goods over imports. The European Commission on October 26, 2022, launched the US-EU Task Force on the IRA to address specific concerns raised by the EU related to the IRA.

The Treasury Department on December 29, 2022 released a whitepaper—the “Anticipated Direction of Forthcoming Proposed Guidance on Critical Mineral and Battery Component Value Calculations for the New Clean Vehicle Credit”—stating its intention to issue proposed guidance in March 2023. The whitepaper provides that Treasury and the IRS expect to (1) seek comment in the proposed guidance on what criteria should be used to identify free trade agreements for purposes of the critical materials requirement and (2) propose that these criteria include whether an agreement reduces or eliminates trade barriers on a preferential basis, commits the parties to refrain from imposing new trade barriers, establishes high-standard disciplines in key areas affecting trade, and/or reduces or eliminates restrictions on exports or commits the partners to refrain from imposing such restrictions, including for the critical minerals contained in electric vehicle batteries. The whitepaper also provides that Treasury and the IRS expect to adopt an expansive definition of which countries have a free trade agreement with the United States.

US-Russia relations

In response to Russia’s ongoing aggression against Ukraine, President Biden on April 8, 2022, signed the Suspending Normal Trade Relations with Russia and Belarus Act, which subjects imports from Russia and Belarus to duty rates set forth in Column 2 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States. CBP on July 13, 2022 announced an increase in Column 2 duties for certain articles imported from Russia. BIS on September 15, 2022, issued final regulations expanding the existing sanctions against Russia and Belarus by imposing new export controls.

The Commerce Department on November 10, 2022 announced that it no longer will treat Russia as a market economy in its anti-dumping proceedings. This decision gives the United States the ability to apply the full force of US anti-dumping law to address the market distortions caused by increasing interference from the Russian government in their economy.

The Commerce Department found that extensive Russian government involvement in the economy has led to distorted prices and costs, which do not accurately reflect whether Russian companies are fairly pricing exports to the United States. In future cases involving Russian exports, the Commerce Department says it will apply an alternative methodology to calculate the anti-dumping duties on Russian exports, using market-based prices and costs from a country at a comparable level of economic development that produces comparable merchandise.

US-China relations

US multinationals operating in China are increasingly reassessing their long-term global investments plans in response to shifting business sentiment toward the policies of the Chinese government and an increased focus on supply chain diversification. Companies are not leaving China en masse, but some are reluctant to increase investments there. Some are starting to consider shifting at least part of their operations out of China.

Observation: There has been in recent years growing bipartisan support in Congress for scrutinizing the actions of Chinese authorities related to economic competition and national security. The House in early January established a “Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party,” to be led by Rep. Mike Gallagher (R-WI).

Continued expansion of China’s data laws—requiring the state to have access to all digital systems and data within the country—can be expected to clash with other countries’ measures to protect their own data and digital infrastructure. For example, the United States is limiting technology exports to China and is pressuring other countries to help limit China’s technological rise. This pressure could be met with resistance, making supply chain management harder for US multinationals.

Section 301 sanctions

US Trade Representative (USTR) Katherine Tai in May 2022 commenced the statutory four-year review of the additional tariffs on certain imports from China put in place in 2018 as part of the Section 301 investigation of “China’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation.” The USTR has notified representatives of domestic industries that benefit from the tariffs of the possible termination of the tariffs and of the opportunity for representatives to request continuation. The USTR in September 2022 announced that in response to requests for continuation, the tariffs would not be terminated and that the USTR would conduct a review of the tariffs.

The USTR in October 2022 announced the next steps in the four-year statutory review. The USTR requests public comments to consider the effectiveness of the tariffs in achieving the objectives of the investigation, other actions that could be taken, and the effects of the actions on the US economy. In advance of the public comment period, the USTR released a questionnaire that interested parties could use to submit comments. The questionnaire includes (1) questions on economy-wide impacts of the Section 301 tariffs; (2) sector-specific questions on whether the tariffs have been effective in eliminating discriminatory practices; and (3) requests for comments on specific tariff subheadings covered by the Section 301 action, including whether the tariffs should be maintained, eliminated, changed, or possibly added.

The USTR on December 16, 2022 announced a nine-month extension of 352 product exclusions in the China Section 301 investigation that had been scheduled to expire at the end of 2022.

New Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) export controls

The Commerce Department's BIS on October 7, 2022, issued an extension package of interim final regulations imposing new export controls as part of its ongoing efforts to protect US national security and foreign policy interests. The export controls are intended to restrict China's ability to (1) obtain advanced computing chips, develop and maintain supercomputers, and manufacture advanced semiconductors used by China to produce advanced military systems, including weapons of mass destruction; (2) improve the speed and accuracy of its military decision making, planning, and logistics, as well as of its autonomous military systems; and (3) commit human rights abuses.

Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA)

US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) on June 13, 2022, released guidance for importers regarding UFLPA, which was signed into law by President Biden on December 23, 2021. Under the authority of Section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930, UFLPA establishes a rebuttable presumption, which became effective June 21, 2022, denying importation into the United States of any goods, wares, articles, or merchandise mined, produced, or manufactured wholly or in part in China's Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, or produced by certain entities on the Forced Labor Enforcement Task Force (FLETF) Entity List.

