

# *Building on tax reform*

2018 tax policy outlook

**January 2018**

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Tax Services (WNTS)*



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## ***Table of contents***

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<b><i>The heart of the matter</i></b>	<b>1</b>
<b><i>An in-depth discussion</i></b>	<b>5</b>
Balance of power	6
Tax reform implementation	9
Outlook for other tax policy issues	12
Economic outlook	13
Federal budget outlook	16
Global tax controversy	18
Trade and other policy priorities	23
Health care and entitlement reform	27
IRS challenges	29
State tax policy trends	31
<hr/>	
<b><i>What this means for your business</i></b>	<b>32</b>
<b><i>Appendices</i></b>	
Appendix A: Tax policymakers	33
Congressional Leadership in the 115th Congress	
House and Senate tax-writing committees	
Key Treasury and other Administration officials	
Appendix B: Senators up for election in 2018	35
Appendix C: Summary of key provisions of the 2017 Tax Reform Act	36
<b>PwC Tax Policy Services team</b>	
<b>Acknowledgments</b>	

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## ***The heart of the matter***

The United States recently enacted the most comprehensive tax reform in more than 30 years. US policymakers and American businesses have championed tax reform for years on a bipartisan basis, concerned that the US tax system was out of step with the systems of the rest of the developed world. With tax reform accomplished, President Donald Trump and Congress will need to decide which policy goals will be given primary attention this year in advance of the 2018 midterm Congressional elections.

## Overview

Top priorities for 2018 are expected to include tax reform implementation, Affordable Care Act (ACA) issues, infrastructure funding, immigration reform, international trade negotiations, ongoing regulatory relief efforts, entitlement reform, reauthorization of the Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP), disaster relief legislation, and Senate confirmation of President Trump's nominees to fill open federal judicial and executive branch positions.

Election-year considerations are expected to play a significant role in how legislation advances this year. Political parties that control both the White House and Congress traditionally have lost seats in midterm elections, and a President's overall job approval rating historically is a key factor in such elections. House Republicans currently hold a significant majority. Senate Republicans started the current Congress with a two-seat majority, but now have a one-seat majority as a result of the election of Democrat Doug Jones (AL) to fill the seat once held by Attorney General Jeff Sessions. As of January 21, President Trump had a 39.5-percent job approval rating, according to a RealClearPolitics report on an average of recent polling data. At the same time, Democrats will be defending three times as many Senate seats as Republicans, including in ten states won by President Trump in the 2016 Presidential election.

Senate Democrats in particular will play a key role in how legislation is considered in 2018, since a 60-vote supermajority generally is needed to advance legislation in the Senate. In 2017, Congressional Republicans were able to use budget 'reconciliation' procedures that required only a simple Senate majority to consider ACA repeal and replace legislation and tax reform legislation -- succeeding in passing tax reform while falling short on ACA repeal efforts.

It currently appears doubtful whether House and Senate Republicans will have the votes to pass a fiscal year (FY) 2019 joint budget resolution that could provide budget reconciliation protection for welfare reform or other reconciliation-eligible legislative goals. While the Trump Administration and many Congressional Republicans continue to call for repeal of the ACA, it is unlikely that ACA repeal efforts will dominate the 2018 legislative agenda as they did last year.

## Funding the government

The most immediate issue to be addressed by President Trump and Congress is the need to reach an agreement on funding the federal government for the remainder of FY 2018, which runs through September 30, 2018.

Congress ended a partial shut-down of the federal government when on January 22 it approved another short-term bill funding federal departments and agencies through February 8, 2018. This latest CR, the fourth approved by Congress since the start of FY 2018, provides a two-year moratorium on the 2.3-percent medical device excise tax for sales during 2018 and 2019, a one-year moratorium on the annual excise tax imposed

on health insurers for 2019, and a two-year delay of the excise tax on high-cost employer health coverage (the so-called 'Cadillac' tax). Under this measure, the Cadillac tax would be effective in 2022; the effective date of this tax previously was delayed until 2020. The CR also reauthorizes funding for the Children's Health Insurance Program through FY 2023.

Congress is continuing efforts to reach an agreement to increase spending caps on federal discretionary defense and non-defense programs for the remainder of FY 2018 and for FY 2019, which begins October 1, 2018. House and Senate appropriators hope to complete work by mid-February on an 'omnibus' spending bill that would reflect a spending caps agreement and would set specific funding levels for federal departments and agencies, including the Treasury Department and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).

Congress also hopes to reach an agreement to increase the federal statutory debt limit by mid-February, so that this 'must-pass' provision can be enacted as part of the FY 2018 omnibus spending package. The statutory debt limit was formally reinstated on December 8, 2017. Since then, the Treasury Department has been using 'extraordinary measures' to avoid a default on federal debt obligations, but those measures are expected to be exhausted by late March or early April.

The Administration is said to be reviewing whether changes should be made in the federal debt limit process. Congress in past years has considered addressing growing federal deficits as part of debt limit legislation. However, it is unlikely that a bipartisan agreement on deficit reduction will be reached this year, given the partially deficit-financed 2017 tax reform legislation and current efforts to increase discretionary spending caps that are expected to be largely deficit-financed.

An FY 2018 funding bill could serve as a vehicle for addressing the fate of young undocumented immigrants who have been covered by the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program. President Trump on January 9 expressed support for a 'phase one' deal on DACA that includes increased border security funding, while Republican and Democratic Congressional leaders continue talks on a 'phase two' effort to reach an agreement on a more comprehensive set of immigration reforms. Subsequent events have highlighted the difficulties that are associated with reaching a bipartisan agreement on immigration issues.

In addition, Congress this year is likely to consider certain other expired business and individual tax provisions ('tax extenders') that were not addressed in the 2017 tax reform act, either as part of the FY 2018 funding bill or some other legislation.

## Building on tax reform

Successful implementation of the 2017 tax reform act (the Act) is expected to be the top priority for tax policy officials in the Trump Administration this year, and could play a key role in how well Republicans do in the 2018 midterm elections.

At the same time, the House and Senate tax-writing committees have indicated that there may be a need to consider technical corrections or more substantive changes to the recently enacted tax reform legislation. The quick action by Congress in passing tax reform lessened the ability of affected taxpayers to present their viewpoints to Congress on particular provisions and the statutory language. Tax policymakers in Congress and in the Trump Administration now need to assess whether some provisions may have unintended consequences and, if so, how urgent is the need to make corrective changes.


Most individuals and both large and small US businesses should expect to experience tax relief from the recently enacted legislation. A number of companies have announced employee bonuses or other actions as a result of the Act. The Treasury Department estimates that 90 percent of American workers should see the effect of lower tax rates in the form of increased take-home pay before the end of February as a result of the IRS adjusting withholding tables to reflect the new tax law. The IRS also plans to release a new withholding calculator on its website by the end of February to enable employees to confirm the correct amount of withholding and then inform their employers of any necessary adjustments.

The new 21-percent US federal corporate tax rate, when combined with average state corporate income taxes, drops the US combined tax rate to 25.75 percent in 2018. This combined federal and state rate is still two percentage points higher than the 23.75 percent OECD average (excluding the United States) in 2017, when the combined US corporate tax rate had been 38.9 percent

The Treasury Department and the IRS are expected to issue a series of notices and other regulatory guidance on how businesses should implement the Act. One of the first issues addressed through a notice was guidance on the new mandatory deemed repatriation 'toll tax' on foreign profits invested offshore.

The Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) staff had estimated that US companies had accumulated \$2.6 trillion in unrepatriated foreign profits that have been viewed as 'locked out' by virtue of the high additional tax that would have to be paid under prior law if the profits were brought back to the United States. Although US companies will pay a significant tax on those unrepatriated earnings -- 15.5 percent on earnings held in cash and cash equivalents and eight percent on illiquid assets -- companies will be free thereafter to invest the repatriated earnings as they see fit.

**Figure 1: New US statutory corporate tax rate (21% federal rate plus state average) closer to OECD average**



Source: OECD and PwC calculations



In addition to lowering the corporate tax rate and eliminating tax on repatriated foreign earnings, the Act permits full expensing of domestic investments and provides a reduced tax rate for certain export-related earnings. Taken together, these reforms are likely to enhance the competitiveness of the United States as a location for investment and potentially reverse recent trends for companies to incorporate outside the United States.

### ***Continuing global tax controversies***

The final 2017 tax reform legislation includes significant provisions that reflect concerns identified by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's (OECD) report on base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS). The Act contains stringent limitations on interest deductibility, two minimum tax proposals -- the 'global intangible low-taxed income' (GILTI) provision and the 'base erosion anti-avoidance tax' (BEAT) -- that are aimed at protecting the US tax base from erosion, and an anti-hybrids provision. As a whole, the BEPS provisions in the Act represent the strongest measures adopted by any country to implement the BEPS action items.

At the same time, the launch of a 'digital taxation' project by the OECD before governments have completed implementation of BEPS signals governments continuing dissatisfaction with the international tax regime. Some foreign tax governments have indicated they are examining the US tax reform act closely to determine whether the Act's provisions are consistent with US commitments to comply with established international trade agreements. Finance ministers in five European countries have focused in particular on a new provision providing a tax deduction for certain 'foreign derived intangible income' (FDII). The BEAT also has attracted concerns.

Notwithstanding agreements reached at the OECD, numerous countries have gone beyond the formal OECD recommendations to enact proposals aimed at taxing a greater share of global profits on gross-border revenues of multinational businesses, especially businesses operating on digital platforms. The European Commission (EC) in particular has undertaken an effort to identify what its staff considers to be 'unfair' tax competition through a series of 'State aid' investigations. There continues to be a concern among US policymakers that actions taken by some countries and EC State aid rulings, if sustained by the European courts, constitute an unjustified revenue grab by foreign governments.

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## *An in-depth discussion*



## Balance of power

In the House of Representatives, the Second Session of the 115th Congress begins with 239 Republicans, 193 Democrats, and three vacant seats.

In the Senate, there are 51 Republicans and 49 Democrats (including the two Independents who caucus with Senate Democrats). Democrats gained one Senate seat in the 2017 Alabama special election to fill the seat previously held by Attorney General Jeff Sessions. Senate procedures in effect generally require 60 votes to limit debate on legislation and bring about a vote on final passage. A Senate rule modification adopted in 2017 lowers the threshold for approving Supreme Court nominations to a simple majority (usually 51 votes), which brings the requirement in line with a 2013 rule change which adopted a simple majority threshold for executive branch and non-Supreme Court judicial nominations.

The President has the power to veto legislation passed by Congress, with a two-thirds majority of both the House and Senate required for a veto override. With Republican majorities in both the House and the Senate, President Trump did not veto any bills during his first year in office. The presidential veto may not be an important factor again in 2018.

### House and Senate tax committees


Rep. Kevin Brady (R-TX) continues as chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, and Rep. Richard Neal (D-MA) remains the Ranking Democratic Member. There currently are 24 Republicans and 16 Democrats on the committee. Ways and Means member Pat Tiberi (R-OH) retired on January 15; Rep. Darin LaHood (R-IL) was selected to take his seat on the committee.

The Senate Finance Committee continues to be led by Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT), who has announced that he will retire at the end of 2018. Senator Ron Wyden (D-OR) remains the Ranking Democratic Member. To adjust the ratio of Republicans to Democrats on the committee after the Democrats gained a Senate seat, Senator Sheldon Whitehouse (D-RI) was added to the committee. The Finance Committee now is composed of 14 Republicans and 13 Democrats.


A listing of House and Senate tax committee members and other tax policymakers is provided in Appendix A.

**Figure 2: Current composition of the 115th Congress**

#### US House



#### US Senate



\* Includes two Independents: Senators Bernie Sanders (I-VT) and Angus King (I-ME)

\*\* Assumes current vacancies are filled by same party

## **Looking ahead to the 2018 elections**

The 2018 midterm elections could change the balance of power in Congress and have an impact on the prospects for future tax legislation. Even before considering election outcomes, the next Congress will look different because of the large number of lawmakers retiring or running for other office.

In midterm elections, the President's party historically has lost an average of 25 House seats and four Senate seats. In elections where the President's party held a majority in both chambers of Congress, the average losses were even higher at 33 House seats and roughly five Senate seats. In addition, historical data shows a correlation between the President's approval rating and the net change in Congressional seats for the President's party in the first midterm election. While these trends might appear to favor Democrats, other factors and an unconventional political landscape create uncertainty about the upcoming elections.