The presumption applies unless CBP determines that the importer of record has fully complied with the FLETF-issued importer guidance, has responded to all inquiries, and has proven by clear and convincing evidence that the goods, wares, articles, or merchandise were not produced using forced labor. The importer guidance released by CBP was intended to assist the trade community in preparing for the implementation of the UFLPA rebuttable presumption. UFLPA's trade restrictions are already reducing imports of various Chinese exports, including solar panels and other components used for renewable energy projects.

Senate Finance Chairman Wyden on December 22, 2022 sent letters to eight automakers requesting responses to questions regarding reports that their supply chains may include materials from the Xinjiang region.



Other US trade policy developments

US-UK free trade agreement

The United States and the United Kingdom formally launched trade negotiations in March 2020 and completed five rounds of talks working toward a comprehensive US-UK Free Trade Agreement. After a promising start, US-UK trade negotiations slowed as both countries focused on other domestic and international priorities.

Ways and Means Committee Ranking Member Kevin Brady (R-TX) and Ways and Means Subcommittee on Trade Ranking Member Adrian Smith (R-NE), joined by all Republican Ways and Means Committee members, on October 12, 2022, sent a letter to UK Secretary for International Trade Kemi Badenoch calling for closer cooperation with the United Kingdom on economic policies, including a US-UK Free Trade Agreement.

US-Taiwan free trade agreement

A joint “US-Taiwan Initiative on 21st-Century Trade” was launched in June 2022 to develop concrete ways to deepen the economic and trade relationship, advance mutual trade priorities based on shared values, and promote innovation and inclusive economic growth for workers and businesses, including through new trade agreements.

US trade officials held trade talks with Taiwan officials in Taipei in early January of this year. The negotiating mandate for these negotiations, which was jointly announced last August, includes an agenda that seeks to:

- reach agreements on trade facilitation, good regulatory practices, and strong anti-corruption standards;
- enhance trade between small and medium enterprises;
- deepen agriculture trade, remove discriminatory barriers to trade, digital trade, robust labor and environmental standards; and
- address distortive practices of state-owned enterprises and non-market policies and practices.

Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF)

The United States on May 2, 2022 launched the IPEF with Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Fiji, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. The IPEF, designed to be different from a traditional free-trade agreement, includes a trade pillar as well as three additional pillars on supply chains; clean energy, decarbonization, and infrastructure; and tax and anti-corruption. The framework seeks to build high-standard, inclusive, free, and fair-trade commitments and to develop new and creative approaches to trade and technology cooperation with the goal of supporting enduring prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region and the United States.

The USTR on September 23, 2022, released its negotiating goals that lay out the focus and priorities for the trade pillar that will guide the USTR as IPEF negotiations move forward. This document lays out the Biden administration's vision for advancing these goals with partners in the Indo-Pacific region and negotiating a trade arrangement that will benefit IPEF countries. Specifically, the United States plans to negotiate commitments on labor, environment, digital economy, trade facilitation, agriculture, competition policy, transparency and good regulatory practices, inclusivity, and technical assistance and economic cooperation.

The USTR and the Commerce Department joined the first negotiating round for the IPEF in Brisbane, Australia from December 10-15, 2022. The Biden administration has signaled its intent to continue engaging with IPEF Partners and is planning to participate in additional in-person negotiating rounds in 2023.

Senate Finance Chairman Wyden and Ranking Member Crapo on December 1, 2022, sent a letter to President Biden raising Constitutional concerns about the process to approve and implement the proposed IPEF, as well as the need for the administration to increase consultation and transparency. The letter notes that Congress holds ultimate responsibility for approving trade pacts, regardless of whether they include tariff reduction or market access provisions. This follows a May 10, 2022, letter that Wyden, Crapo, and other Finance Committee members sent to the USTR calling for improved transparency and consultation with Congress on pending trade negotiations.

Observation: President Biden has not asked for the TPA statute to be reauthorized, as noted above. The lack of statutory trade promotion authority procedures, which include Congressional oversight and consultation requirements, is expected to complicate the outlook for Congress considering any trade agreements that may be negotiated by US trade officials.



State tax policy

State governments in general continue to show budget surpluses, although some state legislatures are bracing for a potential shift in economic conditions that may require a renewed focus on closing budget gaps. That makes 2023 a pivotal year for state tax policy, as incoming administrations and legislatures look to enact and fund various priorities and, in some cases, find tax revenue sources that might weather a possible economic downturn.

State business tax policies likely to be a focal point

Reflecting the budgetary and economic environment, states in 2022 generally did not adopt business tax increases. Many states instead sought ways to incentivize investment through tax changes, including decreasing tax rates. On corporate tax rates, a standout in this respect was Pennsylvania, which enacted a scheduled rate reduction from 9.99% in 2022 to 4.99% in 2031.

With continuing budget surpluses predicted in many states, some are likely to continue employing tax policy as an economic development tool. This includes lowering income tax rates, but also enacting and expanding credits and incentives, addressing apportionment rules with the intent to encourage in-state investment (single sales factor, market-based sourcing), and continuing to amend state conformity to federal tax rules, such as GILTI and Section 163(j).