All 435 seats in the House are up for election every two years. Democrats would need to achieve a net gain of 24 seats in 2018 to gain control of the House.

The Ways and Means Committee will have several new members in the next Congress, since a number of members have announced they will not seek re-election to the House this year. Departing Ways and Means members include Sam Johnson (R-TX), Dave Reichert (R-WA), Lynn Jenkins (R-KS), Diane Black (R-TN), Jim Renacci (R-OH), Kristi Noem (R-SD), and Sander Levin (D-MI).

Roughly one-third of all Senate seats are subject to election every two years. Democrats would need a net gain of two seats in the 2018 elections to win a 51-seat majority in the Senate, while Republicans would need a net gain of nine seats to achieve a filibuster-proof 60-seat majority. Eight seats currently held by Republicans and 26 seats currently held by Democrats (including two Independents who caucus with Democrats) are up for election in 2018. Of those, 10 seats now held by Democrats are in states that President Trump won in the 2016 Presidential election; only one seat held by a Republican is in a state won by Hillary Clinton. This history suggests that Republicans should be able to strengthen their control of the Senate in the 2018 elections, but that possibility likely would depend on factors within individual campaigns and states, as well as President Trump's level of support in specific states.

A listing of all Senators whose seats are subject to election in 2018 is included in Appendix B. Senate Finance Committee members up for re-election are Republican Dean Heller (NV) and Democrats Sherrod Brown (OH), Maria Cantwell (WA), Benjamin Cardin (MD), Thomas Carper (DE), Robert Casey (PA), Claire McCaskill (MO), Robert Menendez (NJ), Bill Nelson (FL), Debbie Stabenow (MI), and Sheldon Whitehouse (RI).

**Figure 3: 2018 Congressional legislative schedule**

House and Senate convene	January 3
Martin Luther King Jr. Day	January 15
House recess	January 22 - 26
President's State of the Union Address	January 30
President's Day recess	February 19 - 23
Spring recess (House, Senate)	March 26 - April 6
House and Senate recess	April 30 - May 4
Memorial Day recess (House, Senate)	May 28 - June 1
Independence Day recess (House, Senate)	July 2 - 6
August recess (House)	July 30 - September 3
August recess (Senate)	August 6 - September 3
House and Senate recess	September 10 - 11
House recess	September 17 - 21
Senate recess	September 19
Columbus Day	October 8
House recess	October 15 - November 9
Senate recess	October 29 - November 9
Election Day	November 6
Veterans Day (observed)	November 12
Thanksgiving recess (Senate, House)	November 19 - 23
Target adjournment date (House)	December 13
Target adjournment date (Senate)	December 14

# Tax reform implementation

Congress will be closely monitoring implementation of tax reform by the Treasury Department and the IRS. The House and Senate tax committees also are expected to hold oversight hearings on how quickly guidance is being issued and on technical or administrative issues that may arise.

## Legislative guidance and technical corrections

The staff of the non-partisan Joint Committee on Taxation is expected to release a 'Blue Book' general explanation of the Act in coming months that should provide additional guidance to Treasury and the IRS on Congressional intent regarding ambiguities or inconsistencies in specific provisions of the new law. In the case of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which was enacted October 22, 1986, a JCT Blue Book was issued a little over six months later, on May 4, 1987.

Congress this year may consider 'technical corrections' to the Act, but any such legislation would have to be considered on a bipartisan basis and would need to secure 60 votes in the Senate for passage. Budget reconciliation procedures generally are not available for technical corrections bills that, by their nature, are not considered to have the budgetary effects


required for reconciliation to be used. Congress also may take some time to complete action on technical corrections legislation. Technical corrections to the Tax Reform Act of 1986 were enacted November 10, 1988, as part of the Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988 (TAMRA).

## Temporary tax reform provisions

Congress this year is not expected to approve any legislation extending or making permanent individual or business tax reform proposals that were included in the tax reform legislation (as contrasted with previously expired provisions), but the issue is likely to be hotly debated in advance of the midterm elections. The 2017 tax reform act sunsets nearly all the individual tax provisions in order to comply with a Senate budget reconciliation rule that allows a 60-vote procedural point of order against any legislation increasing federal deficits in future decades.

In a recently updated report on expired or expiring tax provisions, JCT lists 23 separate tax reform provisions that are set to expire at the end of 2025, including the newly enacted individual tax rates, individual alternative minimum tax (AMT) relief, limitations on itemized deductions including the cap on deductions for state and local taxes, and the 20-percent deduction for certain pass-through business income.

**Figure 4: Key tax reform provisions that are permanent or temporary/subject to sunset**



Full expensing was restored as a temporary business tax provision that is available for the entire cost of certain depreciable assets acquired and placed in service after September 27, 2017, and before January 1, 2023 (with an additional year for certain aircraft and longer production period property). For qualified property placed in service in calendar years 2023, 2024, 2025, and 2026 (2024, 2025, 2026, and 2027 for certain aircraft and longer production period property), the applicable percentage is reduced to 80 percent, 60 percent, 40 percent, and 20 percent, respectively.

In addition to the provisions that expire, the 2017 tax reform act includes provisions that adjust automatically in future years. Research and experimentation costs, for example, are expensed under current law, but must be capitalized and amortized beginning in 2022.

Bills have been introduced in the House and Senate since the 2017 tax reform act was signed into law to make permanent certain temporary individual and business tax reform provisions, as well as bills to reverse some of the temporary individual provisions.

A future Congress and President may agree to extend or make permanent many of the temporary individual and business tax provisions. For example, former President Barack Obama and Congress in 2012 agreed to make permanent most of the tax cuts enacted in 2001 and 2003 under former President George W. Bush. The 2012 ‘fiscal cliff’ legislation was enacted under regular legislative procedures so budget reconciliation restrictions limiting the resulting increase in projected federal budget deficits did not apply.

For a summary of key tax reform provisions, see Appendix C.

### ***Treasury and IRS implementation of tax reform***

Layered on top of the challenges facing the IRS due to decreased budget and staffing will be implementation of the Act. The extremely short period between enactment of the new legislation and its becoming effective will immediately affect all aspects of IRS operations at the time the agency is working to deliver the critical annual filing season program. The IRS has estimated that it will need an additional \$495 million in federal funding during FY 2018 and FY 2019 to implement the Act.

Of primary importance to the IRS will be issuance of guidance regarding the various aspects of the 500-plus page legislation. In light of procedural and timing requirements for promulgating and finalizing regulations, the IRS likely will use other guidance formats, such as revenue rulings, revenue procedures, notices, and announcements for preliminary guidance. As an example, the IRS on December 29, 2017, issued Notice 2018-07 to provide guidance regarding the deemed repatriation ‘toll charge’ under the Act.

The IRS on January 11, 2018, published Notice 1036, which updates the percentage withholding tables for income tax withholding on employee wages and provides the optional and mandatory flat rates for withholding on supplemental wages. The IRS noted that the 2018 withholding tables should be implemented by employers no later than February 15, 2018. The IRS has not released a new Form W-4, Employee’s Withholding Allowance Certificate. The IRS plans to release a new withholding calculator on its website by the end of February to enable employees to confirm the correct amount of withholding. Employees then would be able to inform their employers of any adjustments needed to avoid under-withholding or over-withholding.

The push to issue guidance on an expedited basis will involve all components of the IRS Chief Counsel’s National Office, and will place a strain on resources performing other functions within the Office, such as processing requests from taxpayers for private letter rulings and technical advice. Once the IRS has issued initial guidance, it will begin developing more formal regulatory guidance, including issuance of temporary and proposed regulations, eventually followed by final regulations. This is a lengthier process due to procedural requirements associated with promulgating regulations, including review by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) at the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the required periods for public notice and comment.

At the same time as it develops guidance to taxpayers, the IRS will need to begin implementing the new tax rules and updating its computer systems to reflect them. The main IRS computer system, Master File, is several decades old and is the subject of a long-running and ongoing modernization program. The IRS updates the Master File annually to reflect new tax provisions coming into effect and to address statutory adjustments to current provisions (such as inflationary adjustments); this experience should assist in implementing the many new provisions of the Act. Given the sheer magnitude of the updates needed, however, the IRS’s limited resources will be further strained.

In addition to updating its computer systems, the IRS will need to revise many existing forms, instructions, and publications, as well as create new ones. While all new and revised IRS forms are developed within the IRS Forms and Publications function, they ultimately must be reviewed and approved by Treasury and by OMB under the Paperwork Reduction Act before being formally released to taxpayers for tax and information reporting purposes.

IRS examination agents will need training on how to apply the provisions of the Act. As with other areas of the IRS budget, there has been a substantial decrease in funds available for training. Since the new legislation generally is not effective until taxable years beginning after December 31, 2017, the first tax returns under the new rules will be filed in 2019, giving the IRS additional time for training. Under normal procedures, the IRS has up to three years from the date a return is filed to assess additional tax, and most examinations are not commenced until a number of months after the return is filed. This timing delay should alleviate some of the pressure on the IRS and allow time to develop training programs on applying the new rules. Regardless, with the new provisions becoming effective in 2018, the effects of the changes may be felt sooner by certain groups of taxpayers, such as taxpayers in the Compliance Assurance Process (CAP) Program, in which the IRS generally conducts examinations concurrently with the filing of the return, and taxpayers seeking a pre-filing agreement (PFA), as the IRS enters into PFAs with taxpayers prior to the filing of a tax return.

### ***State and local government reaction to US tax reform***

State legislators across the country are conferring with revenue officials as well as other tax professionals to analyze the impact of federal tax reform on state revenue bases. While nearly all states conform in some manner to the federal code, they likely will consider adopting only certain of the new tax reform provisions. For example, many states decoupled from the accelerated depreciation provisions enacted in the Economic Stimulus Act of 2008. Those states likewise may choose to decouple from the full expensing provisions of the 2017 Act.

Although the state legislative process can be lengthy -- recent budget debates have lasted months beyond scheduled session adjournment -- states may quickly adopt provisions that would diminish additional strains on continuing weak revenue streams. It will be an ongoing challenge for taxpayers to keep pace with the many changes coming out of state legislative chambers in 2018.

### ***International reaction to US tax reform***

The European Commission on December 20, 2017, stated it may bring a WTO challenge against certain provisions of the 2017 tax reform act. The EC stated, 'We will now examine the final bill in greater detail, including how these measures will be implemented. At the same time, the Commission will reflect on all possible measures that may be need to be taken if the bill enters into force as agreed today. All options are on the table.'

This statement comes after a December 12, 2017 letter from the finance ministers of Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Spain, and Italy to Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin stating concerns related to several international provisions that had been under consideration at the time, including the base erosion and anti-abuse tax (BEAT), and global intangible low-taxed income (GILTI) provisions that were enacted as part of the final Act.

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## ***Outlook for other tax policy issues***

With the most significant tax reform in more than 30 years in its rearview mirror, Congress is expected to take much more limited action on tax legislation this year.

### ***Expiring and expired tax provisions***

The JCT staff updated report on expiring tax provisions, known as ‘tax extenders,’ covering the years 2016 through 2027, notes a number of tax provisions that were not made permanent as part of a 2015 tax extenders act -- which made permanent the research credit and numerous other business and individual tax provisions -- as well as the new expiring tax provisions that were created as part of the 2017 tax reform act.

Congress this year may consider tax extender provisions that were not addressed as part of the final tax reform legislation. To that end, Senate Finance Chairman Hatch last December introduced the Tax Extenders Act of 2017 (S. 2256), which would provide retroactive temporary extensions of more than 30 provisions that expired at the end of 2016. Expired provisions that would be renewed by S. 2256 include various renewable energy tax credit provisions, targeted tax depreciation provisions, and a deduction for mortgage insurance premiums. The bill would modify a tax credit for energy production from advanced nuclear power facilities and a carbon dioxide sequestration credit.

While there has been discussion of restoring certain expired tax provisions as part of the FY 2018 funding bill, House Ways and Means Chairman Brady has indicated a reluctance to address expired tax provisions as part of a February agreement on federal spending.

Congress this year may also act on several significant temporary business tax provisions that are set to expire in future years and that were not addressed in the final tax reform act. For example, business tax provisions that expire at the end of 2019 include the Subpart F rule for look-through payments between related controlled foreign corporations and the work opportunity tax credit (WOTC).

## Economic outlook


The US economic outlook in 2018 is relatively strong with a growing global economy, low inflation, and accommodative fiscal policy that should continue to support steady employment growth through next year. At 4.1 percent, the unemployment rate is at its lowest point since the end of the tech bubble in 2000. The economy averaged 171,000 new jobs per month over 2017, summing to more than two million jobs for the year.

Labor force participation, particularly among prime-age workers, remains below the levels seen prior to the Great Recession, but has stabilized since the beginning of 2014. The number of underemployed, which includes those working part time but looking for a full-time job, has fallen to historic lows.

Despite historically low rates of unemployment, both inflation and wage growth have remained low. Core inflation has been consistently below the Federal Reserve's target rate of two percent (as measured by the annual change in the price index for core personal consumption expenditures, or PCE), despite nearly eight years of interest rates at historically low levels. With many economic forecasts predicting unemployment rates will continue to decline in 2018, wage growth may finally break out of its recent modest pace of increase.

This recovery is currently the third longest on record, and many analysts expect it will continue at least through 2018 if not beyond. Supporting the continued growth is a global market that finally turned a corner in 2017. Real GDP growth in OECD countries is estimated to have reached 2.4 percent in 2017, compared to 1.8 percent in 2016.

**Figure 5: Unemployment and underemployment rates have dropped below historical averages**




Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, January 2018.



## Figure 6: Current economic challenges

### Post-financial crisis wage growth has been weak



Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics. Employment cost index measures total wages, salaries, and employer costs for employee benefits. Average hourly earnings exclude fringe benefits.

Two big questions for the US economy in 2018 will be what effect the 2017 tax reform act will have on output, and how rate normalization by the Federal Reserve will affect investment, asset prices, and the overall economy.


### Will tax reform be pro-growth?

The Act is likely to positively impact the economy in 2018 through several major channels. The first will be the stimulative effect of lower personal and corporate income taxes. Projections from JCT staff show an estimated net \$1.456 trillion 10-year reduction in taxes resulting from the legislation, including \$135 billion in 2018 and \$280 billion in 2019. Lower taxes will leave more money available for private investment and consumption by households and businesses.

The second stimulative effect from the Act will come from allowing businesses to immediately deduct the full cost of any new investments in equipment. This provision applies for five years and then is phased out over the following five years. Lowering the cost of new investments could lead to stronger growth in private investment starting in 2018, which would boost economic output and may increase labor productivity and wages.

Another channel for growth will come from the repatriation of retained earnings from overseas, which are now eligible to come back to the United States after being subjected to the repatriation toll tax. The JCT staff has estimated that there is

### Inflation remains below Federal Reserve target



Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics. Inflation measure is the price index for core personal consumption expenditures.

roughly \$2.6 trillion in retained earnings held overseas by US-based businesses, with some estimates suggesting about half is held as cash and other liquid investments. At least some of that money will come back to the United States to fund investment, acquisitions, increase employment, buy down debt, make shareholder distributions, as well as pay the toll tax.

Higher interest rates could offset some of the pro-growth impacts of tax reform. Additional government borrowing will place upward pressure on interest rates. Such higher interest rates would have a countervailing effect on investment and economic growth. A key factor in the ultimate impact of the Act on interest rates will be the reaction of the Federal Reserve -- whether it will regard stronger economic activity to be inflationary or as providing a sustainable enhancement to productive capacity.

## ***How will the Fed manage with low unemployment and no inflation?***

The Fed has indicated it plans three more 25-basis point increases in the Federal Funds rate this year, the continuation of a rate-hiking cycle that began in December 2015. In addition to these projected rate hikes, in October 2017 the Fed began the process of gradually selling off part of its \$4.4 trillion balance sheet. This balance sheet reduction is unlikely to be a significant factor that affects interest rates in 2018, as the Fed's goal is a gradual unwinding that is supportive of its overall accommodative interest rate policy.

As long as inflation remains low in 2018, the Fed is likely to keep to its expected schedule of a 75-basis point increase in the Fed Funds rate in 2018, bringing the rate to between 2 and 2.25 percent by the end of the year -- still well below historical averages. With no signs of inflation on the horizon, very little wage pressures, low energy prices, and continued competition from low-cost, low-wage producers abroad, the potential for an upside shock to inflation seems muted, which sets the stage for accommodative monetary policy for the foreseeable future. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) last year estimated inflation as measured by the Consumer Price Index (CPI) to be 2.4 percent over the next 10 years, while the Cleveland Fed's inflation expectations model shows markets generally expect inflation to be below two percent, a sign of confidence in the Fed's ability to manage inflation should it start to show up in prices or wages.

## ***Will trade decline in 2018?***

Trade policy could evolve in such a way as to affect negatively the overall growth picture, especially if there is disruption with any of America's three largest trading partners – Canada, Mexico, and China. The ongoing renegotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) could lead the United States to withdraw from the deal, which could disrupt cross-border supply chains and result in increased prices for Americans. Higher prices would depress overall levels of economic activity and could lead to job losses.

As discussed below, the Trump Administration is considering taking several actions against Chinese government support for its export market, which also could result in higher prices for American consumers and lead to retaliation against US exports.

Trade with China equals only about three percent of US GDP, so any action in a single segment of US-China trade is unlikely to have significant impacts for the US economy overall. However, specific sectors could suffer. Automobiles and retail clothing are two sectors that could be particularly hard hit by trade restrictions, as both of these sectors rely heavily on imports. Also, escalation of the disagreement between the United States and China could lead to more trade constraints with potentially larger impacts on the US economy.


The Administration's trade policy agenda is discussed below in more detail.

## Federal budget outlook

The 10-year budget outlook continues to show rising deficits throughout the budget window. Even without taking into account the Act, the CBO in 2017 had been projecting deficits as a percent of GDP of 5.2 percent by 2027, due to what it calls ‘rapid growth in spending for federal retirement and health care programs targeted to older people and to rising interest payments on the government’s debt.’ With the Act, annual federal budget deficits are now set to exceed \$1 trillion in 2020. Extension of the Act’s changes to personal income taxes that currently expire in 2025 would push annual deficits by 2027 to over \$1.6 trillion, or close to six percent of GDP.


By 2027, the total debt held by the public is estimated to represent 97.5 percent of GDP, even without extension of the personal income tax changes and other likely changes in taxes and spending. By comparison, only 11 of the 34 other OECD countries had debt-to-GDP ratios over this level in 2015, the most recent year collected by the OECD.

**Figure 7: Spending grows throughout budget window, especially on old-age retirement and health programs**



Source: Congressional Budget Office, June 2017.

**Figure 8: Revenues and outlays as a share of GDP, 1966-2027**  
**(2018-2027 projections reflect the Act)**



Source: CBO and PwC calculations

These projected budget deficits reflect long-term structural challenges to the US federal budget arising from rising healthcare costs, the aging of the workforce, and the retirement of the baby boom generation. As a result of a growing number of Americans living longer in retirement, future generations will be supporting ever-growing expenditures on old-age health care and retirement programs, specifically Social Security and Medicare, as well as increased spending on Medicaid.

The increases in government debt used to fund these programs will erode the ability of the economy to grow. Lower national savings will reduce investment and economic growth. Further, high debt levels will reduce the ability of the government to respond to future financial downturns or other economic crises.

It appears unlikely that Congress will take steps soon to modify these programs to either slow the growth of spending or supplement the dedicated revenue streams that support them, which will lead to a worsening long-run fiscal picture that could become a drag on economic growth in future generations.

At least in the near term, these increased deficits are unlikely to have a negative impact on the overall economic outlook. As long as low interest rates persist and an ample supply of investors willing to lend money to the United States continues, the federal government should be able to finance budget deficits with minimal impact on interest rates. Even during the height of the financial crisis in 2009 when the federal government was running deficits of nearly 10 percent of GDP, the massive intervention by the Federal Reserve and strong commercial market and foreign central bank demand for US Treasury assets kept yields low. This may change if the Federal Reserve backs off its post-financial crisis stimulus programs and investors gain confidence in foreign investment opportunities.

## Global tax controversy

The uncertainties for US and non-US multinational corporations (MNCs) created by global tax controversies likely will intensify in 2018. The impact of US tax reform is being closely monitored by other countries as they seek to introduce their own reforms – some of which resemble, while others differ significantly from, the US approach.

Meanwhile, the OECD, if it is to continue holding its position as the international standard-setter, will need to encourage patience and compromise in order to maintain the underlying global corporate income tax (CIT) framework that has survived nearly 100 years. Uncertainty over individual national tax regimes – and the underlying international CIT framework – will continue throughout 2018 and beyond.

### Digitalization of the economy

The most significant global tax policy development in 2017 was the emergence of taxation of the digital economy as the biggest focus for policymakers and MNCs.

#### Background

When the OECD Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project Report on the Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy (Action 1) was released in October 2015, the OECD Task Force on the Digital Economy (TFDE) concluded that digitalization exacerbated the opportunities for BEPS, but that the other BEPS Action Item recommendations should suffice to address such risks. The TFDE also concluded that the Digital Economy could not be ring-fenced because it ‘is increasingly becoming the economy itself.’

While consensus was reached that these areas should be revisited in a full review by 2020, there was an understanding that countries might not await the result of this review before acting unilaterally – albeit consistently with their treaty obligations – through introducing measures such as virtual permanent establishments (PEs), equalization levies, and withholding taxes.

During 2016, a few countries sought to introduce ‘innovative’ tax measures, but 2017 saw a significant acceleration in the consideration of such measures – particularly by some European countries.

#### G20 and OECD developments

The G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors met in Germany in March 2017. Their Communiqué noted that they had ‘undertaken a discussion on the implications of digitalization for taxation’ and that they would continue to examine this issue through the TFDE with a view to accelerating the interim report to April 2018.

### Box 1: Examples of unilateral measures put in place to date

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UK and Australia: Diverted Profits Tax
India: Equalization Levy on online advertising
Israel: Deemed PE rules
Saudi Arabia: Virtual PE concept
Russia: VAT changes for electronic services

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The OECD TFDE (co-chaired by the United States and France) worked through the summer and fall of 2017 gathering information on business models. In September/October, the TFDE issued a public call for information and held a public consultation meeting in Berkeley, CA.

#### European Union developments

Meanwhile, several EU countries publicly expressed concerns on digitalization tax issues and supported EU legislative action. In September 2017, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain called for the EU to consider an ‘equalization levy’ that is a tax on gross turnover from specified activities. Estonia (which held the EU Presidency for the second half of 2017) pushed the tax challenges of digitalization up the agenda – itself favoring introduction of a ‘virtual PE’ concept. One ‘leaked document’ from the Council of Ministers’ October meetings sought to discuss ways in which restrictions of OECD treaties and guidelines could be overcome.

The EU Council as a whole (which requires unanimity on tax issues) stepped back from recommending any of these proposals. In its December Economic and Financial Affairs Council conclusions, it asked the European Commission to investigate all the options, including turnover-based solutions.

There appears to be a broad agreement that the optimal solution would be a global consensus on a coherent CIT framework that aligns taxation rights with value creation, eliminates double taxation, and encourages cross-border trade and growth. There is increased interest in most quarters to have this discussion in light of the changes to the economy that digitalization continues to bring.

However, increasing numbers of countries are signalling they are not prepared to wait for this and are moving to introduce unilateral measures to address their concerns. Such measures could lead to further defensive or retaliatory measures (see Box 1 above).

## Next steps - OECD

The OECD TFDE intends to meet its April 2018 deadline and deliver an interim report that looks at business models and tax policy developments in recent years, as well as examining and critiquing possible short-term and long-term measures. Given the broad membership of the OECD and its Inclusive Framework, and the known differences in opinion between members on key issues (e.g., US and Japanese views compared with French and Italian views), it seems unlikely that concrete recommendations can be agreed upon.

At the OECD TFDE's public consultation, the US delegate suggested that it may be preferable to allocate some taxation rights to market jurisdictions in lieu of a difficult and drawn-out conversation regarding digital value creation. This is not dissimilar to arguments made by China before and during the BEPS Project that the market jurisdiction deserved a greater share of taxing rights. Such comments have not gone unnoticed by EU policymakers, and an increased focus on destination-based elements can be expected in 2018 (not least because of some of the changes to the US tax rules made by the 2017 tax reform act).