However, some post-election developments suggest a more adverse business tax environment, especially if economic conditions worsen. California Governor Gavin Newsom (D), for example, called a special session that will run concurrent with the 2023 regular session to consider legislation to “deter price gouging by oil companies by imposing a financial penalty on excessive margins.” The state budget submitted to the legislature on January 10 reflects an estimated budget gap of \$22.5 billion in the 2023-24 fiscal year. Governor Newsom won reelection overwhelmingly, and his party holds supermajorities in both chambers of the legislature.

Mandatory unitary combined reporting could reemerge as a trend in 2023, with renewed consideration likely in Maryland. That state has seen such reporting proposed as a corporate tax “loophole closer” for many years. It remains unknown what position incoming Governor Wes Moore (D) will take on the issue. Depending on the results of special elections, Pennsylvania’s House under possible Democratic control may take up unitary combined reporting, although it appears unlikely to be approved by the Pennsylvania Senate, which remains under Republican control.

Pass-through entity and individual tax trends likely to continue

Since the TCJA’s enactment in 2017 of a \$10,000 limitation on the federal income tax individual itemized deduction for state and local taxes, 29 states have enacted “workarounds” for pass-through entity business owners by levying a state tax at the entity level and allowing a deduction or credit at the individual owner or partner level. This is an increase from last year of seven states (plus New York City), and more states are likely to follow this trend in 2023 in the absence of federal legislation to repeal or modify the limitation.

States continue to refine or amend their pass-through entity tax regimes through legislation or administrative guidance to address various issues of application and compliance. Further, some states have provided the benefit retroactively; for example, Colorado in 2022 made its pass-through tax election retroactive to 2018.

Another trend likely to continue in providing tax relief to individuals and business owners is cutting the personal income tax rate and adoption of a “flat tax.” Some rate reductions have been contingent on future revenue growth, and this trend is likely to continue as states are wary of future revenue downturns and the impact of decreased income tax collections.

One proposal that may receive further attention in 2023 is a “wealth tax.” While Washington State’s capital gains tax is subject to litigation, other states may look at taxing capital gains (whether realized or unrealized) as a means of funding budget priorities or addressing wealth disparities.

Digital tax, service tax, and excise tax expansion

The digital economy is another evolving area of state tax policy, particularly in the indirect tax arena. Maryland's digital advertising gross revenue tax was struck down by a Maryland state court in 2022, while another challenge to the tax was rejected by a federal district court. Appeals in both state and federal courts are pending.

In the interim, New York appears poised to consider an alternative "data tax" based on the use of New York residents' personal information. In addition, sales and use tax imposition on digital products likely will continue to expand. The Multistate Tax Commission is undertaking a project that seeks to broadly define digital products, which may prompt some states to consider legislation to expand their existing tax bases in this area.

Kentucky adopted legislation in 2022 imposing its sales and use tax on 35 newly listed services, including website design, development, and hosting services, marketing services, and prewritten computer software access (SaaS). The legislation also reduced the individual income tax rate in a phased approach depending on state revenue levels. As some states look to continue cutting income tax rates and provide other business incentives, taxes on services may be seen as an attractive funding source in 2023 (notwithstanding that business-to-business services make up the bulk of the untaxed service tax base).

States also may continue seeking new or increased funding sources for programs through excise taxes. Energy taxes and "cap and invest" programs likely will be at the forefront of policy discussions in many states given their ambitious environmental goals. New and evolving excise tax regimes in areas such as online wagering will continue to challenge businesses expanding into these markets.

Finally, property taxes are the largest source of local tax revenue, and COVID-era policies and remote working arrangements have strained many local budgets. Property tax rate increases and valuation disputes are likely to increase for localities faced with revenue shortfalls due to reduced office building occupancy rates.



Appendix A: Key policymakers

Congressional leadership in the 118th Congress

House Leadership

Speaker of the House	Kevin McCarthy (R-CA)
Majority Leader	Steve Scalise (R-LA)
Majority Whip	Tom Emmer (R-MN)
Republican Conference Chair	Elise Stefanik (R-NY)
Republican Conference Vice Chair	Mike Johnson (R-LA)
Republican Congressional Campaign Committee Chair	Richard Hudson (R-NC)
Republican Policy Committee Chair	Gary Palmer (R-AL)
Minority Leader	Hakeem Jeffries (D-NY)
Minority Whip	Katherine Clark (D-MA)
Assistant Democratic Leader	James E. Clyburn (D-SC)
Democratic Caucus Chair	Pete Aguilar (D-CA)
Democratic Conference Vice Chair	Ted Lieu (D-HI)
Democratic Policy and Communications Committee Chair	Joe Neguse (D-CO)
Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee Chair	Suzan DelBene (D-WA)