## Next steps - European Union

Views among EU Member States differ significantly. While the EU is likely to await the OECD's report before seeking to implement its own measures, some Member States want EU-wide interim solutions to be introduced swiftly, and the European Commission is gearing up to report on options available in March 2018 (i.e., in advance of the OECD).

While several EU Member States have expressed concern at proposals to introduce EU-wide interim or long-term measures without a global agreement to do so, some large Member States (UK, Italy, and France) have indicated that they would proceed with interim measures unilaterally without an EU-wide agreement. Italy has already acted, introducing a three-percent

## **Box 2: Concerns raised and potential areas for discussion in OECD TFDE**

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Whether the 'value creation' approach that underpins the OECD BEPS work is suitable to address taxation challenges of the digital economy.

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Whether the current transfer pricing emphasis on the activities undertaken by people as a part of the Functions, Assets, and Risks analysis is a valid framework in the increasingly automated environment, especially with increasing use of artificial intelligence.

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How to value contributions to new digital intangibles -- e.g., value of networks, user base, and access to the market.

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Whether data (and in particular user data) has value, and how this can be measured.

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Whether there should be a move towards greater destination-based profit allocation.

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turnover tax on many B2B electronic services, and the UK is considering its own approach. These positions should become clearer and firmer in early 2018, so it would not be surprising to see more unilateral movements soon after April 2018 should the OECD and EU not find consensus on legislative action.

That said, Direct Tax remains an area of EU law that requires unanimity. While there may be a political imperative to act, it seems questionable whether any Commission proposals in this area could become EU law in 2018.

## **Other OECD developments**

### **Multilateral Instrument and other treaty developments**

In November 2017, the OECD Council approved the latest version of the OECD Model Tax Convention, introducing all of the treaty changes that were included in the October 2015 BEPS recommendations.

For the BEPS Multilateral Instrument (MLI) to come into effect, five countries have to have completed the ratification process. This is expected to happen in early 2018, meaning that it should enter into force in March or April 2018. The United States has not signed the MLI, but 71 other jurisdictions have done so, and 1,136 matched agreements currently are in scope. All 71 signers have embraced the principal purpose test, and 16 will also accept a simplified limitation of benefits (LOB) clause. As other countries complete their ratification process and accede to the MLI, the scope will grow and is expected to eventually cover over 2,000 bilateral tax treaties.

While the individual treaty changes are clear from the OECD's online tools, the timing of entries into effect and the number of different treaties changing in different ways simultaneously will require significant effort to monitor the potential impacts on individual businesses and business models. Bilateral treaties remain subject to local court interpretations, which may differ from other courts' interpretation of the same provision.

### **Country-by-Country reporting and information exchange**

Last year saw the introduction of Country-by-Country (CbC) reporting rules around the world, along with other transfer pricing documentation requirements in line with BEPS Action 13 in many countries. A vast – but not universal – network of multilateral and bilateral exchange agreements also were signed.

While there was no obligation in the United States for MNCs to file CbC reports in 2017, many did so in order to avoid the need to file multiple local 'secondary' filings. Because the United States did not sign the Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement to exchange these reports, the US Treasury worked to sign over 30 bilateral agreements by December 31, and other countries were encouraged to relax their reporting requirements.

From a compliance perspective, more countries will introduce CbC reporting requirements in 2018, and more exchange agreements will need to be signed accordingly. However, MNCs also must prepare for additional questions they may receive from recipient tax administrations in the second half of 2018, once those tax authorities have reviewed the first batch of CbC reports received from the United States.

In addition, the Common Reporting Standard (CRS) under which jurisdictions obtain information from their financial institutions and automatically exchange this information with other jurisdictions came into force in 2017. At the end of 2017, the OECD launched a public discussion draft on Mandatory Disclosure Rules for Addressing CRS Avoidance Arrangements and Offshore Structures.

### **Transfer pricing**

Following on from similar releases in 2016, the OECD's Working Party 6 (WP6) in 2017 issued discussion drafts and held public consultations on transfer pricing profit splits and attribution of profits to permanent establishments.

To date, there is no consensus on final rules for attributing profits to PEs, nor even agreement on whether the Authorized OECD Approach should be mandated. The project has now been going on for many years, and consensus could not be reached even before the the OECD's expansion of participation to Inclusive Framework countries. It is expected that a high-level agreement will be reached and published in early 2018, but this may not include detailed guidance or examples.

WP6 has had more success in agreeing on guidance related to transfer pricing of profit splits. While some disagreement remains regarding the behavior of unrelated parties (the lack of comparables for unique transactions poses obvious difficulties), it is expected that final guidance will be published in Spring 2018.

WP6 is also seeking in early 2018 to issue a 'Discussion Draft on Transfer Pricing of Financial Transactions' (covering guarantee fees, captive insurance, and cash-pooling) and 'Implementation Guidance on the Transfer Pricing of Hard-to-Value-Intangibles,' following the final guidance released in 2017 (which is similar to the US 'commensurate with income' rules).

### **'Harmful Tax Practices'**

In 2017, the OECD completed its review of 164 'preferential regimes' in line with the BEPS Action 5 minimum standard. The OECD deemed the French IP regime and the transition date of an Italian IP regime to be harmful. Nine other regimes were reviewed as harmful but as posing limited risk, so remain under review. Four regimes are deemed potentially harmful; economic analysis is ongoing to determine their final status.

Additionally, the OECD reports that over 10,000 rulings have been exchanged between tax administrations.

## **Dispute resolution (and prevention)**

The OECD continues to monitor implementation of BEPS Action 14, undertook peer reviews throughout 2017 on a number of its members, and will continue to do so through 2018. Findings to date have shown that the number of Mutual Agreement Procedure (MAP) cases are increasing, and that – broadly – participating countries are complying with the new rules. However, there are differences between countries' abilities to deal with the increased volume of cases, with many inventories increasing during 2016 and 2017.

The OECD continues to examine ways in which to relieve this burden. Ten countries are working with the OECD on a pilot International Compliance Assurance Programme (ICAP), commencing in January 2018, including the United States. This voluntary program seeks to assess risk of 'not high-risk' MNCs multilaterally across the participating countries. Interested MNCs will be able to talk through their CbC report together with tax administrations, and then deal with one lead administration for follow up. Assurance letters on risk ratings can be provided at the successful conclusion of the program.

## **Other EU developments**

### **State aid**

The State aid investigations -- which predominantly had been into EU Member States' rulings granted to US MNCs -- continued through 2017, although with a greater focus on EU regimes and MNCs. The UK's controlled foreign company (CFC) regime, for example, is under review.

Following the 2016 ruling of the European Commission against Ireland and instruction to recover €13 billion, both Ireland and the taxpayer appealed the ruling to the European Court of Justice (CJEU) in 2017. In addition, Luxembourg has appealed a €250 million finding against a ruling it granted to a different US taxpayer. Neither of these cases have yet been heard. The Commission also has started legal proceedings against Ireland for failing to collect the €13 billion tax due (although Ireland and the taxpayer have now reached agreement on an escrow arrangement).

Two cases may be suggestive as to the CJEU's final decisions regarding the two State aid cases.

In December 2016, CJEU published its decision on Santander, regarding whether allowing amortization of shares in a foreign company (but not in domestic companies) constitutes State aid. The required selectivity criteria was ruled to be met, because only those acquiring foreign shares could benefit. The CJEU stated that a significant number of claimants, spread across a wide range of industries, is not sufficient to demonstrate the measure is not selective.

In June 2017, the German Federal Fiscal Court referred questions on its real estate transfer tax to the CJEU, questioning whether the tax exemption provides a selective advantage to certain undertakings because it requires (i) a restructuring in the sense of the German Restructuring Act, (ii) a 95-percent shareholding between a controlling and a dependent company, and (iii) a minimum holding period of five years before and five years after the restructuring.

### **ATAD 2**

Following on from the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive (ATAD) in 2016, ATAD 2 was adopted in May 2017, extending the hybrid mismatch provisions to cover mismatches between EU and non-EU countries, as well as branch mismatches (upon which the OECD also released a final report in June 2017).

Member States have until January 1, 2020, to introduce the provisions, except rules regarding so-called 'reverse hybrids,' which may be delayed until January 1, 2022.

### **Public CbC reporting and 'blacklist'**

Despite considerable press and political interest in proposals to require MNCs to disclose elements of their CbC reports, none were adopted in 2017. Several EU Member States (but reportedly not enough to block the vote) considered that qualified majority voting (QMV) was not the appropriate legal base for the measure, and instead considered that unanimity should be required.

Additionally, because the legal base for accounting directives remains QMV, the European Parliament must agree on a final text through a slower 'trilogue' process which commenced in fall 2017. Debate continues regarding whether there should be a so-called safeguard clause that allows MNCs to defer reporting of commercially sensitive information for a number of years. Ultimately, the results of Germany's coalition negotiations (or 2018 elections, should these negotiations fail) are expected to be influential in the passage of this proposal.

Progress was made by the EU Code of Conduct Group, and in December 2017 a 'blacklist' of countries was published. The countries that currently appear on the list are American Samoa, Bahrain, Barbados, Grenada, Guam, Macao SAR, Marshall Islands, Mongolia, Namibia, Palau, Panama, Saint Lucia, Samoa, South Korea, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, and the United Arab Emirates. At this writing, it has been reported that EU officials intend to delist Barbados, Grenada, Macao SAR, Mongolia, Panama, South Korea, Tunisia, and the United Arab Emirates, after these countries agreed to make changes in their tax rules.



Jersey, Guernsey, and the Isle of Man were included on a so-called 'grey list' of 47 countries that are considered tax havens but that have agreed to bring their fiscal rules into line with EU expectations.

Following the 2017 hurricanes, the Council has put on hold its work in relation to eight Caribbean countries, but this will begin again in February 2018 with a view to finalizing in 2018.

### **Mandatory disclosure rules (MDR)**

In response to the recommendations of the TAXE and TAXE II Parliamentary Committees, the European Commission made legislative proposals to the European Council in 2017 that would require taxpayers and intermediaries to report transactions where certain hallmarks of 'aggressive' tax planning are met.

The 'leaked' proposals from the Council Presidency's compromise text of November 2017 suggest a broad selection of hallmarks (see Box 3 below), which could cover a significant volume of transactions without any tax motivation, but further changes can be expected before the final adoption of a directive.

The Council is expected to agree on a final text in early 2018.

### **Dispute resolution**

In October 2017 a directive on mandatory and binding dispute resolution mechanisms within the EU was passed. The text allows for MAP to be initiated by the taxpayer, and requires Member States to reach an agreement within two years.

If the MAP fails, an arbitration procedure would be launched to resolve the dispute within specified timelines. For this, an advisory panel of three to five independent arbitrators is appointed, together with up to two representatives of each Member State.

Member States are required to enact relevant legislation by 30 June 2019. Any complaint submitted from July 1, 2019, onward relating to questions of dispute relating to income or capital earned in a tax year commencing on or after January 1, 2018 will be covered.

### **Box 3: November Council Discussion Document on MDR**

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Any 'cross-border arrangement' would be reportable if it meets one of the hallmarks.

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Any one of the adviser, intermediary, or party to the in-scope transactions being subject to EU law (i.e., taxpayers) would trigger the requirement to disclose.

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Generally, the obligation to report would be with the adviser (within five days of the arrangements being made available to the taxpayer).

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However, where the adviser had no obligation to report, the taxpayer would need to report itself within 15 days of the transactions being entered into.

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### **US tax treaties**

No new US tax treaties or protocols have entered into force since 2010 due to objections raised by Senator Rand Paul (R-KY) about information-sharing agreements that generally are part of all US tax treaties. On October 29, 2015, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held a hearing on eight treaties/protocols – those with Chile, Hungary, Poland, Japan, Luxembourg, Spain, and Switzerland, and a protocol to a multilateral treaty on mutual administrative assistance in tax matters. Although they were reported out favorably by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on November 10, 2015, they were not ratified by the full Senate so they remain pending in the Foreign Relations Committee with the start of the new 115th Congress. Since 2015, new US treaties/protocols have been agreed to with Vietnam and Norway.

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## Trade and other policy priorities

Actions in 2018 related to international trade, infrastructure investment, and federal regulations could have a significant effect on businesses and individuals.