Senate Leadership

President of the Senate	Vice-President Kamala Harris (D)
President Pro Tempore	Patty Murray (D-WA)
Majority Leader and Democratic Conference Chair	Charles Schumer (D-NY)
Majority Whip	Dick Durbin (D-IL)
Democratic Policy and Communications Chair	Debbie Stabenow (D-MI)
Democratic Policy and Communications Vice-Chairs	Joe Manchin, III (D-WV), Cory Booker (D-NJ)
Democratic Conference Vice-Chairs	Elizabeth Warren (D-MA), Mark Warner (D-VA)
Democratic Conference Secretary	Tammy Baldwin (D-WI)
Deputy Democratic Conference Secretary	Brian Schatz (D-HI)
Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee Chair	Gary Peters (D-MI)
Democratic Steering Committee Chair	Amy Klobuchar (D-MN)
Democratic Outreach Committee Chair	Bernie Sanders (I-VT)
Democratic Outreach Committee Vice-Chair	Catherine Cortez Masto (D-NV)
<hr/>	
Minority Leader	Mitch McConnell (R-KY)
Minority Whip	John Thune (R-SD)
Republican Conference Chair	John Barrasso (R-WY)
Republican Conference Vice-Chair	Shelley Moore Capito (R-WV)
Republican Policy Committee Chair	Joni Ernst (R-IA)
National Republican Senatorial Committee Chair	Steve Daines (R-MT)

House and Senate tax-writing committees

House Ways and Means Committee

The Ways and Means Committee currently is composed of 25 Republicans and 18 Democrats, the same ratio of majority to minority members as the last Congress.

House Ways and Means Committee Members, 118th Congress

Republicans	Democrats
Chairman Jason Smith (R-MO)	Richard Neal (D-MA), Ranking Minority Member
Vern Buchanan (R-FL)	Lloyd Doggett (D-TX)
Adrian Smith (R-NE)	Mike Thompson (D-CA)
Mike Kelly (R-PA)	John Larson (D-CT)
David Schweikert (R-AZ)	Earl Blumenauer (D-OR)
Darin LaHood (R-IL)	Bill Pascrell Jr. (D-NJ)
Brad Wenstrup (R-OH)	Danny Davis (D-IL)
Jodey Arrington (R-TX)	Linda Sanchez (D-CA)
Drew Ferguson (R-GA)	Brian Higgins (D-NY)
Ron Estes (R-KS)	Terri Sewell (D-AL)
Lloyd Smucker (R-PA)	Suzan DelBene (D-WA)
Kevin Hern (R-OK)	Judy Chu (D-CA)
Carol Miller (R-WV)	Gwen Moore (D-WI)
Greg Muphy (R-NC)	Dan Kildee (D-MI)
David Kustoff (R-TN)	Don Beyer (D-VA)
Mike Carey (R-OH)	Dwight Evans (D-PA)
Randy Feenstra (R-IA)	Brad Schneider (D-IL)
Michelle Fischbach (R-MN)	Jimmy Panetta (D-CA)
Brian Fitzpatrick (R-PA)	
Nicole Malliotakis (R-NY)	
Blake Moore (R-UT)	
Michelle Steel (R-CA)	
Greg Steube (R-FL)	
Claudia Tenney (R-NY)	
Beth Van Duyne (R-TX)	

Senate Finance Committee

The ratio of Democrats to Republicans on the Finance Committee and the appointment of any new members are expected to be announced the week of January 23. In the previous Congress, the Finance Committee included 14 Democrats and 14 Republicans; in the 118th Senate, the ratio of Democrats to Republicans is 14 to 13.

Senate Finance Committee Members, 118th Congress

Democrats	Republicans
Ron Wyden (D-OR), Chairman	Mike Crapo (R-ID), Ranking Minority Member
Debbie Stabenow (D-MI)*	Charles Grassley (R-IA)
Maria Cantwell (D-WA)	John Cornyn (R-TX)
Robert Menendez (D-NJ)	John Thune (R-SD)
Thomas Carper (D-DE)	Tim Scott (R-SC)
Benjamin Cardin (D-MD)	Bill Cassidy (R-LA)
Sherrod Brown (D-OH)	James Lankford (R-OK)
Michael Bennet (D-CO)	Steve Daines (R-MT)
Robert Casey, Jr. (D-PA)	Todd Young (R-IN)
Mark Warner (D-VA)	John Barrasso (R-WY)
Sheldon Whitehouse (D-RI)	Thom Tillis (R-NC)
Maggie Hassan (D-NH)	Ron Johnson (R-WI)
Catherine Cortez Masto (D-NV)	Marsha Blackburn (R-TN)
Elizabeth Warren (D-MA)	

* Not running for re-election

Senators subject to re-election in 2024 in **bold**

Key Treasury and other Administration officials

Treasury Secretary	Janet Yellen
Director, National Economic Council	Brian Deese
Director, Office of Management and Budget	Shalanda Young
Chair, Council of Economic Advisers	Cecilia Rouse
Treasury Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy	Lily Batchelder
IRS Commissioner, <i>Acting</i>	Douglas O'Donnell
IRS Commissioner, <i>Nominated</i>	Daniel Werfel
IRS Chief Counsel, <i>Acting</i>	William Paul

Appendix B: Senators up for re-election in 2024

Democrats/Independents	Republicans
Baldwin, Tammy (D-WI)	Barrasso, John (R-WY)
Brown, Sherrod (D-OH)	Blackburn, Marsha (R-TN)
Cantwell, Maria (D-WA)	Braun, Mike (R-IN)*
Cardin, Benjamin (D-MD)	Cramer, Kevin (R-ND)
Carper, Thomas (D-DE)	Cruz, Ted (R-TX)
Casey, Robert (D-PA)	Fischer, Deb (R-NE)
Feinstein, Dianne (D-CA)	Hawley, Josh (R-MO)
Gillibrand, Kirsten (D-NY)	Ricketts, Pete (R-NE)**
Heinrich, Martin (D-NM)	Romney, Mitt (R-UT)
Hirono, Mazie (D-HI)	Scott, Rick (R-FL)
Kaine, Tim (D-VA)	Wicker, Roger (R-MS)
King, Angus (I-ME)	
Klobuchar, Amy (D-MN)	
Manchin, Joe, (D-WV)	
Menendez, Robert (D-NJ)	
Murphy, Christopher (D-CT)	
Rosen, Jacky (D-NV)	
Sanders, Bernard (I-VT)	
Sinema, Kyrsten (I-AZ)	
Stabenow, Debbie (D-MI)*	
Tester, Jon (D-MT)	
Warren, Elizabeth (D-MA)	
Whitehouse, Sheldon (D-RI)	

* Not running for re-election**

** Special election for last two years in the term

Senate Finance Committee members shown in **bold**

Appendix C: Summary of energy-related credits

The IRA added a number of new tax credits related to clean energy production and investment, and extended and expanded other credits (and a deduction). This table summarizes some information about these provisions. For additional information, see the discussion at page 31.

Bonus credit legend:

WA = wage and apprenticeship; EC= energy community; DC = domestic content; LI = low income community; TE = tax-exempt entity

Code section	Base amount	Bonus credit	Direct pay	Transfer	Effective dates
25E previously owned clean vehicles (new)	Lesser of \$4,000 or 30% of sale price; income limitation			Yes, to dealer similar to Section 30D (not IRA)	Vehicles acquired after 2022 and before 2033
30B categories of alternatively powered motor vehicles (conforming changes)	Various	higher credit for better fuel economy (not IRA)			2005; not applicable to vehicles purchased after 2021
30C alternative fuel vehicle refueling (recharging) property (amended, extended)	\$100,000 for depreciable property, \$1000 other	WA	TE only	Yes to extent treated as business property	Amendments apply to property placed in service after 2022 and before 2033
30D clean vehicles (batteries meet certain requirements) (amended, extended)	\$3,750 + \$3,750			Yes to dealer (not IRA)	Property placed in service after 2022 (in general) and before 2033
40A biodiesel and renewable diesel fuel (conforming changes, extended)	\$1 or \$10/gallon				2004; amendments apply to fuel sold or used after 2021 and before 2025
40B sustainable aviation fuel (added)	\$1.25/gallon plus 1 to 50 cents/gallon supplement	Supp. for higher emission reduction			Fuel sold or used after 2022 and before 2025
43 enhanced oil recovery (no change)	15% of enhanced oil recovery costs				1990
45 electricity produced from renewable sources (amended)	.3 cents/ kilowatt hour	WA, EC, DC	TE only	Yes	Amendments generally apply to facilities placed in service after 2021
45J production from advanced nuclear facilities (no change)	1.8 cents/ kilowatt hour			By a public entity (not IRA)	2005, not applicable to property placed in service after 2020
45K producing fuel from an unconventional source (no change)	\$3/oil barrel equivalent				Fuel produced from well drilled or facility placed in service after 1979 and before 1993 (some fuels extended to 1998 or 2009)



Code section	Base amount	Bonus credit	Direct pay	Transfer	Effective dates
45L energy efficient homes (amended, extended)	\$500 or \$2,500 / dwelling unit	Wage only			Amendments apply to dwelling units acquired after 2022 and before 2033
45Q carbon oxide sequestration (amended)	Between \$10 and \$20/ metric ton of carbon oxide captured and disposed of	WA	Yes	Yes	Amendments generally apply to property placed in service after 2022, credit limited to 12 years after placed in service
45U zero emission nuclear power plant (added)	Excess of .3 cents/ kilowatt hour over reduction amount	Wage only	TE only	Yes	Electricity produced and sold after 2023 in a tax year beginning after 2023; does not apply to tax 54years beginning after 2032
45V clean hydrogen production (new)	.12 to .60 cents/ kilogram depending on emissions rate	WA	Yes	Yes	Generally, hydrogen produced after 2022; construction must begin before 2033; limited to 10 years after property is placed in service
45W clean commercial vehicles (new)	\$7,500 if gross vehicle weight is under 14,000 pounds, otherwise \$40,000		TE only		Vehicles acquired after 2022 and before 2033