### Trade

The US Department of Commerce reported on January 5, 2018 (in its most recent monthly survey for November 2017) that the United States ran a net trade deficit in goods and services for the first 11 months of 2017 of \$513.6 billion, which reflected \$2.6 trillion in imports offset by \$2.1 trillion in exports.

#### Presidential trade and tariff authority

President Trump has broad authority to negotiate trade agreements. Congress in June 2015 enacted the Trade Preferences Extension Act of 2015 renewing trade promotion authority (TPA), giving the President authority to negotiate comprehensive reciprocal free trade agreements with major trading partners, which then are considered in Congress under an expedited process.

TPA is subject to a renewable vote this spring. Under the current TPA statute, the President is authorized to request TPA renewal by April. Congress then has until June to pass a resolution of disapproval. If no resolution of disapproval is passed, TPA is automatically extended until 2021. If the President does not request renewal or if Congress does pass a resolution disapproving his request (both of which are currently considered unlikely), TPA automatically sunsets June 30.

Under TPA procedures, trade agreements are subject to limited debate (i.e., no filibuster in the Senate) and then an up-or-down vote (i.e., no amendments allowed) when all debate time expires. Also known as 'fast track' trade negotiating authority, TPA is subject to certain conditions, including Congressional consultation and access to information during all phases of trade negotiations. When the President exercises trade-related powers delegated by Congress, such actions may be challenged in court.

During his 2016 Presidential campaign, President Trump stated that he would impose tariffs on goods sold into the United States by certain countries if they engage in unfair trade practices. He cited presidential authority to impose tariffs under various existing trade provisions, including Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, which provides the President with the ability to take retaliatory actions (e.g., tariffs and quotas) against any country that violates or otherwise denies benefits under any trade agreement with the United States.

President Trump has said that he will direct United States Trade Representative (USTR) Robert Lighthizer to bring trade cases against China in response to that country's 'unfair subsidy behavior.' He also has said that he will instruct Treasury Secretary Mnuchin to label China a 'currency manipulator,' and will 'use every lawful presidential power to remedy trade disputes if China does not stop its alleged illegal activities, including its theft of American trade secrets.'

The Trump Administration in April 2017 launched investigations into the amount of steel and aluminum the United States needs to protect its national security, whether current capacity meets that level, and whether rising imports of Chinese steel and aluminum constitute a threat to US national security. These investigations are being carried out under Section 232 of the 1962 Trade Expansion Act, which enables the president to take action (e.g., impose tariffs or quotas) against imports to mitigate a threat to or impairment of national security when the Secretary of Commerce finds certain imports impose such a threat. The Commerce Department must submit its reports on the investigations by January 2018 to the President, who will have 90 days to take action. President Trump could choose to impose sweeping barriers on imports of Chinese steel and aluminum.

The Trump Administration in August 2017 opened an investigation into whether China's requirement that US companies share their technology secrets as a condition of doing business there constitutes the theft of US intellectual property. The results of the investigation could prompt the Administration to order new limits on Chinese investment in the United States or raise tariffs on Chinese products.

The Trump Administration also opened two 'safeguard' cases in 2017, with respect to solar panel cells and modules and to large residential washing machine imports. The US International Trade Commission (ITC) subsequently found that increased foreign imports of these solar cells and modules and washing machines caused serious injury to domestic manufacturers and recommended the imposition of safeguard tariffs on these goods. USTR Lighthizer on January 22, 2018 announced that President Trump approved the imposition of tariffs.

Foreign countries may bring World Trade Organization (WTO) challenges against US unilateral trade actions as violations of international trade agreement commitments, which require members to bring complaints against trading partners to the WTO's dispute settlement system. For example, the safeguard law was last invoked by the George W. Bush administration in 2002 when it imposed steel tariffs to protect domestic steelmakers. The Bush Administration later removed these tariffs after WTO deemed them improper.

## **Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)**

President Trump on January 23, 2017, signed a presidential memorandum to withdraw the United States from the TPP trade agreement. The agreement, which had been signed by the United States, but not approved by Congress, is an agreement involving countries in Asia Pacific and North and South America aimed at reducing or eliminating a substantial number of tariffs. The 11 remaining countries — minus the United States — have indicated their intention to continue working toward a revised TPP that could be finalized in 2018.

## **North American Free Trade Agreement**

USTR Lighthizer on November 17, 2017 released an updated summary of the negotiating objectives for the renegotiation of NAFTA. The new objectives update the previous objectives unveiled by the Trump Administration on July 17, 2017. This update marks the first time the USTR has released a second updated version of negotiating objectives.

Covering a wide range of areas, the objectives would directly impact trade in North America. Some objectives, such as automation of import, export, and transit processes, harmonization of customs data requirements, expedited customs treatment for express delivery shipments, and increased transparency and impartial administration by customs authorities should ease cross-border trade in North America. Meanwhile, other objectives such as lightened rules of origin for NAFTA origination and more stringent enforcement of trade remedies may cause disruption of existing supply chains.

The negotiating teams of Canada, Mexico, and the United States met in Mexico City in November 2017 for their fifth round of efforts to renegotiate NAFTA. Negotiators have worked to address uncertainty for Canadian, Mexican, and US importers and exporters, narrow conceptual gaps, and find solutions to significant policy differences. The negotiating teams also have reaffirmed their commitment to moving forward in all areas of the negotiations, in order to conclude negotiations as soon as possible. Negotiators will hold their next round of negotiations from January 23-28, 2018, in Montreal, Canada.

Issues likely to be considered at the January meeting include US proposals to (1) require automobiles to have a minimum amount of North American content in order to benefit from tariff exemptions when manufactured in Mexico and sold in the United States, (2) repeal a trade dispute settlement system that largely shields Canada and Mexico from US anti-dumping duties, and (3) add a sunset provision that would allow NAFTA to expire if all three countries do not renew it every five years

## **United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS)**

The Trump Administration and South Korean officials met in Washington on January 5, 2018, to begin formally renegotiating KORUS, the United States' largest free trade agreement outside of NAFTA. The agreement was negotiated by the George W. Bush administration and signed in 2007 by the United States and South Korea — the United States' seventh-largest export market for goods. Ratified by Congress in 2011, KORUS took effect in March 2012, cutting almost all tariffs and many other trade barriers between the countries.

The January 5 talks represent the first round of KORUS negotiations since the United States in July 2017 invoked a clause in the agreement that enables either party to seek amendments. The United States presented proposals to improve auto exports and lift trade barriers. South Korea responded with proposed changes to investor-state dispute settlement rules and trade remedies.

## **Tariff relief**

The House on January 16 voted 402 to 0 to pass a miscellaneous tariff relief bill (H.R. 4318) that was jointly introduced by House Ways and Means Chairman Brady, Ways and Means Ranking Member Neal, Senate Finance Chairman Hatch, and Finance Ranking Member Wyden. This legislation reflects the recommendations of the ITC. Congress in 2016 established a new process for the consideration of tariff relief proposals that provides for tariff relief requests to be received by the agency. The House and Senate tax committees then review the ITC's report and prepare legislation to implement the agency's recommendations. Under this process, Congress may not add products for tariff relief that were not recommended by the ITC.

## **Infrastructure**

The Trump Administration appears to be preparing to unveil its long-awaited \$1 trillion infrastructure plan utilizing public-private partnerships. Potential uses for the money could include transportation needs, such as highways, bridges, railroads, airports, and transit; upgrades to veterans hospitals; and expansions of rural broadband service.

Administration officials have said that they hope that \$200 billion in new federal spending over the next 10 years will trigger almost \$1 trillion in private spending and local and state spending. The White House has said that the \$200 billion federal share of the package would be split into four categories: (1) funding for states and localities that promise to take on more of the financial burden of infrastructure building and upkeep; (2) block grants for rural areas; (3) existing federal loan programs; and (4) money for 'transformational' projects 'that will truly change the face of our country.'

Administration officials have said that they plan to release their infrastructure plan as a lengthy statement of ‘principles’ sometime before President Trump delivers his State of the Union address on January 30, 2018. An infrastructure package would need 60 votes in the Senate, meaning that the Administration must get some Senate Democrats on board for an infrastructure plan to be enacted.

Some business organizations have called for Congress to consider an increase in federal gas and diesel excise taxes to fund an increase in federal infrastructure spending. While a number of state governments in recent years have approved increases in state fuel excise taxes, the current federal taxes of 18.4 cents per gallon for gasoline and 24.4 cents per gallon for diesel fuel have been unchanged since 1993. Although some individual Members of Congress have supported such proposals, the current Congress is not expected to approve an increase in federal fuel excise taxes.

The authorization for the Federal Aviation Administration and federal excise taxes on aviation fuel and air transportation services are set to expire on March 31, 2018.

## ***Federal regulations***

Since taking office, President Trump has signed a series of executive orders directing federal departments and agencies to provide relief from federal regulations. A number of these executive orders have focused on providing relief from tax regulations.

### **Executive Order on Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs**

President Trump on January 30, 2017, signed an executive order (EO 13771) generally requiring that for every new regulation proposed, agencies must identify two existing regulations to be repealed. Regulations generally are addressed under specified administrative procedures that allow for public comments. Agencies would have to go through the same rulemaking process to repeal existing regulations. The EO also provides that the total incremental cost for all new regulations, including those repealed, be no greater than zero in FY 2017. The order exempts regulations with respect to the military, national security, foreign affairs, and those related to agency organization, management, or personnel.

### **Notice 2017-38**

President Trump on April 21, 2017, signed an executive order (EO 13789) directing Treasury Secretary Mnuchin to review any significant tax regulations issued in 2016 for the purposes of identifying and reducing tax regulatory burdens that ‘add undue complexity’ and ‘exceed statutory authority.’ The IRS on July 7, 2017, released Notice 2017-38, which determined that of the 105 regulations issued between January 1, 2016, and April 21, 2017, 52 regulations were potentially ‘significant tax regulations’ subject to review for purposes of the EO. After examining those regulations, Treasury concluded that the following eight regulations either ‘impose an undue financial burden’ and/or ‘add undue complexity’:

- Treatment of certain interests in corporations as stock or indebtedness (Section 385)
- Income and currency gain or loss (Section 987)
- Treatment of certain transfers of property to foreign corporations (Section 367)
- Liabilities recognized as recourse partnership liabilities (Section 752)
- Restrictions on liquidation of an interest for estate, gift, and generation-skipping transfer taxes (Section 2704)
- Certain transfers of property to RICs and REITs (Section 337(d))
- Definition of political subdivision (Section 103)
- Participation of certain persons in a summons interview (Section 7602).

### **Notice 2017-36**

The IRS on July 28, 2017, issued Notice 2017-36, announcing a one-year delay in the application of the documentation requirements in final regulations under Section 385, which authorizes Treasury to prescribe rules to determine whether certain instruments between related parties are treated as debt or equity (or as part debt and part equity). Treasury and the IRS intend to amend the documentation regulations to apply only to interests issued or deemed issued on or after January 1, 2019. This delay was in response to the review of the final and temporary Section 385 regulations per Notice 2017-38.

## **Second Report to the President on Identifying and Reducing Tax Regulatory Burdens**

Treasury on October 4, 2017, released a final report with recommendations on modifying or revoking the eight regulations previously identified in Notice 2017-38.

Treasury recommended:

- Revoking the Section 385 regulations and revising the documentation regulations (with a prospective effective date)
- Substantially revising the Sections 987, 367, and 337(d) regulations
- Revoking in part the Sections 707, 752, and 7602 regulations
- Withdrawing the Sections 2704 and 103 regulations.

### **Withdrawal of two proposed regulations**

The IRS on October 20, 2017, published in the Federal Register withdrawal notices for proposed regulations relating to restrictions on liquidation of an interest for estate, gift, and generation-skipping transfer taxes under Section 2704 and the definition of a political subdivision for purpose of taxexempt bond rules under Section 103. The withdrawals were in accordance with Executive Order 13789.

## **2017-2018 priority guidance plan**

Treasury on October 20, 2017, released its 2017-2018 priority guidance plan with EO 13789. The plan contains guidance on projects Treasury seeks to complete during the plan year July 1, 2017, through June 30, 2018. Treasury noted that most of the projects involve guidance on various tax issues that could take the form of revocations of final, temporary, or proposed regulations; notices, revenue rulings, and revenue procedures; and simplifying and burden-reducing amendments to existing regulations.


Part one of the plan focuses on the eight regulations identified by Treasury in Notice 2017-38 to implement EO 13789. Part two of the plan describes 19 projects that Treasury identified as burden-reducing and plans to complete by June 30, 2018, including (1) final regulations under Section 263A regarding the inclusion of negative amounts in additional Section 263A costs; (2) guidance under Section 871(m), which governs withholding on certain notional principal contracts, derivatives, and other equity-linked instruments; and (3) guidance under Section 954(c) regarding foreign currency gains.

## Health care and entitlement reform

Following passage of the Act, House Republican leadership has expressed interest in addressing entitlement and welfare reform in 2018, and President Trump previously had urged a return to health care reform. However, concerns about the 2018 midterm elections may impede Congress' ability to enact entitlement reform measures this year.

House Speaker Paul Ryan (R-WI) has called for reforms to Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security to achieve deficit reduction. Previously, Speaker Ryan has supported transitioning Medicare into a premium support system whereby federal spending for each Medicare beneficiary would be fixed based on the regional outcomes of competitive bidding between traditional Medicare fee-for-service and private plans.

**Figure 9: Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security are projected to account for an increasing share of Federal outlays**



Source: PwC analysis of the Congressional Budget Office's June 2017 Update to the Budget and Economic Outlook: 2017 to 2027. Does not include impacts from the Act.

A recent analysis by the CBO estimated that transitioning Medicare into a premium support system could save the federal government between \$21 billion and \$419 billion over the 2022–2026 time period depending on the exact structure adopted.

Republicans also may revive efforts to transform federal funding for Medicaid into a system of block grants, which was included in various 2017 proposals to repeal and replace the Affordable Care Act (ACA). Those proposals were not enacted, but there may be an opportunity to consider Medicaid block grants as part of entitlement reform.

House Republicans have endorsed these Medicare and Medicaid policy goals in recent budget resolutions.

The Trump Administration may be able to achieve some Medicaid reforms through waivers. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) on January 11 issued guidance giving states much broader flexibility over Medicaid eligibility and benefits, under which states can apply for waivers to impose work requirements on non-disabled adults. CMS on January 12 approved a waiver request from Kentucky allowing that state to impose work requirements and to require beneficiaries to pay monthly premiums based on income. In addition, some states have expressed interest in charging monthly premiums for certain Medicaid enrollees, similar to a proposal by Indiana.

States also have begun to take action to reform other welfare benefits. In December 2017, Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker (R) proposed a plan to require drug testing for some recipients

of the state's food stamp program (supplemental nutrition assistance program, or SNAP). If recipients test positive, they would be required to undergo treatment or lose SNAP benefits. This plan had been blocked by the Obama Administration but may gain approval under the Trump Administration.

In addition to considering entitlement reform, Congress may revive health care reform legislation in 2018. Senator Susan Collins (R-ME) last year received a commitment from Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-KY) to pass legislation to stabilize the ACA insurance exchanges. These proposals would guarantee funding for cost-sharing reduction subsidies and restart the reinsurance program, along with other measures.

By dropping the individual mandate penalty to \$0, the Act is anticipated to result in more instability in the ACA insurance exchanges. This may lead to increased pressure from states for Congress to take action.

As noted above, the most recent short-term funding bill approved by Congress provides a two-year moratorium on the 2.3-percent medical device excise tax for sales during 2018 and 2019; a one-year moratorium on the annual excise tax imposed on health insurers for 2019; and a two-year delay of the excise tax on high-cost employer health coverage (the so-called 'Cadillac' tax), so that this tax would be effective for the first time in 2022, instead of 2020. The CR also reauthorizes Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP) funding through FY 2023.



## *IRS challenges*



Implementation of the 2017 Tax Reform Act primarily will be the responsibility of the IRS, together with the Treasury Department, at a time when the IRS has decreased funding and staffing and continues to be scrutinized by lawmakers and the public for its handling of certain tax-exempt status applications several years ago. Moreover, the top two IRS positions -- Commissioner and Chief Counsel -- became vacant last year. John Koskinen's term as IRS Commissioner ended November 12, 2017, and Bill Wilkins stepped down last year as IRS Chief Counsel.

Treasury Department Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy David Kautter currently is serving both in his Treasury role and as Acting IRS Commissioner. The position of IRS Chief Counsel remains vacant, with William M. Paul, Deputy Chief Counsel (Technical), currently serving as Principal Deputy Chief Counsel. President Trump is expected to nominate individuals to fill both positions, and the Senate then would need to consider the nominations.

The Trump Administration's FY 2018 budget proposes a \$239 million reduction in IRS funding, from \$11.3 billion (in FY 2017) to \$10.9 billion. The proposed budget continues a steady pattern of IRS funding reductions; for comparison, the FY 2010 IRS budget was \$12.1 billion. Funding reductions, coupled with attrition and hiring freezes, have resulted in a reduced IRS workforce, from 95,000 employees in FY 2010 to 78,000 employees in FY 2016.

### ***Congressional review of IRS procedures***

The Act does not provide any overarching restructuring to the administrative organization or procedures of the IRS. Congress generally was precluded from including IRS reforms due to restrictions under budget reconciliation procedures. House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Brady plans to consider IRS restructuring legislation this year. During 2017, the Ways and Means Oversight Subcommittee held several hearings to review the fair administration of tax laws, focusing on dispute resolution between the IRS and taxpayers. The House Ways and Means Committee is expected to continue its efforts in reviewing IRS administrative procedures, and IRS interactions with taxpayers, into 2018.

On July 13, 2017, H.R. 3220, Preserving Taxpayers' Rights Act, was introduced by Reps. Jason Smith (R-MO) and Terri Sewell (D-AL). The bill would codify a taxpayer's right to an administrative appeal before the Office of Appeals and limit that right only in particular instances defined within the statute; there no longer would be any IRS discretion to deny a taxpayer the right to an appeal on the grounds of 'sound tax administration.' In addition, the bill would limit the IRS ability to 'designate cases for litigation,' an authority which allows the IRS to deny a taxpayer administrative appeal rights. H.R. 3220 also would modify the IRS authority to issue 'designated summons' and make other changes to IRS compliance procedures



## ***LB&I examination updates***

In 2017, the IRS LB&I Division continued its efforts to refine its examination process in moving toward issue-focused examinations. In 2016, the IRS had signaled that it would be instituting compliance ‘campaigns,’ that is, plans focused on the right issues, using the right resources, and using the right combination of ‘treatment streams’ to achieve the intended compliance outcome.

In January and November 2017, the IRS formally identified these campaigns, along with potential treatment streams. Below is a list of the announced campaigns.

The status of particular campaigns likely will be reviewed in light of the enactment of the Act.

### ***Campaigns announced January 31, 2017:***

- TEFRA linkage plan strategy campaign
- S corporation losses claimed in excess of basis campaign
- Section 48C energy credit campaign
- Domestic production activities deduction, multi-channel video program distributors (MVPDs) and TV broadcasters
- Micro-captive insurance campaign
- Related party transactions campaign
- Deferred variable annuity reserves and life insurance reserves IIR campaign
- Basket transactions campaign
- Land developers – completed contract method (CCM) campaign
- Form 1120-F non-filer campaign
- Repatriation campaign
- OVDP (Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program) declines-withdrawals campaign
- Inbound distributor campaign

### ***Campaigns announced November 3, 2017:***

- Form 1120-F Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 withholding campaign
- Swiss bank program campaign
- Foreign earned income exclusion campaign
- Verification of Form 1042-S credit claimed on Form 1040NR campaign
- Section 956 avoidance campaign
- Corporate direct (Section 901) foreign tax credit (FTC) campaign
- Energy efficient commercial building property campaign
- Economic development incentives campaign
- Individual foreign tax credit (Form 1116) campaign
- Agricultural chemicals security credit campaign
- Deferral of cancellation of indebtedness income campaign

Deputy IRS Commissioner Kirsten Wielobob announced in December that the IRS was assessing the performance of its transfer pricing examinations, noting mixed results in the sustaining of proposed adjustments. Although no further announcements have been made, on January 12, 2018, the IRS released interim instructions to LB&I examiners on the issuance of mandatory transfer pricing information document requests (IDRs) in LB&I examinations. At the same time, the IRS issued new instructions for LB&I examiners on transfer pricing issue examination scope and the appropriate application of Section 6662(e) penalties, along with new issue selection instructions related to reasonably anticipated benefits in cost sharing arrangements, cost-sharing arrangement stock based compensation, and best methods for transfer pricing selection and scope of analysis.

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## State tax policy trends

Aside from responding to the consequences of federal tax reform, states are advancing a number of tax policy proposals, with some nearing a tipping point for consequential change, particularly in the nexus arena.

### **Physical presence nexus provisions**

Massachusetts transformed the physical presence debate in 2017 by promulgating a regulation specifying that internet vendors with more than \$500,000 in sales into the state comprising over 100 transactions must collect and remit sales and use tax if they establish a physical presence through the use of in-state software such as ‘apps’ and ancillary data such as ‘cookies.’ Relationships with content distribution networks or the use of marketplace facilitators or delivery companies also create a physical presence for these internet vendors. Since apps and cookies are routinely distributed to or stored on computers or other physical communication devices of an internet vendor’s customers, many remote sellers likely will be considered to have nexus in the state under this approach.

While there may be constitutional challenges to the Massachusetts regulations, the history of state tax nexus expansion reflects that a single state’s efforts may be adopted quickly by other states, regardless of any potential controversy attached to the position. The Connecticut Department of Revenue Services Commissioner, for example, publicly announced that the state will follow Massachusetts’ lead in defining an in-state physical presence. It is anticipated that other states will not wait for the outcome of any legal challenges to the Massachusetts regulation before adopting their own ‘cookie’ nexus provisions.

### **Constitutional challenges to the physical presence standard**

While many states continue to expand the definition of what constitutes a constitutionally required physical presence for purposes of mandating a sales and use tax collection responsibility, an increasing number are choosing instead to directly challenge the *Quill* physical presence requirement. States such as South Dakota, Alabama, Tennessee, and Wyoming have enacted or promulgated economic nexus standards to trigger sales and use tax collection requirements.

The South Dakota law, enacted in 2016, requires out-of-state sellers to collect and remit sales tax based solely on economic factors: \$100,000 in sales or 200 separate transactions. The law immediately was challenged, and the case was fast-tracked to the US Supreme Court, which on January 12, 2018 granted review of the case.

The question presented to the US Supreme Court is whether it should abrogate *Quill*’s physical presence standard. The crux of the state’s argument is that *Quill*’s sole animating concern – namely, the logistical burden national sellers face in collecting sales tax in thousands of jurisdictions – has been eliminated by advances in technology and, therefore, no longer poses an undue burden on interstate commerce. Many online and e-commerce businesses argue, however, that technological advances have not mitigated the inherent burdens of compliance with over 12,000 tax jurisdictions – double the number deemed unduly burdensome in *Quill*. These businesses also claim states have not done enough to meaningfully simplify their tax systems, such as providing one tax rate per state.

Should the Court overturn *Quill*, it may effectively eliminate any incentive for states to simplify their tax systems. Rather, an increase in complexity may result due to the lack of a uniform legal framework upon which laws are adopted. As a result, pressure from the business community may increase for Congress to assert its Commerce Clause authority and enact a national legislative solution.

### **The single sales factor and alternative apportionment approaches**

In the state income tax area, one important trend has been the use of an alternative to the statutory apportionment formula.

In the 1950’s, a tumultuous period in state taxation, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act (UDITPA). Under UDITPA, all business income is apportioned to a state by an equally weighted three factor formula of payroll, property, and sales. Since that time, this formula has been considered the ‘gold standard’ for apportioning income. However, over time a significant number of states have dropped the three-factor formula in favor of a single sales factor and the use of market-based sourcing.

This change has been viewed as a means to support economic development -- that is, businesses may locate payroll and property in a state without increasing their tax liabilities. One consequence of this change has been an increase in both the number of taxpayers petitioning for apportionment relief and departments of revenue imposing alternative apportionment formulas. At issue is whether the single sales factor creates qualitative and quantitative distortions of where economic activity takes place and income is earned. While the US Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the single sales factor in its 1978 *Moorman v. Bair* decision, the expectation is that challenges to its efficacy will continue.