Code section	Base amount	Bonus credit	Direct pay	Transfer	Effective dates
45X advanced manufacturing production (energy property components, critical minerals) (new)	Cents per unit or dollars per area or weight, based on type of property		Yes	Yes	Property produced and sold after 2022
45Y clean electricity production (new)	.3 cents/kilowatt hour	WA, EC, DC	TE only	Yes	Facilities placed in service after 2024, limited to 10 years after property is placed in service
45Z clean fuel production (new)	20 cents (35 cents for aviation fuel)/ gallon or gallon equivalent	WA	TE only	Yes	Fuel produced after 2024 and sold before 2028
48 investment in energy property (amended, extended)	Generally 6% of basis of energy property	WA, EC, DC, LI	TE only	Yes	Amendments generally apply property placed in service after 2021; for some types of property, construction must begin before 2025
48A advanced coal project (no change)	15%, 20%, or 30% of project basis				2005
48B advanced gasification project (no changed)	20% or 30% of project basis				2005
48C advanced energy project (build facility to manufacture or recycle energy property, re-equip facilities to reduce emissions, or process critical materials) (amended)	6% of eligible property basis	WA	TE only	Yes	Amendments apply January 1, 2023
48E investment in clean electricity facility or energy storage property (added)	6% of eligible property basis	WA, EC, DC, LI	TE only	Yes	Property placed in service after 2024
179D energy efficient commercial buildings/ retrofit property deduction (amended)	Cost of property limited by excess of (\$.50 to \$1.00 x square footage) over (total deduction for three preceding tax years)	WA			Amendments apply for tax years beginning after 2022; retrofit property placed in service after 2022 in tax years beginning after 2022

Appendix D: Countries with current or proposed digital services taxes or other unilateral tax measures

Country	Type of Tax	Effective or Proposed	Timeframe
Austria	Digital Services Tax	Effective	Interim
Belgium	Digital Services Tax	Proposed	Interim
Canada	Digital Services Tax	Proposed	Interim
Colombia	Significant Economic Presence Withholding Tax	Proposed Proposed	Open-Ended Open-Ended
Denmark	Streaming Services Tax	Proposed	Interim
France	Digital Services Tax	Effective	Interim
Ghana	Electronic Transactions Tax	Effective	Open-Ended
Hungary	Digital Services Tax	Passed	Interim
India	Equalisation Levy Significant Economic Presence	Effective Effective	Interim Open-Ended
Indonesia	Significant Economic Presence	Effective	Interim
Israel	Significant Economic Presence	Effective	Open-Ended
Italy	Digital Services Tax Significant Economic Presence	Effective Effective	Interim Open-Ended
Kenya	Digital Services Tax	Effective	Open-Ended
Mexico	Withholding Tax	Effective	Open-Ended
Nepal	Digital Services Tax	Effective	Open-Ended
Nigeria	Significant Economic Presence	Effective	Open-Ended
Pakistan	Withholding Tax	Effective	Open-Ended
Paraguay	Withholding Tax	Effective	Open-Ended
Peru	Withholding Tax	Effective	Open-Ended
Poland	Streaming Services Tax	Effective	Open-Ended
Sierra Leone	Digital Services Tax Withholding Tax	Effective Effective	Open-Ended Open-Ended
Slovakia	Significant Economic Presence	Effective	Open-Ended
Spain	Digital Services Tax	Effective	Interim
Taiwan	Withholding Tax Significant Economic Presence	Effective Effective	Open-Ended Open-Ended

Country	Type of Tax	Effective or Proposed	Timeframe
Tanzania	Digital Services Tax	Effective	Open-Ended
Tunisia	Digital Services Tax	Effective	Open-Ended
Turkey	Digital Services Tax Withholding Tax	Effective Effective	Interim Open-Ended
United Kingdom	Digital Services Tax	Effective	Interim
Uruguay	Withholding Tax	Effective	Open-Ended
Vietnam	Significant Economic Presence Withholding Tax	Effective Effective	Open-Ended Open-Ended

Note: Only those taxes that are expected to be enacted and in force prior to 2024 as listed as proposed. Taxes that have been previously proposed, but whose legislative approval or enactment prior to 2024 is unclear have not been included in this list.

Legend sheet

Digital Services Tax	Tax on gross revenue modeled on the original “digital services tax” proposed by the EU Commission in March 2018. The particular services and revenue in scope vary by country. In general, these taxes apply to gross revenue from the provision of goods and services via digital platforms and must be paid by the company earning such revenue, regardless of whether the company has a permanent establishment in the country.
Electronic Transactions Tax	Tax applied at a fixed rate to individual transactions, especially financial or banking transactions within the digital space.
Equalization Levy	Tax on gross revenues from specified activities similar to a digital service tax, but not modeled on the EU Commission’s proposal in March 2018. An equalization levy can be withheld by the customer or paid by the company providing goods and services, depending on the tax regime.
Interim Tax	Tax enacted or proposed by a jurisdiction where the stated intent is to withdraw such tax when a global consensus on taxation of the digital economy is reached. In general, an interim tax shall be withdrawn when Pillars 1 and 2 of the OECD project are enacted by certain countries, although the specific conditions under which a unilateral tax measure shall be withdrawn vary by each jurisdiction and often remain unclear.
Open-Ended Tax	Tax enacted or proposed that does not qualify as an interim tax. Such a tax may or may not be withdrawn at some point in the future, but at the present time, the enacting country has provided no clear indication that it intends to withdraw its tax once a global consensus on taxation of the digital economy has been reached.
Significant Economic Presence	Novel extension of the traditional permanent establishment concept to companies who do not necessarily have a physical presence in a jurisdiction, but are deemed to have a taxable presence in such jurisdiction on the basis of digital interactions with users located in that jurisdiction.
Streaming Services Tax	Subset of digital services taxes specifically limited in scope to revenue from online video streaming services.
Withholding Tax	Taxes that in general apply to passive income paid to a person in another jurisdiction and require the payor to withhold such amounts. Some countries have extended withholding taxes to apply to payments made for digital products, services, subscriptions, etc. However, unlike more traditional forms of withholding taxes, the extent to which bilateral tax treaties can provide relief to taxpayers subject to digital withholding taxes remains unclear.