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## ***What this means for your business***

Congress last December enacted the most significant overhaul of the US tax code in more than 30 years. The benefits of US tax reform should be broadly felt by Americans, and businesses large and small will see tax relief from the recently enacted tax reform. The 2017 tax reform act contains elements important for stronger economic growth – a competitive corporate tax rate and a move toward a territorial system of international taxation. The Act also temporarily lowers income taxes for individuals, with additional temporary tax relief for owners of pass-through businesses.

A permanent 21-percent US federal rate plus average state corporate income taxes places the combined US corporate tax rate just below the GDP-weighted average of other OECD countries. This should significantly enhance the attractiveness of the United States as a place to invest relative to its position before tax reform.

Businesses and individuals should engage with the Treasury Department and the IRS as they begin the regulatory process to implement the legislation. IRS funding issues may affect implementation of the tax reform legislation and will continue to make it more difficult for companies to resolve tax disputes.

The appropriate ‘balance’ between spending and revenues likely will be part of any future debate over the federal budget and tax legislation. The continued involvement of business leaders is critical to guide actions to reduce deficits in a responsible and equitable manner that promotes economic growth.

There is continued cause for concern that BEPS-inspired unilateral actions and EC State aid investigations could result in double taxation of US companies operating abroad. Given their global prominence, US companies likely will continue to be a primary focal point of the media, foreign governments, and non-governmental organizations. US tax reform may well add to that focus as governments evaluate the US tax reform legislation and consider its consistency with OECD agreements, tax treaties, and WTO rules.

We share the concern of many of our clients that the OECD BEPS action plan and unilateral actions of various countries will result in an increased risk of double taxation of cross-border business operations, greater complexity, additional administrative burdens, and an expansion of disputes with tax authorities.

# Appendix A: Tax policymakers

## Congressional leadership in the 115th Congress

### House Leadership

Speaker of the House	Paul Ryan (R-WI)
Majority Leader	Kevin McCarthy (R-CA)
Majority Whip	Steve Scalise (R-LA)
Chief Deputy Whip	Patrick McHenry (R-NC)
Republican Conference Chair	Cathy McMorris Rodgers (R-WA)
Republican Conference Vice Chair	Doug Collins (R-GA)
Republican Campaign Committee Chair	Steve Stivers (R-OH)
Republican Conference Secretary	Jason Smith (R-MO)
Republican Policy Committee Chair	Luke Messer (R-IN)
Minority Leader	Nancy Pelosi (D-CA)
Minority Whip	Steny Hoyer (D-MD)
Assistant Minority Leader	Jim Clyburn (D-SC)
Democratic Conference Chair	Joseph Crowley (D-NY)
Democratic Conference Vice Chair	Linda Sánchez (D-CA)
Democratic Campaign Committee Chair	Ben Ray Lujan (D-NM)
Democratic Steering and Policy Committee Chairs	Rosa DeLauro (D-CT) and Eric Swalwell (D-CA)

### Senate Leadership

President of the Senate	Vice-President Mike Pence (R)
President Pro Tempore	Orrin Hatch (R-UT)
Majority Leader	Mitch McConnell (R-KY)
Assistant Majority Leader	John Cornyn (R-TX)
Republican Conference Chair	John Thune (R-SD)
Republican Conference Vice Chair	Roy Blunt (R-MO)
Republican Policy Committee Chair	John Barrasso (R-WY)
Republican Senatorial Campaign Committee Chair	Cory Gardner (R-CO)
Minority Leader and Democratic Conference Chair	Charles Schumer (D-NY)
Minority Whip	Richard Durbin (D-IL)
Assistant Minority Leader	Patty Murray (D-WA)
Democratic Policy and Communications Chair	Debbie Stabenow (D-MI)
Democratic Policy and Communications Vice-Chair	Joe Manchin, III (D-WV)
Democratic Conference Vice-Chairs	Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) and Mark Warner (D-VA)
Democratic Conference Secretary	Tammy Baldwin (D-WI)
Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee Chair	Chris Van Hollen (D-MD)
Democratic Steering Committee Chair	Amy Klobuchar (D-MN)
Democratic Outreach Committee Chair	Bernie Sanders (I-VT)

## House and Senate tax-writing committees

### House Ways and Means Committee

The Ways and Means Committee membership currently is composed of 24 Republicans and 16 Democrats.

#### House Ways and Means Committee Members, 115th Congress

Republicans	Democrats
Kevin Brady (R-TX), Chairman	Richard Neal (D-MA), Ranking Minority Member
Sam Johnson (R-TX)*	Sander Levin (D-MI)*
Devin Nunes (R-CA)	John Lewis (D-GA)
Dave Reichert (R-WA)*	Lloyd Doggett (D-TX)
Peter Roskam (R-IL)	Mike Thompson (D-CA)
Vern Buchanan (R-FL)	John Larson (D-CT)
Adrian Smith (R-NE)	Earl Blumenauer (D-OR)
Lynn Jenkins (R-KS)*	Ron Kind (D-WI)
Erik Paulsen (R-MN)	Bill Pascrell Jr. (D-NJ)
Kenny Marchant (R-TX)	Joseph Crowley (D-NY)
Diane Black (R-TN)*	Danny Davis (D-IL)
Tom Reed (R-NY)	Linda Sanchez (D-CA)
Mike Kelly (R-PA)	Brian Higgins (D-NY)
Jim Renacci (R-OH)*	Terri Sewell (D-AL)
Pat Meehan (R-PA)	Suzan DelBene (D-WA)
Kristi Noem (R-SD)*	Judy Chu (D-CA)
George Holding (R-NC)	
Jason Smith (R-MO)	
Tom Rice (R-SC)	
David Schweikert (R-AZ)	
Jackie Walorski (R-IN)	
Carlos Curbelo (R-FL)	
Mike Bishop (R-MI)	
<i>Darin LaHood (R-IL)</i>	

\* Not running for re-election to the House / New member in italics

### Senate Finance Committee

The Finance Committee membership currently is composed of 14 Republicans and 13 Democrats.

#### Senate Finance Committee Members, 115th Congress

Republicans	Democrats
<b>Orrin Hatch (R-UT), Chairman*</b>	Ron Wyden (D-OR), Ranking Minority Member
Charles Grassley (R-IA)	<b>Debbie Stabenow (D-MI)</b>
Mike Crapo (R-ID)	<b>Maria Cantwell (D-WA)</b>
Pat Roberts (R-KS)	<b>Bill Nelson (D-FL)</b>
Michael Enzi (R-WY)	<b>Robert Menendez (D-NJ)</b>
John Cornyn (R-TX)	<b>Thomas Carper (D-DE)</b>
John Thune (R-SD)	<b>Benjamin Cardin (D-MD)</b>
Richard Burr (R-NC)	<b>Sherrod Brown (D-OH)</b>
Johnny Isakson (R-GA)	Michael Bennet (D-CO)
Rob Portman (R-OH)	<b>Robert Casey, Jr. (D-PA)</b>
Patrick J. Toomey (R-PA)	Mark Warner (D-VA)
<b>Dean Heller (R-NV)</b>	<b>Claire McCaskill (D-MO)</b>
Tim Scott (R-SC)	<b>Sheldon Whitehouse (D-RI)</b>
Bill Cassidy (R-LA)	

Senators subject to re-election in bold / New member in italics

\* Not running for re-election to the Senate

### Key Treasury and other Administration officials (current and designated)

Republicans	Democrats
Treasury Secretary	Steven Mnuchin
Director, National Economic Council	Gary Cohn
Director, Office of Management and Budget	Mick Mulvaney
Chair, Council of Economic Advisers	Kevin Hassett
Treasury Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy	David Kautter
IRS Commissioner (Acting)	David Kautter
IRS Chief Counsel	Vacant

## Appendix B: Senators up for election in 2018

Democrats	Republicans
Baldwin, Tammy (D-WI)	Barrasso, John (R-WY)
<b>Brown, Sherrod (D-OH)</b>	Corker, Bob (R-TN)**
<b>Cantwell, Maria (D-WA)</b>	Cruz, Ted (R-TX)
<b>Cardin, Benjamin (D-MD)</b>	Fischer, Deb (R-NE)
<b>Carper, Thomas (D-DE)</b>	Flake, Jeff (R-AZ)**
<b>Casey Jr., Robert (D-PA)</b>	<b>Hatch, Orrin (R-UT)**</b>
Donnelly, Joe (D-IN)	<b>Heller, Dean (R-NV)</b>
Feinstein, Dianne (D-CA)	Wicker, Roger (D-MS)
Gillibrand, Kirsten (D-NY)	
Heinrich, Martin (D-NM)	
Heitkamp, Heidi (D-ND)	
Hirono, Mazie (D-HI)	
Kaine, Tim (D-VA)	
King, Angus (I-ME)*	
Klobuchar, Amy (D-MN)	
Manchin III, Joe (D-WV)	
<b>McCaskill, Claire (D-MO)</b>	
<b>Menendez, Robert (D-NJ)</b>	
Murphy, Christopher (D-CT)	
<b>Nelson, Bill (D-FL)</b>	
Sanders, Bernard (I-VT)*	
Smith, Tina (D-MN)	
<b>Stabenow, Debbie (D-MI)</b>	
Tester, Jon (D-MT)	
Warren, Elizabeth (D-MA)	
<b>Whitehouse, Sheldon (D-RI)</b>	

\*Caucuses with Democrats

\*\*Incumbent not running for re-election in 2018

Senate Finance Committee members shown in bold

## Appendix C: Summary of the 2017 Tax Reform Act

General business provisions		
Provision	Prior law	2017 tax reform act
<b>Corporate tax rates</b>	35% rate	21% rate for tax years beginning after 12/31/2017. A blended rate applies for fiscal-year taxpayers
<b>Corporate AMT</b>	20% corporate AMT rate.	Corporate AMT repealed for tax years beginning after 2017. Prior-year AMT credits refundable from 2018 to 2021.
<b>Cost recovery (full expensing)</b>	<p>Recover investment over the investment's applicable life under MACRS or ADS.</p> <p>Additional depreciation deduction for qualified property placed in service through 2019 (additional year for certain qualified property with longer production period).</p> <p>50% bonus depreciation for property placed in service during 2017, phased-down to 40% in 2018 and 30% in 2019.</p>	<p>100% full expensing for investments made after 9/27/2017 and before 1/1/2023 (additional year for certain qualified property with longer production period).</p> <p>Phased-down by 20% a year for property placed in service after 12/31/2022 and before 1/1/2027 (additional year for certain qualified property with longer production period).</p> <p>Applies prior law phase-down of bonus depreciation for property acquired before 9/28/2017, and placed in service after 9/27/2017, as well as the present-law phase-down of the Section 280F increase amount in the limitation on the depreciation deductions allowed with respect to certain passenger automobiles acquired before 9/28/2017, and placed in service after 9/27/2017.</p> <p>Excludes property used by a regulated public utility.</p> <p>Extends to used property.</p> <p>Extends to qualified film, television, and live theatrical productions.</p>
<b>Business interest expense</b>	Deductible as incurred.	<p>Limited to the sum of business interest income plus 30% of the adjusted taxable income of the taxpayer for the taxable year. Adjusted taxable income is defined similar to EBITDA for taxable years beginning after 12/31/2017 and before 1/1/2022, and is defined similar to EBIT for taxable years beginning after 12/31/2021. Would not apply to certain regulated public utilities and certain electric cooperatives, floor plan financing interest, and at the taxpayer's election certain real property trades or businesses.</p> <p>Limitation applies to both related-party and unrelated-party debt.</p> <p>Disallowed interest is allowed to be carried forward indefinitely.</p>

<b>Pass-through entities</b>	Income is passed through to the owners to be taxed at the individual rates.	<p>Creates a 20% deduction for non-wage portion of pass-through business income. Deduction is limited to the greater of (a) 50% of the W-2 wages paid with respect to the qualified trade or business, or (b) the sum of 25% of the W-2 wages with respect to the qualified trade or business plus 2.5% of the unadjusted basis, immediately after acquisition, of all qualified property, for taxpayers with income over \$315,000 (married) or \$157,500 (individuals). The 50% limit is phased in over the next \$100,000 (married) of taxable income (\$50,000 for other individuals).</p> <p>Broadens eligibility requirements to include income from trusts and estates.</p> <p>The deduction does not apply to specified services business income, except when income of taxpayers married filing jointly does not exceed \$315,000 (\$157,500 for individuals). The benefit of the deduction is phased out over the same limits as above.</p> <p>Sunsets after 2025.</p>
<b>Domestic production</b>	Deduction up to 9% of qualified income for items manufactured, produced, grown, or extracted in US (6% of qualified income for oil & gas production).	Repeals Section 199 deduction for taxable years beginning after 12/31/2017.
<b>R&amp;D</b>	Regular credit – 20%	<p>Maintains R&amp;D credit.</p> <p>Section 174 research and experimentation expenditures must be capitalized and amortized over a 5-year period (15 years for foreign expenditures) for amounts paid or incurred in tax years beginning after 12/31/2021.</p>
<b>Net operating losses</b>	Carryback up to 2 years and carryforward up to 20 years.	Limit to 80% of taxable income (determined without regard to the deduction) for losses arising in tax years beginning after 12/31/2017. Indefinite carryforward; no carryback.
<b>Like-kind property</b>	Allows deferral of gain from an exchange of 'like-kind' property.	Repeals like-kind exchange except for real property.
<b>Accounting methods</b>	C corporations/ partnerships with a C-corporation partner may only use the cash method of accounting if their average annual gross receipts for the prior 3 tax years do not exceed \$5 million for all prior tax years for tax years beginning after 12/31/2017 and indexed for inflation after 2018.	Increases receipts limit to \$25 million.
<b>Advance refunding bonds</b>	Interest on advance refunding bonds is tax-exempt.	Repeals exemption.
<b>Revision of treatment of contributions to capital</b>	The gross income of a corporation generally does not include contributions to its capital. A debtor corporation that acquires its own debt from a shareholder as a contribution to capital generally will not recognize cancellation of debt income except to the extent the shareholder's basis in such debt is less than the adjusted issue price.	<p>Preserves the current provision under which a corporation's gross income generally does not include contributions to capital, but provides that the term "contributions to capital" does not include (1) any contribution in aid of construction or any other contribution as a customer or potential customer, and (2) any contribution by any governmental entity or civic group (other than a contribution made by a shareholder as such).</p> <p>Section 118, as modified, continues to apply only to corporations.</p>



<b>Capitalization of certain policy acquisition expenses</b>	Certain policy acquisition expenses, such as commissions, are required to be capitalized over 120 months. A special rule provides for 60-month amortization of the first \$5 million of certain policy acquisition expenses, with a phase-out.	Extends the amortization period for specified policy acquisition expenses from a 120-month period to a 180-month period and modifies the specific percentage of net premiums deductible for certain insurance contracts.
<b>FDIC premium deduction</b>	FDIC premiums are deductible once the all events test for the premium is satisfied.	Phases out deductions for any FDIC premiums paid by financial institution groups with assets between \$10 billion and \$50 billion.
<b>Entertainment deduction</b>	Employers may deduct 50% of business-related entertainment costs.	Repeals deduction.
<b>Moving expense deduction</b>	Provides deductions for certain moving expenses.	Repeals deduction, except for those in the Armed Forces.
<b>Moving expense reimbursement exclusion</b>	Employer-provided reimbursements for certain moving expenses are excluded from income.	Repeals exclusion.
<b>Transportation and parking</b>	Employers may deduct cost of certain benefits provided, such as transportation and parking.	Repeals deduction.

#### International provisions

Provision	Prior law	2017 tax reform act
<b>International tax regime</b>	'Worldwide' system with foreign tax credits to mitigate double taxation.	'Territorial' system 100% foreign dividend exemption.
<b>Repatriation 'toll tax'</b>	No provision. Previously untaxed foreign earnings: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 35% corporate rate when repatriated with foreign tax credit.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Imposes a one-time tax on previously untaxed foreign earnings (determined as of November 2, 2017 or December 31, 2017, whichever amount is higher). High-level details regarding the one-time toll tax include the following: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 15.5% tax on cash and cash-equivalents;</li> <li>• 8% tax on non-cash assets;</li> <li>• Payable over 8 years in increasing installments;</li> <li>• Proportional reduction in foreign tax credits attributable to previously untaxed foreign earnings; and</li> <li>• Election to preserve NOLs and opt out of utilizing such NOLs to offset the mandatory inclusion.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>

<b>Anti-base erosion regime (Subpart F)</b>	<p>Subpart F anti-deferral regime includes CFC's insurance income, foreign base company income, etc., with foreign tax credit.</p> <p>Inclusion only required if CFC in existence for 30 days or more during its taxable year.</p>	<p>Subpart F regime generally maintained. Inclusion rule changed to require inclusion by a US shareholder of a foreign corporation if the corporation is a CFC at any time during its taxable year. Certain other modifications made related to stock attribution rules and the definition of a US shareholder. Other amendments, not provided here, were also made to the subpart F regime.</p> <p>In addition, a US shareholder of a CFC must include its proportionate share of GILTI in gross income. Generally, a US shareholder's GILTI is equal to an amount by which its aggregate pro rata share of net CFC tested income exceeds a specified return.</p> <p>A specified return is equal to 10% of a shareholder's aggregate pro rata share of qualified business asset investment (QBAI) and is reduced by interest expense taken into account in determining net CFC tested income. A domestic corporation can deduct 50% (37.5% after 2025) of GILTI included in gross income. GILTI after the 50% deduction is effectively taxed at 10.5% (13.125% after 2025) before consideration of foreign taxes.</p>
<b>Incentive for US production for sale to foreign customers</b>	Not provided.	<p>A 37.5% FDII deduction is allowed for foreign-derived intangible income produced in the US. The deduction is reduced to 21.875% for tax years starting after 12/31/2025.</p>
<b>Anti-base erosion regime and related party payments</b>	No provision.	<p>Imposes the BEAT minimum tax equal to excess of (i) 10% (5% for 2018 and 12.5% for tax years beginning after 12/31/2025) of taxable income determined without regard to base erosion payments (i.e., deductible payments to a related foreign person); over (ii) regular tax liability reduced by certain credits. (Higher rates apply for certain banks and securities dealers.)</p> <p>Modified taxable income is reduced by payments to the extent they are subject to the 30% tax on US source FDAP income.</p>
<b>Related-party amounts paid or accrued in hybrid transactions or with hybrid entities</b>	No provision.	<p>Denies a deduction for interest or royalties paid or accrued to a related party in connection with a hybrid transaction or a hybrid entity, to the extent that the related party does not have a corresponding inclusion or is allowed a deduction with respect to the amount paid for foreign tax purposes.</p>
<b>Limitation of losses on transfer of foreign corporation</b>	<p>Foreign Corporation - Gain recognized by a US shareholder on the sale or exchange of stock in a foreign corporation is generally treated as a dividend distribution to the extent of the foreign corporation's E&amp;P.</p>	<p>Foreign Corporation - A domestic corporation is required to reduce the basis of its stock in a foreign subsidiary by the amount of any exempt dividend received, but only for purposes of determining the amount of a loss on the sale or exchange of the stock.</p>
<b>Recapture of post-2017 branch losses upon outbound incorporation</b>	<p>Foreign Branch - Gain must be recognized on an outbound transfer of the assets of a foreign branch with previously deducted losses; recaptured losses limited to gain in assets transferred.</p>	<p>Foreign Branch - Branch losses subject to recapture when substantially all of foreign branch assets transferred to a foreign corporation; recapture amount not gain-limited; reduced by branch income in post-loss tax years, OFL recapture, gain recognized on transfer.</p>

<b>Foreign tax credit</b>	<p>A taxpayer can generally take a credit or deduction for foreign taxes paid or accrued.</p> <p>US corporate shareholder may be deemed to pay foreign income taxes paid by a foreign corporation when the US shareholder receives a dividend from a foreign corporation or includes earnings of a foreign corporation in gross income.</p>	<p>Repeals indirect tax credit for dividends received from a foreign corporation, which eliminates the need for computing and tracking cumulative tax pools. Retains deemed paid tax credit for subpart F inclusions.</p> <p>No foreign tax credit or deduction permitted for non-taxed portion of mandatory repatriation.</p> <p>Indirect credit properly attributable to GILTI inclusion limited to 80%.</p> <p>No foreign tax credit or deduction permitted for any taxes paid or accrued with respect to any dividend subject to the new deduction for foreign dividends.</p> <p>No foreign tax credit or deduction permitted upon receipt of hybrid dividend, which provides a tax benefit (e.g., deduction) under foreign law upon payment.</p>
<b>Foreign tax credit limitation</b>	<p>Amount of credit is subject to a limitation based on the taxpayer's foreign source income. Limitation applies separately with respect to passive category income and general category income ('baskets').</p>	<p>Adds separate baskets for foreign branch income and GILTI.</p> <p>No carryforward or carryback of excess taxes in GILTI separate category.</p>
<b>Allocation of interest expense</b>	<p>Members of a US affiliated group can allocate interest expense based on fair market value or adjusted tax basis of assets.</p>	<p>Members of a US affiliated group must allocate interest expense based on the adjusted tax basis of assets.</p>
<b>Transfers of property from US to foreign corporation</b>	<p>In general, an exchange in which a US person transfers property to a foreign corporation is not eligible for non-recognition treatment.</p> <p>Under the active trade or business exception, certain property transferred to a foreign corporation for use in the active conduct of a trade or business outside of the United States is eligible for non-recognition.</p>	<p>Repeals the active trade or business exception.</p>

### Individual provisions

Provision	Prior law	2017 tax reform act
<b>Individual rates</b>	Seven rate brackets (10%, 15%, 25%, 28%, 33%, 35%, and 39.6%).	Seven rate brackets (10%, 12%, 22%, 24%, 32%, 35%, and 37%). Sunsets after 2025.
<b>AMT</b>	AMT imposed when minimum tax exceeds regular income tax.	Increases individual AMT exemption amounts and phase-out thresholds. Sunsets after 2025.
<b>Individual – standard deduction</b>	\$6,500 for single filers/ \$13,000 joint filers (2018).	\$12,000 for single filers/ \$24,000 joint returns (adjusted for inflation based on chained CPI). Increased deduction sunsets after 2025. Chained CPI does not expire after 2025.
<b>Personal exemption</b>	\$4,150 for each person, spouse, and dependents (2018).	Repeals deduction for personal exemptions. Sunsets after 2025.
<b>Overall itemized deductions</b>	Itemized deduction phase out begins at \$320,000 for joint filers and \$266,700 for single filers (2018).	No overall limitation on itemized deductions. Repeals certain other itemized deductions. Sunsets after 2025.
<b>State and local tax deduction</b>	Itemized deductions for state and local income and sales taxes and state and local property taxes.	Retains a deduction in aggregate for state and local property taxes, state and local income taxes, or state and local general sales taxes up to \$10,000. Sunsets after 2025.
<b>Mortgage interest deduction</b>	Mortgage interest deduction limited to acquisition debt of \$1 million and home equity debt of \$100k on a principal and second home.	Retains current-law limitation for existing acquisition debt; acquisition debt limited to \$750,000 for newly purchased homes, available for a first or second home. Repeals deduction for non-acquisition HELOCs. Sunsets after 2025.
<b>Child tax credit</b>	\$1,050 per child.	\$2,000 per child (\$1,400 refundable) and \$500 for non-child dependents. Sunsets after 2025.
<b>Estate tax</b>	Maximum 40% rate for taxable estates exceeding \$5.6 million (2018 indexed amount).	Doubles exemption amounts. Sunsets after 2025.
<b>Carried interest</b>	Taxed at capital gains rates.	Imposes a 3-year holding period requirement for qualification as long-term capital gain with respect to certain partnership interests received in connection with the performance of services.
<b>ACA Individual Mandate</b>	For tax year 2017, the payment is 2.5% of a household's AGI or a flat rate of \$695/adult and \$347.50/child, up to a maximum of \$2,085.	Reduces the amount of the individual mandate payment to \$0 beginning after December 31, 2018.
<b>Excessive employee remuneration for covered officials</b>	Corporate salaries of 'covered officials' have a \$1 million cap on deduction. Exception for performance-based compensation.	Compensation paid by publicly traded entities to executives is subject to a \$1 million deduction limit. Repeals the exception for performance-based compensation.

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