Appendix E: Congressional Budget Office estimates of select revenue-raising options

Provision	Revenue estimate over 10 years (\$ billions)
Individual	
Increase maximum taxable earnings subject to social security payroll taxes	670 – 1,204
Impose a new payroll tax	1,136 – 2,253
Increase individual income tax rates	502 – 1,329
Increase rates on long-term capital gains and qualified dividends by 2 percentage points	102
Eliminate or modify head-of-household filing status	71 – 192
Limit the deduction for charitable giving	257 – 272
Eliminate or limit itemized deductions	541 – 2,507
Change tax treatment of capital gains from sales of inherited assets	156
Eliminate tax exemption for new qualified private activity bonds	35
Expand the base of the net investment income tax to include income of active participants in S corporations and limited partnerships	249
Tax carried interest as ordinary income	12
Include VA disability payments in taxable income	161
Further limit annual contributions to retirement plans	152
Eliminate certain tax preferences for education expenses	128
Lower the investment income limit for the earned income tax credit and extend that limit to the refundable portion of the child tax credit	12
Require earned income tax credit and child tax credit claimants to have a social security number that is valid for employment	25
Expand social security coverage to include newly hired state and local government employees	132
Increase federal civilian employees' contributions to the federal employees retirement system	44

Provision	Revenue estimate over 10 years (\$ billions)
Business	
Reduce tax subsidies for employment-based health insurance	500 – 893
Increase the corporate income tax rate by 1 percentage point	129
Repeal the LIFO, lower of cost or market, and subnormal goods inventory methods	90
Require half of advertising expenses to be amortized over 5 or 10 years	76 – 154
Repeal the low-income housing tax credit	77
Other	
Limit state taxes on health care providers	41 – 526
Impose a tax on financial transactions	264
Increase all taxes on alcoholic beverages to \$16 per proof gallon and index for inflation	92 – 114
Increase excise taxes on tobacco products	42
Increase excise taxes on motor fuels and index for inflation	240
Impose a tax on consumption	1,950 – 3,050
Impose a tax on emissions of greenhouse gasses	571 – 865

Source: CBO, *Options for Reducing the Deficit: 2023 to 2032, Volumes 1 and 2 (December 2022)*



Appendix F: Tax accounting considerations for legislation

Accounting for new legislation

In general ASC 740, *Accounting for Income Taxes*, requires the effects of changes in tax laws or rates to be recognized in the period in which the law is enacted regardless of the effective date. For US federal tax purposes, the enactment date is the date the President signs the bill into law. In the period of enactment, analysis of the resulting changes in US tax law will be needed to determine the appropriate financial statement effects, with the total effect on current and deferred tax balances recorded as a component of the income tax provision related to continuing operations.

To the extent that enactment occurs subsequent to an accounting period but before the financial statement issuance, the law change is a nonrecognized subsequent event that companies would need to consider for disclosure.

The potential enactment of new tax legislation in 2023 could change a number of provisions that may have financial reporting implications, including but not limited to, changes to assessments surrounding the realizability of existing deferred tax assets. Further, companies would need to evaluate the conformity rules for each state or local jurisdiction in order to determine the state or local tax effect of the enactment.

Companies will need to carefully evaluate the impact that the changes will have on their existing financial statement positions and disclosures, in order to appropriately account for changes in the period of enactment.

Accounting for the Inflation Reduction Act and CHIPS Act of 2022

Corporate alternative minimum tax

Prior to US tax reform in 2017, the US had an AMT regime that was explicitly addressed in US GAAP. When there is both a regular tax system and an alternative minimum tax system with the ability to generate a credit against regular tax liabilities in future years, ASC 740 requires deferred taxes to be measured using the regular tax rate even if the company anticipates remaining subject to the AMT system for the foreseeable future (see ASC 740-10-30-10 through 30-11 and ASC 740-10-55-31 through 55-33). Further, ASC 740 provides that a deferred tax asset should be recognized for the AMT credit carryforward. Finally, the guidance also requires companies to consider the realization of the AMT credit carryforward deferred tax asset similar to any other deferred tax asset.

A company that expects to be a CAMT taxpayer may not realize the full benefit of its regular deferred tax assets (i.e., deferred tax assets excluding the CAMT carryforward). We understand that the FASB staff believes that the codification does not contain guidance that specifically

addresses whether a company should anticipate future years' CAMT in its valuation allowance assessment for its regular deferred tax assets. As a result, the FASB staff believes that a company should make a policy election as to whether to consider the impact of its expectation of future years' CAMT on its valuation assessment for its regular deferred tax assets. The accounting policy election should be applied consistently and accompanied by transparent disclosure.

Excise tax on corporate stock repurchases

Taxes that are not based on income are outside the scope of ASC 740. Because the excise tax is levied on the gross amount (i.e., the tax basis excludes any expenditures or other adjustments), the effects of the excise tax are not expected to be included in an entity's income tax provision under ASC 740.

US GAAP does not contain explicit guidance for taxes that are not subject to ASC 740, but most transactional taxes—excise taxes, sales taxes, value-added taxes, etc.—are reflected as an additional cost of the underlying pre-tax transaction that gives rise to the tax. Under US GAAP, many stock repurchases are accounted for as equity transactions with no income statement consequence, although certain equity transactions may have income statement consequences and not all shares of stock are classified as equity instruments for accounting purposes. As a result, the US GAAP accounting treatment for a stock buyback transaction may be relevant in determining the appropriate accounting for the excise tax.

We believe that an acceptable approach would be to consider the excise tax as a direct and incremental cost that is associated with the transaction that created it. Under this approach, if a company incurs an excise tax as a result of an open market purchase of equity-classified common stock that is accounted for as a treasury stock transaction, we believe that it would be appropriate to record the excise tax incurred as part of the cost basis of the treasury stock repurchased and to record a corresponding liability for amounts due. We believe that this amount would be calculated without consideration of potential future transactions that may result in a reduction of the excise tax.

Under this approach, any excise tax reductions generated by a subsequent issuance of shares would be reflected as an adjustment to the excise taxes previously recorded during the relevant period. Thus, if later in the same relevant period, the company issues common shares to settle a warrant that was recorded at fair value with changes in fair value reflected in earnings, we believe that any reduction to the originally accrued excise tax as a result of this issuance of shares should be reported as an adjustment to the cost of the prior treasury stock repurchase. We generally do not believe that it would be appropriate to recognize a reduction to an excise tax liability in earnings that was originally included in the cost basis of an equity transaction.

We also do not believe that it would be appropriate to record an asset if at any point during the relevant period, the company has generated a net surplus of share issuances that might offset potential future excise taxes. For example, if the first transaction in the relevant period that may affect the company's ultimate excise tax liability is a share issuance, we do not believe that a company should record a receivable. In this situation, the company does not have a right to a cash payment from the taxing authority simply by issuing shares. The realization of any excise tax benefit from this share issuance is contingent on future share repurchases. If the company

later enters into a share repurchase transaction that would otherwise be subject to the excise tax absent the existence of the share issuances, we believe it would be appropriate at that time to recognize the net excise tax generated by that issuance as a cost of the transaction, considering any unutilized offsetting benefits from previous transactions.

The application of this model may be complex when there are multiple transactions impacted by the excise tax that were accounted for under different accounting models (e.g., recorded in equity, in earnings, or as a deemed dividend). In these situations, companies will need to apply judgment on how to record the effect of offsetting impacts using a consistent model.

Credits and incentives

The application of the ASC 740 income tax accounting model is warranted if a particular credit or incentive can be claimed on the income tax return and can be realized only through the existence of taxable income. When a company is able to receive the benefit of a credit regardless of whether it has income taxes payable or taxable income, we believe the benefit should be accounted for outside of the income tax model. This would apply to credits with a direct-pay option.

When credits are not accounted for under the income tax model in ASC 740, a reporting entity will need to determine the appropriate accounting framework to apply. The direct-pay provisions make many of these credits akin to a government grant or subsidy. Although the FASB has an active project on its agenda on the accounting for government assistance, there is currently no US GAAP that explicitly addresses the accounting by business entities for government assistance. As a result, reporting entities generally analogize to either other US GAAP provisions (e.g., ASC 958-605, Not-for-profit entities—Revenue recognition), or IFRS (e.g., IAS 20, Accounting for Government Grants and Disclosures of Government Assistance).

ASC 740 does not directly address how to account for transferable credits that may be used by a reporting entity as a reduction of income tax payable on its income tax return or that may be sold to another taxpayer. As it relates to the specific credit transferability provisions introduced by the IRA, we understand that the FASB staff believes it is most appropriate to account for such credits as part of the provision for income taxes under ASC 740, regardless of whether the reporting entity that receives the credit claims the credit on its tax return or if that entity sells the credit to another taxpayer. The FASB staff further believes that if a credit is sold, it is most appropriate for any difference between the notional amount of the credit originally received and the proceeds from sale to be recorded in the income tax provision.

Because there is no directly applicable GAAP, the FASB staff acknowledges that other views may be acceptable, such as accounting for transferable credits similar to refundable or direct-pay credits by accounting for the entire credit outside of the tax line.

If a reporting entity accounts for transferable credits, including any difference between the proceeds and the notional value of the credits, as part of the income tax provision, it would be appropriate for the reporting entity to consider any expected sale of the credits as a source of realization in its valuation allowance assessment.



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